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Howard Simson

The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and its Apartheid Policy

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A sketch of the formation of the peripheral capitalist society in South Africa at the turn of this century revealed that the fundamental social relationship established was that of British mining and Boer (Afrikaner) farming capital exploiting the labour of the African masses. The rapid pace of industrialization after 1933 upset the traditional cheap labour system by providing a higher paying alternative source of employment for some African workers. Hence in the 1940's a rift developed in the power bloc between the secondary and primary industries, the latter demanding State intervention to protect their labour supply. Secondary industrialization also led to African trade unionism and political consciousness, which challenged the "colonial" social order.

The Afrikaner fascist movement grew up in the wake of the Great Depression as a reaction to the destructive effects of monopoly capitalist development on the agrarian community. The movement aimed to unite rural and urban Afrikaners of all social strata and to achieve State power. The fascist Nationalist Party narrowly won the 1948 election (in which only whites participated), by promising to uphold the material and social interests of the Afrikaner farmers and wage earners against the threat posed by the urbanization of the Africans.

The fascist regime set about implementing its Aprtheid policy, which essentially meant the repression of Black (African, Coloured and Indian) trade union and political rights. In this respect, the function of Afrikaner fascism closely resembled that of European fascism, for both ruthlessly suppressed the working class to the advantage of monopoly capital. In addition, the regimes had similar a social basis and ideology.

Howard Simson Ekonomisk-Historiska institutionen, Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

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Howard Simson

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TO MY MOTHER AND THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

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INTRODUCTION: THE DUAL OBJECTIVE

South African society has largely been shaped by the forces of monopoly capitalism in the twentieth century. Yet, it is the racial dimension, rather than the class dimension, which has been the primary point of departure in studies of the society. By placing the racial factor at the centre of one's focus and emphasizing its "uniqueness", one blocks the path towards a scientific and comparative analysis of the social system, and thereby obscures the exploitative role of the monopoly capitalist ruling class.

In 1948 the fascist Nationalist Party came to power and began implementing its racist Apartheid policy; this led South Africa to become an international pariah in the subsequent decades. An adequate explanation of a complex social phenomenon like Afrikaner fascism should comprise three dimensions: firstly, a genetic dimension or uncovering the social conditions of its origins; secondly, a functional dimension or determining its objective social function within capitalist society; thirdly, a phenomenological dimension or explaining the ideological and organizational form of the fascist movement.[1]

This study has a dual objective. The first objective is to adequately explain Afrikaner fascism within all three of the above dimensions. The weight of analysis will be placed on the genetic dimension of the explanation, because only by analysing the historical formation of social classes and their economically determined contradictions can we reach an understanding of the nature of fascism.

The second objective is to examine Afrikaner fascism in relation to a general theory of fascism. It is my contention that Christian-Nationalism is the Afrikaner variety of National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy. In this opinion I am not alone, for there have been a number of studies which have identified crucial similarities in the character of these regimes.

In Chapter 2, I point out the theoretical deficiencies in the existent comparative studies of Afrikaner and European fascism; these inadequacies have led to contradictory results. A common error has been the tendency to equate racial ideology and fascism. I hope to clear up some of the confusion surrounding this subject by analysing their structural similarities and differences on the basis of a Marxist theory of fascism (outlined in Chapter 1.2). The comparative analysis of fascism is found in Chapter 6.

Until the 1970's, scholarly analysis of the Apartheid system and South African history in general had scarcely been undertaken by Marxists. Instead there had been a monopoly of idealistic interpretation of the historical development. It was commonly thought that Marxism was incapable of throwing light on the South African society, where "race struggle" rather than "class struggle" was the "obvious" determining factor. A sketch of Marxist theory has been included in Chapter 1.1.

In Chapter 3 we begin the study of the social origins of Afrikaner fascism and its Apartheid policy by sketching the formation of the South African capitalist society at the turn of the century. Then we will explore the changes in the socio-economic structure, 1933 to 1948, which created the necessary conditions for the rise of fascism (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5 we will analyse the organization and struggle of the "Purified" Nationalists in the 1930's, and show how they successfully exploited the political crisis of the 1940's in their rise to power.

Finally, I should point out that this study is not a full-bodied "history" of the period, but takes the form of an historical sketch. While this sketch is based upon a survey of the available information about the period, it is distinguishable from earlier explanations of the "rise of Afrikanerdom." It aims to produce a new synthesis by using a new combination of concepts to analyse this object.

Chapter 1

A SKETCH OF MARXIST METHODOLOGY AND FASCIST THEORY

1.1. Marxist Methodology

The object of our study, Afrikaner fascism, is a complex social phenomenon which requires a method of analysis of corresponding complexity. The Marxist method is in my opinion the most fruitful for the study of social phenomena in general, and in particular, it is of decisive value as a guide to understanding the functioning of capitalist society.

Marxism is not an agreed upon doctrine to be absorbed as a whole, rather it is a body of concepts derived from the works of Karl Marx and his followers. Marx's express aim was to change the world, in contrast to the prevailing tendency for intellectuals to merely interpret it. However, to change "the world" it is necessary to have a theoretical knowledge of it which will guide practice and will be enriched by the increased knowledge of the object obtained through practice, i.e., the success or failure of practice.

This need for theoretical knowledge is expressed in Lenin's proverbial statement: "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." But what do we mean by a theory of knowledge of an object like human society?

1.1.1. Materialist Epistemology

In order to understand Marx's materialist epistemology and its relevance for historiography, I will proceed by contrasting Mao Tse-tung's "empiricist" view of it with Althusser's "theoreticist" viewpoint.

One of the clearest presentations of Marx's epistemology is that of Mao Tse-tung in his pamphlet On Practice. Here we find a division between perceptual and rational knowledge and a dialectical relationship between the two types of knowledge. Starting at the perceptual pole, or what we might call "vision" or "experience" of reality, we build up

ever more sophisticated theoretical or rational knowledge of reality itself. "Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge - this is the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge." [1]

Now it is precisely this type of epistemology which has been strongly criticized for its "empiricism" by Althusser. In his view, the empiricist error evident in this approach is an implicit belief that "reality" can be directly perceived. In contrast his view is that "we must abandon the mirror myth of immediate vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a production". [2] In particular, the Althusserian theory reverses Mao's version of movement from perceptual to rational knowledge and argues that Marxist epistemology is specifically grounded on the understanding that in practice we move from the abstract to the concrete. Thus the empirical facts are not merely perceived, but are appropriated by an abstract methodology or "problematic" (a system of concepts or questions) which is the implicit or explicit starting-point of the observer.

Following Marx's reasoning in the Grundrisse. Mandel points out that,

> a progression from the abstract to the concrete is necessarily preceded ... by a progression from the concrete to the abstract. For the abstract itself is already the result of a previous work of analysis, which has sought to separate the concrete into its "determinant relations". [3]

However the prior step, which Mao correctly identified as the "materialism of the theory of knowledge", [4] is in practice (e.g. the writing of history) always built into the initial chosen theoretical apparatus. It is in this sense that we can appreciate why Marx saw the concrete as both the "point of departure in reality" and the product of thought. [5]

Althusser is aware of the fact that "the absolute reference point for the process of knowledge" is the real object. [6] But in contrast to Mao he presents a complex view similar to that of Marx, which posits that theory is the initial guiding light to knowledge of reality, or in Sartre's terms, "living Marxism is heuristic, its principles and its

prior knowledge appears as regulative in relation to concrete research". [7] But they can be regulative only in so far as they are objective and not just figments of the imagination. In addition, we must assume that from a genetic point of view the ultimate source of concepts and abstractions is concrete reality.

So whereas Mao's general theory would be regarded as "empiricist" by Althusser, the latter's theory is according to his own confession "theoreticist". [8] For it tends to place scientific knowledge above society, by implying that the refinement of concepts (the goal of science in his theory) can take place at the theoretical level alone, i.e., he ignores the dialect between theory and reality. Although Althusser has been heavily criticized for his idealism, he is generally acknowledged to have done Marxism a service by helping to bring to the foreground the problem of the relationship between theoretical and empirical knowledge, between idealism and empiricism. [9]

1.1.2. History and its Evaluation

> The facts are really not all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use - these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large the historian will get the kind of facts he wants. [10]

In his book History and Truth, Schaff described the implications of the materialist epistemology for historiography. He pointed out the complicated nature of the "historical fact",

> which from the point of view of its ontological status is a segment of history, of objective reality and from the point of view of its gnoseological status is, just as in all other cases of cognitive relation, a product of a specific mutual interaction of the subject and the object. While remaining a solid element of objective reality, which exists outside of any cognizing mind and independent of it, the historical fact is simultaneously a specific product whose origin is affected by the mind of the historian. [11]

Thus we see the dual nature of the historical fact; it is both a "real" element and a "product" of the historian's mind. This latter aspect requires further elucidation.

In line with the "fishing" analogy cited above, Schaff reached the important conclusion that,

> ... the selection of material which goes to constitute an historical fact is not arbitrary ... The historian contributes to the constituting of a fact a determined selection of objectively existing material, objectively present connections and mutual interactions, etc. The criterion of selection, as well as the criterion of endowing the chosen material with an inner structure, differ depending on the theory that rests at their foundation. Some theory must rest at the foundation of this action ... It is clear, of course, that the results of such different selections are also varied. [12]

Furthermore, he comments that,

> /t/he historian commences his work not with facts, but with historical materials, with sources in the broadest meaning of this word, from which he constructs that what we call historical facts. He constructs them both in the sense that he appropriately selects the material which he has at his disposal, employing some criteria of importance, as well as in the sense that he articulates the source material endowing it with the appropriate shape of historical events. In spite of appearances, historical facts are thus not the starting-point, but the end, the result. [13]

Now if the chosen theory and the subjective factor (e.g. class conditioning of the historian) are decisive in the "construction" of history, it seems that we are faced with a problem of relativity, i.e., one historical construction is as "true" as another. However this is only an apparent problem, for if we take "truth to be a process of accumulation of partial truths" rather than "absolute truth", we can acknowledge that despite the intervention of the "subjective factor" the historian is capable of producing new partial truths. [14]

Bearing in mind that "the subject of historical inquiry and cognition is always the complete historical process, although we realize the aim by studying fragments of the whole", [15] we can evaluate the "partial

truth" generating capacity of various explicit or implicit general social theories by testing their internal consistency and their ability to explain the maximum number of facts (i.e. the reality principle). [16]

In connection with the issue of verification, we refer to Dobb's reply to Popper's well known criticism of Marxism as a science, on account of its unfalsifiability.

> Unlike more particular statements, such a conceptual framework is not easily verified or disproved. Indeed, what would seem to be relevant here is not so much whether it is stated or not in a potentially 'testable' or 'falsifiable' form (the Popper-criterion), but rather the degree of generality of statement, which is what renders it remote from the actual possibility of empirical disproof. [17]

1.1.3. Dialectical and Historical Materialism

Historical materialism, the name given to the Marxist conception of social phenomena, is strongly influenced by the principles of logic developed by Hegel. The concepts "dialectics", "totality" and "contradiction" were essential to Hegel's idealist philosophy and were absorbed into Marx's materialist philosophy. In reviewing Marx's relation to Hegel, Nicolaus makes the following comments: [18]

> In short, for Marx, as for Hegel, the problem of grasping a thing is firstly a problem of grasping that it is in motion ... but ordinarily, things present an appearance of rest. (p. 30) ... The whole is in motion, the totality of it develops, it all had a beginning and implies an end. (p. 29) ... This method, whose essence is to grasp wholes as contradictions, is the greatest of the lessons Marx learned from Hegel. (p. 33)

However Marx was a materialist, so it was necessary for him to criticize Hegel's theory which regarded "consciousness" or ideas as the primary element governing human society's development. According to Nicolaus, Marx's critique of Hegel was a process in two major logical phases:

> The first of these major phases required getting a grip on the entire realm of the "independent objective Mind" which Hegel had sent floating into the heavens and returning it

> to its native residence in the mortal human body. At once Hegel's "subject" and Hegel's "object" will be found to have been upside down, and are now right side up again. It becomes clear now that the real history of the world is not the product of a sui generis "Mind", but rather that this "Mind" and all its relations are a product of the human head; and, moreover, of a human head anchored in real history, both driven and limited by particular, changing social-economic modes of existence; finally a human head integrated into a sensual, material and social body which, by its conduct, can and does alter its history, and therefore alters also the sources and conditions of thought ....(p. 33)
> This second major phase in the overthrow of the Hegelian system Marx formulates as "stripping off the mystical shell from the rational core". This is the critique of Hegel's dialectical method, therefore a critique of his theory of contradiction, hence a critique of the fundamental processes of the Hegelian concept, of Hegel's basic grasp of movement. (p. 34).... For Marx, the identity of opposites is conditional; but their non-identity, their struggle, antagonism and break-up are inevitabilities. Just the opposite in Hegel. It is the difference between a conciliatory, harmonizing "dialectic" (ultimately no dialectic at all), and a revolutionary, subversive method. (p. 41)

This theoretical supercession of dialectical idealism by dialectical materialism, a product of the industrial and bourgeois revolutions, laid the philosophical foundations upon which historical materialism or the Marxist science of history was built.

If society is to be grasped as a whole in motion it is necessary to discover the specific contradiction rooted in its underlying material base. This will make possible an explanation of the dynamics of the system.

Marx solved the problem of social dynamics with his conception of the "mode of production", described by Vilar as follows:

> Its originality ... lies ... in the fact that this was the first theoretical object which expressed a social whole ... The second originality of the mode of production ... is that it is a structure of functioning development, and as such is neither formal nor static. Its third originality is that such a structure itself implies the (economic) principle of the (social) contradiction which bears with it the necessity of its destruction as a structure, of its own destructuration. [19]

The importance of the methodological starting point in the field of economics is stressed by Dobb, when he points out that the question as to whether society or the individual is made the point of departure of analysis is the great dividing line in economic thought.

> The important, but much-to-seldom noticed, consequence of this contrast between the classical approach and the modern follows directly from what has been said: namely, that in the former income-distribution is treated as being the result of social institutions (e.g. property ownership) and social relations, whereas in the latter it is determined by the conditions of exchange. [20]

We conclude this discussion of the "economic" realm with a brief outline of the fundamentals of Marx's dynamic model of capitalism. Capitalism is a system motivated by production for profit and not production for social ends. The rate of profit is, therefore, the chief determinant of the process of capital accumulation. Now the rate of profit is dependent on the "rate of surplus value" (i.e. the ratio of profits to wages) and the "organic composition of capital" (i.e. the ratio of "constant" to "variable" capital). The influence of technical progress is to alter the organic composition of capital, generally in the direction of raising the ratio of constant to variable capital. Hence, the tendency of industrial progress to lower the rate of profit, if not off-set by a corresponding rise of the rate of surplus value. [21] Of particular importance are the "counteracting tendencies" to a decline in the rate of profit. The chief of these is an increase of "relative surplus value", the effect of which is to increase the "annual rate of surplus value" to off-set the fall in the rate of profit.

> Marx undoubtedly conceived the situation as one in which the actual value-changes that emerged were resultant of an interaction of technical changes and the particular configuration of class relations which prevailed at the given time and stage. The whole emphasis of his approach was on the dominating influence of the latter in shaping the "law of motion of economic society". [22]

1.1.4. The Scientific Status of Marxism

"The chief aim of science,"according to Bunge, "is the explanation, and application of laws." [23] Hence, science implies a principle of determinancy or lawful production, which he defines as follows:

> Determinism in the large sense is that ontological theory whose necessary and sufficient components are: the genetic principle, or principle of productivity, according to which nothing can arise out of nothing or pass into nothing; and the principle of lawfulness, stating that nothing happens in an unconditional and altogether irregular way, in short in a lawless arbitrary manner. The two principles can be conjoined to yield the following sentence: Everything is determined in accordance with laws by something else, this something else being the external as well as the internal conditions of the object in question. [24]

It can readily be justified that Marxism is scientific in the above sense. It has formulated a set of structured laws which determine the development of the capitalism mode of production and by applying these laws seeks to explain the actual historical process. Of particular interest is the fact that the scientific procedure incorporates the genetic principle. This principle lays emphasis on the explanation of the origins of a particular phenomenon in order to throw light on its later structural form. A genetic explanation may be looked upon as a form of causal explanation.

1.1.5. Historical Explanation

The problems of explanation in the social sciences are extremely complex. So far, we have indicated some of the issues involved in historical explanation. In particular the relation between theory and the empirical facts, the subjective factor in the choice of a methodological starting point, and the scientific status of Marxism have been touched upon.

In an illuminating chapter on the subject of explanation in history, Schaff has outlined the essential duality of historical explanation:

> Causal explanation in history always goes hand in hand with teleological explanation (p. 209).... In both cases what matters is the answer to the question, Why?, but in each of them the nature of the answer, both formal and substantial is different. In the first case, the answer of "because of g", in the second: "in order that g". (p. 201)

As we shall see these two types of explanations may be regarded as two species of the same genus.

1.1.5.1. Causal Explanation

The causal explanation is complicated "because it can be taken either as a search for sufficient conditions (the stronger meaning) or only for necessary conditions (the weaker meaning)". (p. 202) However, due to the impossibility of exhausting the sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event, as well as the imprecision of the premises of the starting condition and the assumed hypotheses (which accord to some general law), historical explanations can only be probabilistic and incomplete. (p. 204) Given that historical explanation takes the form of an "explanation sketch" and that what matters is the necessary condition of the event and not the sufficient condition, the problem arises as to the determination of the "importance" of various causes of an event. Schaff argues that the isolation of the causes of an event always involves a "selection", i.e. we ascertain the greater or lesser "importance" of events by means of a certain system of reference. (p. 206)

1.1.5.2. Teleological Explanation

In the second type of explanation we answer the question, Why?, "by pointing to the aim ... (which motivated people acting in a specific fashion) ... (p. 209) while the event or activity being elucidated serves as a means to its realization". (p. 202) In this case we are concerned with a purposive explanation. Here again the subjective factor in historical cognition is explicitly introduced for the following reasons:

> In order to recreate the aim which marked the human action being studied, we must understand the motivation of the people who were acting; this comprehension, which is a subject-object

> relation, assumes the active role of the subject and thereby introduces the subjective factor into cognition. (p. 220)

Schaff points out that the purposive explanation is only appropriate when we are dealing with "conscious action and its effects, when the aim is to explain the actions of beings who consciously set themselves specific aims and adapt to them action directed at the fulfilment of these aims". (p. 209) He argues that while materialism generally rejects teleologism as a universal principle for the explanation of the events of reality, "everywhere where the subject of our studies is man, acting socially ... we must undertake purposive explanation of his actions in order to avoid failure to understand them" (p. 211), i.e., intentions are causally connected to the actions they explain.

Although it is impossible to explain the past without understanding human action, we do not eliminate the action of other factors such as the causal conditioning of the stands and behaviour of people, i.e., the existence of deeper social determinants than those of which the actors are themselves conscious. In fact, teleological explanation may be looked upon as a sub-class of causal explanation, since aims and purposes could be perceived as a part of antecedent conditions.

On account of this breach between social consciousness and its determinants, the former is often transformed from rational reflection into "false consciousness", i.e., the subject is unable to penetrate the opaqueness of the social whole. False consciousness is of special importance when it clouds exploitative class domination. Given the necessarily mythical quality of social consciousness, it is not surprising to find Schaff explaining that men generally suffer from "auto-mystification" and that even in cases where they were consciously lying, most often, such actions were perceived as necessary in the interests of humanity or, at least, of their own nation. Otherwise "they would not have been capable of such exuberant zeal, or even fanaticism, in actions which were quite often criminal". (p. 213) The relevance of these last comments to the perpetrators of the Apartheid policy will be explored later on.

1.1.5.3. Marx's Explanation of an Historical Event

The methodology I have chosen to use in my study of the social origins of Afrikaner fascism is that of Marx. I have indicated the nature of the Marxist methodology, its emphasis on grasping the social whole in motion and the specificity of the laws governing the operation of the capitalist mode of production. In the following extract from the preface to The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx criticized the explanations put forward by his contemporaries for the coup d'état and simultaneously expressed the fundamentals of his own method of historical explanation:

> Of the writings dealing with the same subject approximately at the same time as mine, only two deserve notice: Victor Hugo's Napoleon le Petit and Proudhon's Coup d'Etat. Victor Hugo confines himself to bitter and witty invective against the responsible publisher of the coup d'état. The event itself appears in his work like a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history. Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the coup d'état as the result of an antecedent historical development. Unnoticeably, however, his historical construction of the coup d'état becomes an historical apologia for its hero. Thus he falls into an error of our so-called objective historians. I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part. [25]

According to Marx, Hugo's explanation fails to take account of the socio-economic dimension, whereas Proudhon's eliminates the conscious role of Bonaparte. In contrast his own method combines both structural causality and purposive action, demonstrating how the former created the opportunity for the success of the latter.

1.2. Aspects of the Marxist Theory of Fascism

1.2.1. A Preliminary Definition of Fascism

The development of the theoretical analysis of fascism is dependent upon the development of the theory of capitalist society in gen-

eral. For fascism is a complex phenomenon, the understanding of which necessitates a theory of crisis and transition, a theory of the state, economics, politics and ideology. Only a theoretical combination of all the above elements will make it possible to grasp the meaning of fascism.

Fascism has traditionally been the object of study of bourgeois and Marxist oriented scholars, both groups have sought to elaborate a general theory of fascism. [26] We are aware of the importance of the researcher's initial focus or problematic in the establishment of theoretical boundaries, i.e., the limits of permissible forms of generalization and questions to be answered. [27] It is, therefore, quite understandable that there is little agreement as to how broad a general theory of fascism may be without losing its relevance. Whereas bourgeois theorists tend to place emphasis on the phenomenological dimension of fascism, Marxists tend to emphasize its functional dimension. Yet, an adequate explanation of fascism should comprise three dimensions: firstly, a genetic dimension, i.e., under what conditions and situations it arose; secondly, a functional dimension, i.e., what is its objective social role in the class struggle between monopoly capital and the working class; thirdly, a phenomenological dimension, i.e., its ideological and organizational form. [28]

On the basis of these theoretical requirements we reach the following preliminary definition of fascism:

Fascism is an exceptional capitalist state form. The necessary conditions for its coming to power are generally: the rise of imperialism and monopoly capital, and the democratization of "the masses" via a parliamentary system and trade unions; and specifically: a political crisis, determined in the last instance by contradictions in the process of capital accumulation, with the following decisive characteristics:

1) A non-revolutionary conjuncture, i.e., the working class is divided and on the defensive, the ruling class is on the offensive.

2) An hegemonic crisis of the ruling class entailing its loss of hegemony over the petty bourgeois and working class masses, and a consequent generalized ideological crisis.

3) A crisis of the power bloc, due to its inability to overcome severe internal contradictions and its inability to resolve its conflicts with the masses.

4) The mobilization by a fascist party of a powerful mass movement based predominantly on the petty bourgeoisie, using a combination of legal and violent tactics and a "radical" hypernationalist anti-working class ideological appeal.

The distinctive characteristics of the fascist regime are:

1) A single mass party with a totalitarian guiding ideology.

2) The destruction and prevention of the independent organizations of the working class by the state and their replacement by a bureaucratic system of administration, i.e., the working class is excluded from.

3) The replacement of key personnel and lower echelons of the state apparatuses by members of the fascist party and hence the "extreme" political autonomy of the state from the traditional ruling class.

4) This distance from the power bloc permits fascism to mediate in the crisis of the power bloc and establish the conditions for the hegemony of monopoly capital.

5) Great expansion of monopoly capital, in the name of a strong national economy, and at the expense of a suppressed working class. A vast increase in state intervention in the economy.

6) Wide extension of the role of the political police and other state repressive and ideological apparatuses, in order to maintain fascist power in the face of constant opposition from all quarters of society. For fascism never removes the inherent contradictions of capitalism. Hence, the class struggle continues beneath the frozen surface, occasionally erupting openly.

The above definition is primarily based upon Poulantzas' theory of fascism.[29] As to the first condition of the political crisis causing the establishment of a fascist regime (the non-revolutionary conjuncture), it might be added that the defensive situation of the working class does not refer to the long-run perspective. Indeed, fascism is historically connected with the rise of the working class, the gravedigger of capitalism.

1.2.2. A Few Theoretical Considerations

The distinguishing feature of Marxist theories of fascism is the attempt to explain fascism as a phenomenon of capitalism. Horkheimer's challenging statement that: "/a/nyone who does not wish to discuss capitalism should also stay silent on the subject of fascism", is the guiding light of all Marxist theories of fascism. Though, as Poulantzas has noted, a more precisely worded statement would be, "it is he who does not wish to discuss imperialism who should stay silent of the subject of fascism". [30]

Yet fascism has not been easy to grasp theoretically, its enigmatic quality explains why it is open to such a wide range of interpretation. This enigma lies in the contradiction between the social basis of the fascist-movement, its ideological mystique, and the objective social function which fascist regimes have played. Togliatti observed in his Lectures on Fascism that fascism involved the connection of two elements in capitalist society: the movement of the petty-bourgeois masses and the dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie. [31]

It is clear that fascism served the interests of capital at the expense of labour and that the mass base of the fascist movements was primarily constituted by the petty-bourgeoisie (the lower middle class). What remains to be explained however, is how these two elements were historically linked up.

Most theories of fascism relate exclusively to the experiences of Italy and Germany and consequently limit the possibility of a general theory of fascism being applicable to similar social phenomena in the "third world". [32] It is not always the intention of the authors to restrict the theory in this way, for they often admit the possibility of fascism arising in a different social setting. But as a result of the predominance of European fascism, theories tend to be constructed on a Eurocentric basis. This is usually a hypostatization of German and Italian conditions, a model comprised of "essential" elements which are often merely theoretical descriptions of European events.

Of central importance to any theory of fascism is the conception of the role of the state in capitalist society. For fascism is "a specific form of regime within the exceptional capitalist State form". [33] Hence, it is distinguishable from other state forms such as bourgeois democracy, military dictatorship, and Bonapartism. So, the fascist state is an exceptional state form which emerges as a solution to a specific socio-economic crisis. The precise knowledge of this crisis is the first step towards a theory of fascism.

We can distinguish two different tendencies in theories of the state in capitalist society. The first lays emphasis on the political function of the state as upholder of bourgeois class rule. The second stresses the role of the state as guarantor of total capital's rate of profit and directs attention to the economic function of the bourgeois state. We will examine both ingreater detail.

The concept of the "relative independence" of the bourgeois state was first formulated by Engels in the course of his defence of Marxism against economistic tendencies which reduced the political sphere to a reflection of the economic. [34] According to Engels the relative indepenpendence of the state is especially pronounced in historical periods characterized by a balance between two classes competing for power. Relative autonomy, according to Miliband,

> simply consists in the degree of freedom which the state (normally meaning in this context the executive power) has in determining how best to serve what those who hold power conceive to be the "national interest", and which in fact involves the service of the interests of the ruling class. [35]

And according to Poulantzas, "the very principles of the Marxist theory of the State lay down the general negative limits of this autonomy. The (capitalist) State, in the long run, can only correspond to the political interests of the dominant class or classes". [36]

Gramsci, by means of the theory of "hegemony", was the first Marxist to explore the political field in any depth. [37] According to Hobsbawm, this theory postulated that,

> a ruling class relies not only on coercive power and authority but on consent deriving from hegemony - what Gramsci calls "the intellectual and moral leadership" exercised by the ruling group and "the general direction imposed upon social life by the dominant fundamental group" ... What is new in Gramsci is the observation that even bourgeois hegemony in not automatic but achieved through conscious political action and organisation. [38]

Poulantzas added a number of new concepts, e.g., the "power bloc" (i.e., the politically dominant classes and/or fractions, conceived of as an unstable alliance), and he defined the capitalist state as follows:

> /s/till taking the separation of the political and the economic under capitalism ... as our point of departure, the State should be seen (as should capital according to Marx) as a relation, or more precisely as the condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes. In this way we escape the false dilemma entailed by the present discussion on the State, between the State comprehended as a Thing/instrument and the State comprehended as Subject. [39]

However, we cannot merely exclude the latter two aspects of the state in capitalist society, for realistically the state is a combination of all three dimensions: a power relation, an instrument and a bureaucracy.

In opposition to the "political" view of the state, we have theories which start their explanations from the capitalist mode of production and the capital accumulation process. Emphasis is placed on determining the limits of state intervention in the accumulation process, i.e., the economic limits of relative autonomy. Here we find the "capital logic" school which stresses the economic function of the state in maintaining the profitability of total capital, and which tends to reduce the political level to an epiphenomenon.

The classical Marxist theory of the fascist state is found in the Comintern's 1935 thesis on fascism, which defined it "as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital". [40] There is certainly an important truth contained in this definition. However, by viewing fascism as simply the tool of financial capital, other aspects of this complex

phenomenon are obscured. Poulantzas attempted to overcome this limitation by basing his theory on a conception of the fascist state as an extreme form of relative autonomy. This allows him to attribute great importance to the autonomous role of the petty bourgeoisie, and to conceive of fascism as an "alliance" between the petty bourgeoisie and big capital. [41] The rationalé of this "alliance" is, then, the fact that not only big capital but also the petty bourgeoisie may experience the advancing working class as a threat to its class position. Even though the small property of the petty bourgeoisie is continually undermined by monopoly capitalism, it is dependent on the latter and some sections of it entertain hopes of rising to the ranks of big capital. Hence, in times of social crisis the fear of falling into the ranks of the proletariat is likely to turn petty bourgeois anger against the working class and lead it to support a party bent on abolishing classes and the class-struggle.

Another version of the autonomous fascist state is presented in a well known essay by Mason. [42] He argued that the Nazi state, for reasons based on the economic history of Germany, was able to attain complete autonomy from the ruling capitalist class. Nazism after 1936 established the absolute "primacy of politics" over total capital's interests, while at the same time its re-armament program benefitted private capital accumulation. [43] In a more recent article in which he analysed the conjuncture and class struggle in the years preceding Nazism's "seizure of power", Mason argued that in order to avoid a conspiracy theory, emphasis should be placed on "the essential harmony between National Socialism and the interests of big business". [44]

An analysis of a fascist regime will inevitably need to explain what is specifically "fascist" about this system of exceptional capitalism. It is not enough to discover that a particular regime served the interests of private capital accumulation, for any regime which does not overthrow capitalism is more or less obliged to serve total capital. It is the specificity of fascist exploitation which is elusive, and which leads to a wide range of interpretations. A recent analysis has attempted to isolate this dimension, arguing that:

> it derives from /its/ being a type of coercive structure in which the control of the extraction of surplus value is displaced from the labour process to the political process, in a vast enhancement of the state's political role. The fascist regime is the extreme form of the autonomization of politics under capitalism ... /The/ delicately distanced relationship of the political and the economic is explosively compressed under fascism, and the political is enthroned in a threatening autonomy. [45]

In his "capital logic" approach to the fascist period, Altvater, is concerned to show statistically the relationship between capital and labour under Nazism. [46] He ties the rise of fascism directly to the falling rate of profit on total capital in the years preceding the regime and shows how income on capital recovered phenomenally during the period 1933 to 1938. At the other pole of the capital relation, the real wages of the German working class suffered an enormous setback relative to profits, during the same period, a direct result of the smashing of the trade union movement and the terroristic disciplining of the labour-force. [47]

The problem with the "capital logic" theories of fascism is that they tend to see, however nuanced they may be, a direct relation between economics and politics, economic crisis and political crisis. This is a result of their high level of abstraction, for they rarely descend from the pure world of the mode of production and its inner-laws to the impure world of the capitalist social formation, where more than capital's logic is at work. The theory has difficulty in taking account of a "marginal class" like the petty bourgeoisie, which has historically played a pivotal role in the establishment of fascism. Its emphasis on the capital relation tends to result in reductionism and at best it can explain only one important dimension of a complex phenomenon like fascism; its objective social function.

That the theory of fascism still poses problems, is clearly expressed by Østergård in his conclusion to an excellent comprehensive critical survey of the leading theories:

> The difficulty is, that none of the existing theories of fascism have been able to combine a clear comprehension of fascism's meaning for capitalism with a sufficiently nuanced analysis of the determinants of its rise and the

> complex equilibrium which characterised the fascistic power-structure. Either the objective function is subjectified (Mandel and Soviet Marxism) or concrete evidence of fascism's objective meaning disappears in the relativisation of its class basis and unimportant detailed research.
> I cannot solve the problem; it is a part of the still unresolved problem within Marxist theory of the relation between theory and the empirical. The only thing I can do here is to formulate the demand for a much higher degree of explicit consciousness of on what level of social analysis we find ourselves: capital in general or individual capital, the individual or class, sociological, social-psychological or economic analysis. 48

The question arises as to whether the rise of fascism corresponds to a definite level of economic development? This is a crucial question for any general theory of fascism.

In this connection we refer to Poulantzas' discussion of the Third International's underestimation of the danger of fascism in the early 1920's in Germany:

> The important point to understand is why the International was not expecting fascism in Germany. This is related to the explanation it gave for Italian fascism. Fascism, in its view, had come to Italy because of its economic backwardness in capitalist development: it could not be reproduced in Germany because of the advanced economy of such a highly industrialised country. 49

In this obviously economistic argument of the International we find the notion that economic evolution is linear and that the form of the regime bears a direct relationship to the economic base. The fact that fascism occurred in the case of the relatively advanced German economy and the less developed "dualistic" Italian economy, indicates that there is a margin in the necessary level of economic development for fascism's rise to power. We can only conclude that fascism can occur at different levels of capitalist development, the only restriction being that those levels are confined to the stage of monopoly capitalism, i.e, the dominance of monopoly capital is crucial. For fascism is a reaction to the deep social rifts caused by the crisis-ridden development of monopoly capital.

One of the obvious shortcomings of an economistic analysis of fascism is its inability to explain political change. In an attempt to transcend the limits of economism Poulantzas has concentrated his analysis on the specification of the "crisis" to which fascism corresponds. The advantage of this approach is that the concept of a crisis incorporates the complex interaction of all the dimensions of the social whole: the economic, political and ideological. His theory of fascism's rise depends upon the discovery of a specific constellation of factors which are typical of the fascist conjuncture. Thus, Poulantzas' theory of fascism has as its goal the identification of the specific political crisis of fascism, i.e., the features of the class struggle.[50]

It is generally recognized that ideology accounted for much of the success or failure of the fascist movement. What was the nature of its ideological appeal? Culturally fascist thinking was closely linked to the turn of the century "revolt against reason". This reaction against the "process of rationalization" by those segments of society which were least integrated into monopoly capitalist society, (the petty bourgeois youth, the peasants and the new middle-class), expressed itself in terms of an anti-intellectualist appeal based on emotion, myth and idealism. Vitalistic philosophy opposed both positivism and dialectical materialism. Fascism itself was a late-comer on the European political scene which explains the anti-character of its ideology. However, its ideology was also characterized by a crucial positive dimension, namely, its goal of establishing a "people's community" in which class conflict would be eliminated while class stratification would persist i.e. corporatism. This extreme form of "false consciousness" in a sense corresponds perfectly to the social situation of the petty bourgeoisie in a period of crisis, when it finds itself caught between the hammer of big capital and the anvil of the working class. The distinctive anti-positions of fascist ideology also ultimately stem from this social situation and the lack of a constructive social perspective. The most important of these anti-positions were: anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal, anti-Marxism, anti-communism, anti-proletarian, partly anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, or at least non-clerical.[51]

Summary

At the outset of this section we presented a Marxist definition of fascism and then proceeded to consider some of the key theoretical building blocks which underlie the construction of an adequate general theory of fascism.

Firstly, we demonstrated the importance of a theory of the state in a capitalist society to an understanding of fascism. The notion of "relative autonomy" of the state in capitalist society permitted the conception of the fascist regime as representative of an extreme case of relative autonomy. Furthermore, this flexible approach was able to accomodate the complex historical relationship between the petty bourgeois based regime and monopoly capital. For although the objective function of fascism is to create the dictatorship of monopoly capital over the working class, the regime remains relatively independent of big capital. This perspective contrasts sharply with the classic Comintern thesis which denied fascism's political distance from monopoly capital.

Secondly, with regard to the genetic dimension of the explanation of fascism, we found that a "capital logic" approach was unsatisfactory. Poulantzas' emphasis on the need to explore the political crisis from which fascism emerged victorious, tended to remove the problem of direct economic determination of political change.

Thirdly, we established that there was a wide range in the level of monopoly capitalist economic development at which fascism could conceivably occur. Thus the coming to power of a fascist regime in the peripheral South African capitalist society in 1948 is not precluded on the basis of a simple economic criterion.

Finally, we outlined the main ideological features of European fascist movements. This dimension will be elaborated upon in Chapter 6.2., where we analyse Afrikaner fascist ideology.

Chapter 2

THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON FASCISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

The poverty of South African historiography has been primarily due to the dominance of a liberal school of thought using an idealistic and empirico-descriptive methodology. [1] In recent years this dominant view has been challenged by Marxist historians and sociologists. The distinctive feature of the empirical approach is the obsession with the obvious features of race and national conflict and the almost complete ignorance or simple denial of the importance of class forces in historical interpretation. In this regard we recall Marx's comment that: "All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided".

The underdevelopment of the scientific approach to the study of modern South African society is particularly obvious when it comes to the question of the relationship between Apartheid and Nazism. Aside from a few simple analogies, mainly on the ideological level, the comparative study of these two fascisms is at such a low level that in no case do we even find a definition of what is meant by fascism. At best a few characteristics, randomly selected, are compared and on this basis a decision is reached as to whether or not the two systems are similar. It is no wonder that the results of these comparisons are contradictory.

The following review of some of the leading works dealing with recent South African history will essentially aim to uncover the state of research on the subject of comparative fascism. The books will be examined according to the way in which their central theses throw light on various aspects of the problem.

2.1. The Nazi Parallel

The best known among the books which draw a direct parallel between Nazism and the racial policy of the Nationalist regime in South Africa is Bunting's The Rise of the South African Reich (1964).[2] As the title of this book reveals, in his opinion the South African Reich is more or less a copy of the German Third Reich. Most of the chapters are headed by quotations from Hitler's Mein Kampf and serve to support the central thesis that the Nationalist Party, guided by the secret Afrikaner Broederbond, was essentially a Nazi-influenced organization which came to power by deception and manipulation of the Afrikaner masses.

There is much to criticize in this comparative approach, the main weakness being the author's lack of scientific objectivity which leads him to accentuate similarities and gloss over differences, e.g., in the ideologies of both regimes. Nevertheless, his contribution to the subject is significant, for this author was the first to explore the similarity between the two regimes and to intuitively grasp that they belong to the same family of social phenomena. But, he mistakenly took the relationship to be blood brothers rather than first cousins.

Vatcher's book White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (1965) is similar to Bunting's work. He is primarily concerned with the influence of Nazi ideology on the Broederbond leaders and he too argues that "perhaps Hitler's greatest influence in South Africa was in precisely the area of nationalist and racist philosophy."[3] A crucial weakness in books of this type is their non-dialectical thinking, in the sense that they do not recognize the total character of social life and consequently divorce the politico-ideological level from the economic base. As a result one is left asking the question, why did Nazi-type ideas fit the needs of certain fractions of the Afrikaner population? To explain this it is necessary to refer to the class basis of the ideology and the general social conditions under which this kind of ideology is likely to be adopted.

Hepple's biography of Verwoerd (1967), also examines the Nazi parallel.[4] However, in contrast to Bunting, he is aware that,

/h/istorical analogies can be misleading. Although it is convenient to draw a parallel between Broederbond rule in South Africa and the evil regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, the comparison obscures the peculiar nature of the South African system. However, there were at least two major similarities between Verwoerd's Broederbond nationalism and Hitler's National Socialism. Both were violently nationalist and racialist; both were fiercely anti-semitic. (p. 209)

He goes on to reveal other similarities between the two ideologies, namely, their anti-liberal, anti-democratic and anti-communist beliefs. Yet, he reaches the conclusion that,

> ... it would be wrong to say that Verwoerd tried to mould South Africa into the shape of Nazi Germany. Yet his philosophy led him along the same paths as the fascist dictators, notwithstanding his insistent claims to being a democrat.... For South Africa's African, Coloured and Indian population, his rigid white supremacist beliefs were merely a variation of Fascism ....(p. 238)

Hepple's line of reasoning is a definite improvement on Bunting and Vatcher, but his lack of a general theory of fascism is his stumbling block, for he too merely ends up comparing phenomenological elements divorced from structural considerations.

2.2. The Afrikaner Mass Movement

Moodie's book, The Rise of Afrikanerdom (1975), sharply contrasts with earlier studies of Afrikaner nationalism (such as Bunting's), in that it provides a teleological or purposive explanation of the rise of Afrikanerdom.[5] His study is based on an ideal-type analysis of the nationalization of the Afrikaner masses. According to him the "civil religion" means "a constellation of symbols held fairly universally and consistently by Afrikaners at least since the end of the Anglo-Boer War". (p. 295) In the 1930's this civil religion was transformed due to the split in the National Party and the infusion of new-ideas by young Afrikaner intellectuals returning from studies in Europe. The latter introduced a "neo-Fichtean social philosophy" (i.e., right-wing totalitarian nationism) into the Broederbond. (p. 154) These ideas were instrumental in the redirection of the Afrikaner movement into all spheres of social life. (p.x)

Moodie never really examines the relationship between the new ideology of the 1930's and the dominant fascist ideologies in Europe at the time. His research into Afrikaner thought indicates that there were two brands of totalitarian nationalism current, one culturalist and the other racist. (p. 164) This important distinction helps to clarify the ideological confusion caused by Bunting-type analyses which only focus on the racist strand of thought.

The weakness in Moodie's perceptive analysis of Afrikaner Nationalism is his failure to examine the socio-economic roots of the ideology and his insistence on the classlessness of the ethnic mobilization. [6] The Afrikaner mass movement incorporated Afrikaners of all social classes and hence, according to Moodie, cannot be regarded as a predominantly class based movement. It is not surprising that identification of the social bases of the European fascist movements has always been a problem for much the same reason.

O'Meara, using a Marxist methodology, provides the necessary class corrective to Moodie's work in his recent study of the social roots and social policies of the Afrikaner movement. [7] He essentially views the Afrikaner movement as a response of the urban petty bourgeoisie to the pressures of capitalist industrialization and the urbanization that accompanied it. This view closely corresponds to my own view. All the same, just as in the case of European fascism the class basis of Afrikanerdom is likely to remain a moot point, for much depends upon the researcher's choice of class theory, and the concept of the "petty bourgeoisie" is admittedly notoriously imprecise. Nevertheless, the categorization of the Afrikaner and other fascist movements as primarily combining the rural and urban "petty bourgeoisie" is a useful first approximation. O'Meara's study will be referred to later on in the text, but at this stage I might add that he did not raise the issue of fascism.

De Klerk's book The Puritans in Africa (1975), is similar in many respects to Moodie's and also contends that Afrikanerdom can only be understood in terms of its secular religion. [8] Yet his study is far

wider in historical scope, though less well researched and less conceptually clear than Moodie's. At the outset he states that,

> this is a book about the attempt by a small people ... to remake their particular world to the concept of a rational plan from the radical Right. In no other way can the modern Afrikaners be understood.(p. xiii)

He later elaborates on this theme:

> ... in the same way as the freedom of the corporate state or nation as promised by the Fascist Right between the wars - so the freedom of various nations within the same geographical context as promised by separate development, has proved to be in no less measure, a radical attempt to establish by rational means the ultimate certitude. (pp. 318-319)

De Klerk connects the growth of the radical right ideology directly to the emergence of an urban Afrikaner "bourgeois"class:

> The growth of an intellectual elite out of the new burgerstand was the true power behind the revolutionary idea of the fourties. (p. 229) ... Urbanization, industrialization, the growth of a new middle class, has so far consistently provided the right milieu for revolution. (p. 186)

Like Moodie he views the coming to power of Afrikanerdom as a revolution on account of its "socio-political ideal", and implies that like Nazism it was a "national" rather than a "proletarian" revolution, right-wing rather than left-wing. (pp. 180, 188, 245) But, de Klerk's theoretical idealism prevents him from exploring the class roots of the movement deeply, (pp. 287-288), and his fascist comparison is glossed over. Both he and Moodie chiefly draw comparisons with Puritanism due to their overemphasis of the religious/Calvinist dimension of Afrikanerdom.

2.3. A Liberal Economist's Viewpoint

Horwitz's book The Political Economy of South Africa (1967), is a good example of the liberal approach to the subject of Apartheid. [9] The chief characteristic of this school of thought is its complete theoretical separation of politics (state power) from the economic sys-

tem. Basically, it combines an empiricist notion of politics with a neo-classical ideal-type of the capitalist system. [10] Using this methodology it is able to divorce monopoly capital from its complicity with Afrikaner fascism in the implementation of Apartheid. Instead it puts forward the idea that the two are logically incompatible.

> This thesis argues that there has been such a political factor of Afrikanerdom. It argues that the South African economy of the 1960's has been decisively shaped, and perhaps determined not merely by the kind of political intervention and increased government activities, which are common experience of most countries of the Western World, but by an overpowering pursuit of ideals, or ideology. As such South Africa has been made into a very different society from any other in the West or East. (pp. 10-11)

Furthermore he contends that:

> it is the thesis of this book that both the rate of economic development and the income relationships of White and Non-White have been crucially influenced by the political factor of Afrikanerdom. This political factor with its fundamental aim of White supremacy progressively disenfranchised the Africans totally and the Coloureds to a nullity (the Asiatics have never had any kind of parliamentary representation). The absolute and the relative poverty of the Coloureds, the Asiatics and the Africans is, in the author's contention, inescapably involved in such disenfranchisement. (p. 423)

In my opinion Horwitz's obsession with Afrikanerdom's pursuit of ideals has prevented him from making a serious assessment of the extent to which the political factor has crucially influenced the rate of growth and the distribution of income between labour and capital. That the distribution of income between races would have been different in a multi-racial democracy is undoubtedly true, but could monopoly capital have coped with an enfranchised black working class? The historical facts seem to indicate that the mining industry (which he views as a model of capitalist rationality), was loath to give a penny's wage raise to the workers, let alone the franchise! Horwitz notes that, "it is on the direction of African labour by the White polity, that the process of state control has approached totalitarianism". (p. 380) But his weak assumption of an absolute divide between economic and political power in Apartheid South Africa hinders him from explaining the economic determinants of Afrikaner fascism's labour policy.

2.4. Current Marxist Views on Apartheid

We turn now to a brief examination of the recent Marxist theories of Apartheid. The "new school" began as a challenge to the dominant liberal approach to the historiography of twentieth century South Africa and undertook the difficult task of re-writing the history of the phase of capitalist development. In opposition to the empirical categories of social analysis chosen by the liberals, race and nation, the Marxists introduced the concept of class and the need to study the process of capital accumulation which underlay the class structure of the peripheral South African capitalist formation. In my opinion, the collective advances of this "new school" over the past decade have been substantial. As a consequence, today the liberal perspective on South Africa is definitely on the defensive.

In the following review I intend to merely outline the main trends in the new approach to the study of the transition from segregation to Apartheid. The central thesis of the liberal school was that the Apartheid policy of the Nationalist regime has been dysfunctional to the operation of an idealized capitalist system. With such a notion of Apartheid widely circulated and accepted, it is understandable that the Marxists should have focused on the weakest aspect of the liberal analysis and demonstrated the role of the Apartheid state in the expansion of monopoly capitalism. In particular, its labour repressive side has been highlighted.

Within the Marxist camp we can identify two different approaches; the first tends to emphasize the economic and structural determinants of the regime's labour policy; the second stresses the class struggle.

It is generally acknowledged that Wolpe's (1972) paper represented a turning point in the "new" debate. [11] The main difference between this analysis of the central causes of Apartheid and its predecessors, was that here the level of abstraction was raised from a deterministic type of description to that of a theory based on the law of value in capitalist society and the conditions for the production and reproduction of labour-power.

Briefly, Wolpe argued against the thesis that secondary industrialization was the economic key to an explanation of Apartheid. Using an historical approach, he showed how in the early development of the South African capitalist formation the role of the pre-capitalist mode of production had been crucial to the rate of surplus-value in the predominant gold-mining sector. This had been possible because the pre-capitalist mode of production had in fact subsidized the capitalist mode of production by permitting the reduction of the level of wages to migrant African workers who were able to receive part of their subsistence needs directly from their own agricultural production. Consequently, when in the 1930's and 1940's the destruction of the economic base of the migrant mine-workers had reached "catastrophic" proportions, this implied that a threat was presented to the "cheap" labour system and the rate of surplus value in the capitalist mode. In Wolpe's thesis, this was the crucial change which underlay the transition from Segregation to Apartheid. The Apartheid system was accordingly conceived of as essentially a mechanism designed to maintain a high rate of capitalist exploitation in a period of rapid decline of the pre-capitalist mode of production wage subsidy. (p. 428)

Wolpe essentially criticized Legassick's industrialization thesis which directly related the implementation of Apartheid system of labour control to the development of secondary industry, on the grounds that it was not formulated within value terms. (pp. 427-428)

Legassick's reply to Wolpe was to uphold his thesis while conceding that,

> coinciding decline of the capacity of the African "reserves" to sustain or subsidize labour reproduction costs posed new problems for South African capitalism in terms of the control and exploitation of a labour force. [12]

In a recent joint article by Wolpe and Legassick, the 1972 thesis was reformulated as follows:

> Apartheid, as the mechanisms specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialization under conditions of rising organic composition of capital, is an expression of the possibility of maintaining a cheap and controlled labour-force, and a high rate of capitalist exploitation, which is in large part a consequence of the character of the industrial reserve army. [13]

It is clear that these theorists are most concerned with economistic explanations of Apartheid's origins and function, and give little consideration in their definitions of Apartheid to either class forces or ideology. Their primary endeavour to date has been to establish the structural determinants of the Apartheid system. They explain the labour repressive policy in term of monopoly capital's logic rather than the logic of Afrikaner ideology. This is an important advancement on the liberal approach, but it is reductive and fails to explain the specific form of the exceptional capitalist state in the Apartheid period.

In contrast to this approach we find the theorists influenced by Poulantzas, whose main task has been to identify the class structure in South Africa and to outline the class struggle between labour and capital, as well as the struggle within the power bloc for hegemony. In a recent article written jointly by four of the major contributors to this subject, Davies, Kaplan, Morris and O'Meara, entitled, "Class Struggle and the Periodization of the State in South Africa" we find a summary of their latest views. Here they reach the following "definition" of the function of Apartheid, which also reveals their interpretation of its class origins:

> Yet apartheid represented primarily an attempt to restructure relations of exploitation to cope with agriculture's labour crisis, and to establish a system of established urban labour which would threaten neither farm labour supplies, nor compete with the petty bourgeoisie or white labour. [14]

This explanation of Apartheid's function in terms of those classes and fractions of classes which supported the Nationalist Party in 1948, has rightly come under criticism from Wolpe and Legassick, for it tends to confuse the social basis of the regime with its objective social function, i.e., its relation to total social capital. In their view, as stated above, the application of the extremely coercive Apartheid labour policy should be understood, not in terms of competing labour requirements of different sectors of capital, but in terms of the conditions of accumulation of total social capital. [15] Criticism can also be made of its inability to comprehend the special nature of the Afrikaner mass movement using a class fractional perspective.

2.5. My own Synthetic View

So far we have examined four different strands of thought concerning modern South African society. The first two strands mainly deal with politics and ideology, the latter two with economic structure and class structure. In the first category, Bunting overstated the Nazi-dimension in Afrikaner fascism. Moodie recovered the originality of the Afrikaner mass movement but lost sight of its fascist dimension. De Klerk presented a similar interpretation of Afrikanerdom, but retained the fascist parallel. In the second category, Horwitz overstated the autonomy of the Afrikaner polity vis a vis the capitalist economic structure and the Marxists responded by overstating the structural determinants of the system, losing sight of both the extreme relative autonomy of this exceptional state and the specific form of the regime.

It is my belief that all four elements can be synthesized within the framework of a general Marxist theory of fascism, (such as is outlined in Chapter 2.1.), and that much of the confusion surrounding the theme of fascism in South Africa is a direct result of the absence of a proper theoretical framework to date. However, before embarking on my own analysis of the subject, this survey of the literature on the subject will be completed with a review of two other more systematic attempts to compare Apartheid to fascism.

2.6. Functionalists Compare Apartheid and Fascism

The books of two functionalist sociologists, van den Berghe's South Africa: A Study in Conflict (1965), and Adam's Modernizing Racial Domination (1971), are further examples of empiricism, for both arbitrarily describe South African society primarily in terms of racial/national concepts; these concepts are not theoretically derived and merely reflect the authors' intuitive choice.[16] However, they are the only ones to have attempted a more rigorous comparison between Apartheid and National Socialism. My criticism will be concentrated on this aspect of their studies.

When van den Berghe comes to his critique of the fascism thesis the weakness of his methodology becomes obvious. He begins by pointing out

that since the Nationalist Party victory in 1948,

> there has been a steady deterioration of civil liberties for everybody, including the whites, to the point where the democratic façade has become empty of meaning even for the privileged race. Successive dictatorial measures have slowly transformed South Africa into an increasingly arbitrary police state. (p. 78)

Thus he has identified an essential factor in the fascist state, namely the transition from a state based on the rule of law to a police state.[17]

He centres his argument against fascism primarily on the ideological plane; "the ideology of apartheid is more a brand of nineteenth century colonial paternalism than a form of modern fascism". (p. 79) Van den Berghe's analysis of ideology suffers from the general weakness in his analysis of the South African class structure. According to him,

> /s/ocial classes in the Marxian sense of relationship to means of production exist by definition, as they must in any capitalist country, but they are not meaningful social realities. Clearly, pigmentation rather than the ownership of land or capital is the most significant criterion of status in South Africa. (p. 267)

However, he recognizes the fact that the Afrikaners form the bulk of the petty-bourgeoisie or lower middle class. (p. 63) But he does not apprehend the similarity of the "romantic" ideology of the Nazis and the Afrikaner Nationalists as stemming from their common class basis.

Van den Berghe's knowledge of fascism is as poor as his knowledge of Afrikaner ideology in the 1930's and 1940's, and his comparison never comes to grips with the real structure of fascism. (I will deal with his main anti-fascist points in the course of my review of Adam, for he repeats van den Berghe's arguments).

In his book Adam provides a far more sophisticated critique of the notion of totalitarianism and fascism applied to Apartheid. In sharp contrast to Van den Berghe, his central hypothesis is that,

> the Apartheid system has been viewed simply as the most outdated relic of a dying colonialism, yet possibly it is one of the most advanced and effective patterns of rational, oligarchic domination. (p. 16)

Adam follows Franz Neumann's "five essential factors" typology of modern totalitarian dictatorship. [18] He points out that the totalitarian concept is inadequate because it

> does not take into account the historical development in which these characteristics acquire their significance. As the implicit comparison between Fascist and Communist domination indicates, such static-structural thinking overlooks the different historical preconditions and functions of political institutions, often substituting them with arbitrary typologies or abstract analogies. It is essential to abstract not only from the similarities in terror of Fascist and Stalinist domination, but also focus on the qualitatively different utopian goals of the two totalitarian endeavors, which cannot be equated in an undifferentiated form. (pp.38-39)

So Adam sees that the totalitarian concept masks the essential differences between Fascists and Communist dictatorship and that only by a historical analysis can we arrive at a more specific categorization of both and an understanding of the social function of each dictatorship. Neumann, of course, is well aware of this distinction and points to the need for a study of class relationships in the light of changing economic systems. For him it is obvious that fascism can only be explained in terms of the preceding class struggle. [19] But Adam, who pretends to be be an "expert" on Marxist theories throughout his book, conveniently ignores the class aspect of Neumann's analysis and begins to talk of differentiating between ideologies divorced from their roots and development in particular socio-economic systems.

He states that, "race and class criteria are ... almost synonymous in South Africa", (p. 8) and that, "it would indeed be absurd not to see that in South Africa, class conflicts are secondary to race conflicts". (p. 19) On what basis does he jump to this conclusion? Surely in a society where race and class are almost "synonymous" he can at best conclude that race conflict and class conflict are inseparable at any single moment and that only on the basis of theoretically informed historical research can we determine which element has been dominant historically.

Adam begins his comparative analysis of Nazi fascism and Apartheid by stating that,

> /r/ace-oligarchy would seem /the/ most adequate /term/ to describe South Africa's system of domination. A comparison with the caste structure is also useful. A racially defined and privileged minority caste rules autocratically over the rest of the caste hierarchy ....

Here we have a good example of Adam's unscientific use of terminology, for he never defines "caste". Cox, however, pointed out that, "a caste system is not possible in Western society", and that,

> one primary objection to the use of the caste belief in the study of race relations rests not so much on its scientific untenability as upon its insidious potentialities. It lumps all white people and all Negroes into two antagonistic groups struggling in the interest of a mysterious god called caste. This is very much to the liking of the exploiters of labour, since it tends to confuse them in an emotional matrix with all people. 20

According to Adam,

> the decisive difference between National Socialism and Apartheid lies in their goals: the former aimed at the outset at aggressive expansion, the latter attempts to defend the status quo. (p. 42)

We can accept his loose formulation of the function of Apartheid, but his characterization of German fascism is historically inaccurate for the primary task of Nazism was to stabilize the existing capitalist social formation. In the first place Nazism had to break the resistance of the German working class before it could embark upon its program of imperialist expansion. But, this expansion ultimately was a means for keeping the Nazi society, based on maximum exploitation of labour, going. Defense of the status quo was the central role of both the Nazi and the Afrikaner "counter-revolutions". Furthermore, Adam shows basic confusion in the very choice of his terms of comparison, namely, National Socialism and Apartheid. For he should have compared the former to Afrikaner Christian-Nationalism. Apartheid is one policy stemming from Christian-Nationalist ideology, just as anti-communism and anti-Semitism were National Socialist policies.

Adam takes up a number of important issues in his critique. I will start by looking at the major objections he raises and conclude by showing how his book unwittingly presents an analysis which closely conforms to my own. Early on in his critique he refers to Barrington Moore's statement that, "fascism is inconceivable without democracy ...." (pp. 43-44) I have taken up the discussion of this point in Chapter 6.1 where I argued that provided a section of the masses are enfranchised - in this case the "petty bourgeois" Afrikaner masses - fascism is possible.

The existence of racial and national divisions within the South African masses meant that fascism, which was based on the mobilization of the Afrikaner masses alone, could not unify all the peoples of South Africa in a single (multi-racial) people's community. German fascism aimed to achieve such a classless Volksgemeinschaft and obviously differed from Afrikaner fascism in this respect. However, Adam incorrectly argues that this lack of a "unifying ideology" crucially distinguishes Apartheid from Nazism. (p. 44) He fails to grasp that the Apartheid policy or separate development is in fact based on the same national totalitarian principle, but applied to a multi-racial/national setting. (See de Klerk's comment above.) It follows that the differences between Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa will be substantial if race and not class is made the primary focus, as in Adam's case.

A similar criticism can be made of the differences between the particular form of rule established by the fascist regimes. Nazism had a dictator, Afrikaner fascism has the Nationalist Party at its helm. But what, may we ask, is the significance of this difference to the unenfranchised and non-trade unionised Black working class, or the disenfranchised German working class?

Entering the ideological field Adam recalls Adorno's warning that in a totalitarian state "critique of ideology has to be substituted by the analysis of the cui bono", that is, who profits by it. For in such a context the category ideology is inappropriate since even the propagandist did not expect that people would believe his nonsense or take it seriously. (p. 45)

Adam argues that Nazi race ideology is different to Apartheid ideology. But instead of comparing the central Nazi concept of the racial-volk to the dominant conceptions of the Afrikaner volk in the 1940's, he compares German anti-Semitism to the Apartheid ideology. Besides correctly noting that the Apartheid ideology is "irrational" due to its "assumption of 'natural' instead of social-cultural differences between the race groups", he totally confuses the ideological comparison. (p. 46) (See Chapter 6.2 for a thorough investigat on of the ideological parallels and differences.)

Anti-Semitism is one element in a racist ideology. The German fascists used anti-Semitism as a tool to manipulate people's ingrained prejudices against the Jews both domestically and abroad. It is true that the Jews were placed in forced labour camps and later into extermination camps, along with "pacificists, conservatives, socialists, Catholics, Protestants, Free Thinkers, and the members of the occupied people".[21] But, it is unscientific to compare the plight of the Jews under Nazism to the plight of the Africans under Apartheid. The German Jews were primarily of middle-class origin, as were the followers of Hitler, so anti-Semitism was a useful tool for gaining support by exploiting petty-bourgeois rivalry and resentment. But the historical function of fascism was to destroy the proletarian forces in the interests of monopoly capital. Therefore, the plight of the working class in Germany must be compared to the plight of the African proletariat under Apartheid. Adam acknowledges the historical inaccuracy of a comparison between German anti-Semitism and South African racism, but on account of his disdain for class analysis misses the relevance of this point for a comparison of the two social systems. (p. 51)

Reading Adam's summary in which he concludes that "the structural differences between Hitler's Germany and South Africa make a comparison of both societies under the concept of fascism ahistorical and rather useless", one is reminded of his earlier demands for a rigorous theoretical approach. (p. 52)

He pompously criticizes "leftist publications" for "not coming to grips with an adequate theory of fascism", without either referring to one of these publications (Bunting's book was probably in mind) or any

work on the general theory of fascism. (p. 50) His own comparison is restricted to Nazism, Italian fascism is ignored, and his understanding of Nazism seems to be mainly confined to its anti-Semitism, rather than to its anti-socialism or anti-communism.

The fact is, that Adam presents an ahistorical and superficial study which avoids structural comparison. He begins by stating that Apartheid defends the status quo but never tells us why this is necessary or what this status quo is in socio-economic terms. He mentions Adorno's demands for an analysis of the "cui bono" but provides none. Nevertheless in other sections of his book we are able to get beyond his classless concept of "pragmatic race oligarchy".

For example, we are told that the purpose of the Apartheid system is

> the smooth, frictionless, and tolerable domination over cheap labour ... (p. 53)
>
> The entrepreneurs on their part are aware that only the Apartheid order, and especially the prohibition of effective non-white unions, ensures a relatively cheap labour force. Any political advance of the non-whites would enable them to force economic concessions to the detriment of white profit rates. (p. 148)

He tells us that white society is sharply split with political power lying exclusively in the hands of Afrikaners and private enterprise largely in the control of the English-speaking community (p. 40), and that severe class struggle has taken place between these two "classes". But he once again fails to compare this Afrikaner "revolution" to the Nazi Volkish "revolution", even though he perceptively notes that:

> Both movements have similar roots and origins ... Psychologically, the fear of the German middle class threatened by the monopolies on the one hand and the socialist workers on the other is in some way analogous to the reaction of the Afrikaners caught between English imperialism and black nationalism. In both cases it was important to suspend the competition principle and to limit upward mobility to the privileged. (p. 43)

These extracts have cut through his confused presentation and begun to penetrate the structural dynamics of Apartheid. It is obvious that Adam, despite his insistence on the primary of race, has been obliged to readmit the class dimension through the back-door.

Chapter 3

THE FORMATION OF A CAPITALIST SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

Since fascism is a phenomenon of bourgeois society we begin this study of the roots of South Africa's fascism with a sketch of the formation of the new capitalist society.

We differentiate between two basic periods in South African history: the pre-1910 era and the post-1910 era. The first period can generally be referred to as a period of "primitive accumulation", i.e., transition to the capitalist mode of production. It can be divided into two phases: a pre-1870 phase of "spontaneous primitive accumulation" in which the seizure of land plays the dominant role; and a post-1870 phase of "forced primary accumulation" in which the creation of a proletariat to serve imperialist capital was primary. In the second period, post-1910, we find the existence of a capitalist mode of production and the formation of a new political entity, the Union of South Africa, with a dynamic of its own, i.e., metropolitan political force is withdrawn after having successfully structured the new social formation in its interests.

The focus of the first part of this chapter will be mainly on the period of forced primary accumulation, 1870 to 1910, in which the imperialist forces structured a new capitalist social formation in the South African satellite. [1] Capital was injected from the metropolis, but "free labour" was forced out of the existing pre-capitalist tribal African societies. The particular method used for African proletarianization is known as the "migrant labour system" and after a century of capitalist development in South Africa it is still a dominant structural feature of the society.

In the second part of this chapter we will examine the production relations established in the dominant gold mining industry at the turn of the century. For as we shall see, the economic viability of migrant labour was directly related to the specific process of gold production employed.

3.1. Primary Accumulation in South Africa: 1870-1910

3.1.1. The Meaning of Primary Accumulation

Marxist theory defines capitalism as a system of commodity production based on exchange between money capital and "free labour". It is these two elements which characterize the capitalist mode of production (hereafter "cmp"). So-called "primary accumulation" is the term used by Marx to refer to the pre-history of the cmp and relates specifically to the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production to the cmp. Thus, it is concerned with the formation of money capital and "free labour" as the prerequisites for capitalist production. [2]

In the section of Capital entitled "The So-Called Primitive Accumulation", Marx draws attention to several crucial historical facts which were evidently essential for the formation of the metropolitan cmp. I will begin by summarizing his main points. Firstly, he clearly defines the term

> "free" labourers as (free) in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. [3]

This double freedom resolves itself into the necessity for the labourer to sell his labour power, his only commodity, to the owner of capital in order to maintain his survival, and thereby furnishing a necessary condition for the production of surplus value. Fundamental to the creation of free labour is the dissolution of the feudal bond and the expropriation of the means of production from the potential proletariat.

Secondly, money capital must be in the hands of the capitalist to enable him to purchase labour power.

A third point Marx stresses is that the history of the formation of the elements of the cmp was "anything but idyllic". [4] He particularly emphasizes the role of "force" and the use the emergent bourgeoisie makes

of "state power" to achieve its aim of rapid transition from feudalism to capitalism.

In the early days of capitalism there is no question of waiting for the "natural" laws of the market to form the cmp:

> The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally. In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the "natural laws of production", i.e., to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves. It is otherwise during the historic genesis of capitalist production. The bourgeoisie, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the state to "regulate" wages, i.e., to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value making, to lengthen the working-day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of dependence. This is an essential element of the so-called primitive accumulation. [5]

A final and crucial point for our later analysis is that the growth of modern industry causes the extension of the domestic market, a necessary condition for the development of the cmp at the centre. [6]

3.1.2. The Centre - Periphery Link

The general development of the cmp at the centre was not geographically limited to the centre, but a process that involved the gradual incorporation of the whole world. The development of capitalism at the centre meant a simultaneous incorporation of pre-capitalist societies with varying modes of production. The accumulation of capital creates in capitalism an intrinsic need to expand, thus it was inevitable that in time it would incorporate the whole world, creating free labour to serve expanding capital wherever profitability was reasonable.

But this immanent law of capital expansion took several centuries to actualize itself by creating a world capitalist system. It was not until the growth of monopoly capital and the consequent era of imperialism that the peripheral world became dominated by the forces of capitalism. Only in the era of monopoly capitalism, with its great concentration of wealth and ability to organize, could the rest of the

world be fully integrated into the capitalist system. [7]

Three major periods of central capitalist development are commonly identified. These are mercantile capitalism, industrial capitalism and monopoly capitalism, and each had its specific effects on the periphery of the system.

In a chapter entitled "The Modern Theory of Colonization", Marx emphasized the contradiction between the cmp and earlier modes of production. [8] He pointed out that the new colonial capitalist uses force, backed by the mother country, to convert the opposing mode of production to its needs, i.e., to force it to yield free labour to serve foreign capital by "the annihilation of self earned private property, in other words the expropriation of the labourer". [9]

Samir Amin has identified a crucial difference between the central and peripheral capitalist social formations. [10] Whereas central accumulation is self-oriented, peripheral accumulation is centre-oriented, i.e., capital is introduced from outside the periphery by the expanding centre. Capital is not exported to create a new self-oriented capitalist formation, but rather to serve the centre's interest. According to Amin:

> /t/he reason for creating an export sector (in the periphery) therefore lies in obtaining from the periphery products which are the basic elements of constant capital (raw material) or of variable capital (food products) at production costs lower than those at the centre for similar products ... This is therefore the framework for the essential theory of unequal exchange. The products exported by the periphery are important to the extent that - ceteris paribus, meaning equal productivity - the return to labour will be less than what it is at the centre. And it can be less to the extent that society will, by every means - economic and non-economic, be made subject to this new function, i.e. providing cheap labour to the export sector. [11]

Thus, this particular type of incorporation from the outside alters the domestic accumulation model in the peripheral social formation . As a

result of the primacy of export orientation, the vital link between "the rate of surplus value and the level of development of the productive forces" (i.e. wages to output) will be severed. In the absence of this tie, which tends to deepen the domestic market at the centre, wages can be kept at subsistence minimum and "marginalization" is the fate of the peripheral peoples. [12]

The general social effect of this type of economic integration into the world capitalist market was identified by Myrdal as "segregation":

> The capital, enterprise and skilled labour of a metropolitan country sent to a dependent country tended for natural reasons to form enclaves, cut out and isolated from the surrounding economy but tied to the economy of the home country. Their economic relations with the indigenous populations were restricted to their employment as unskilled labour. Racial and cultural differences, and the very much lower level of wages and modes of living made strict segregation a natural consequence even within the enclaves themselves. [13]

3.1.3. The Early Economic History: 1652-1870

The centre - periphery model which we have adopted for the study of capitalism's expansion stresses the dependency of the periphery on development at the centre. According, therefore, to the three primary periods of centre development we identify corresponding periods in the periphery.

A history of "South Africa" should begin with a study of the pre-capitalist African societies which occupied the territory now known as South Africa, i.e., before their "natural" development was disrupted by the intrusion of mercantile capitalism.

With the advent of Dutch settlers at the Cape in 1652 the first period of colonial development was initiated in the interests of the metropolis. This phase of colonial history ends at about 1800 with the rise of industrial capitalism at the centre, and the seizure of the colony by the British.

The second phase of colonial history lasts until the 1870's with the emergence of monopoly capital and the imperialist era. It is noteworthy

that the Cape Colony changed hands at the beginning of the second period. Britain's ascension in the industrial era and Holland's relative decline lay behind the transfer of control at the Cape.

I do not intend to elaborate on either the pre-capitalist societies of South Africa or the first two periods of colonial development. My interest lies in revealing the fundamental forces at work in the imperialist period, since it was in this period that a cmp was forged and the new capitalist social formation was structured.

We need, however, to discover the extent to which the primary accumulation process had been operative prior to the imperialist period, i.e., to what extent the means of production had become capital and the "peasantry" had become a proletariat.

In the more than 200 years of centre - periphery linkage prior to the 1870's, the centre had had little incentive to develop a capitalist economy in the South African region. The Cape Colony played an important role as a revictualling station on the trade route from Europe to the lucrative East, but was itself starved of capital. [14] Neither Holland nor Britain saw any economic advantage in the expansion of their responsibilities at the Cape. Consequently colonial policy varied little in the first two periods.

This lack of metropolitan interest led the initiative for development to fall into the hands of the white settlers. From the beginning white settler development was of two major types. One group served the limited market created by trade with the metropolis. The second settler group moved away from the market to the borders of the colony and tended to form an independent self-subsistent peasantry whose prime aim was the seizure of land and cattle. [15]

The South African territory was originally occupied by a large number of African tribes whose interest in land and cattle were in direct opposition to the white settlers. [16] Those tribes which were in the immediate vicinity of the Cape settlement were overcome by the superior force of the settlers. However as the colony expanded eastward it confronted a far more formidable rival, the militarily organized African

tribesmen. Defeating these tribes was a far more difficult and costly venture which Britain had little interest in undertaking.

The Wars of Dispossession (Kaffir Wars) were fought on the eastern borders of the Cape Colony by the Boers and the British between 1797 and 1850,

> /t/he general causes of the wars were seen most clearly in their effects. They can be seen in the loss of native land, in the growing inability of the natives to maintain themselves in more restricted and less fertile areas, and in the diminishing means of independent livelihood of the tribes. [17]

The Great Trek which started in 1834, was the name given to the trek into the interior by a group of Dutch settlers who were disaffected to British rule. In particular, they were angered by the British failure to keep their promise of full compensation for the losses suffered by the emancipation of their slaves in 1832, and by the return of Xhosa land by the British after it had been seized in war with the assistance of the Boers. [18] The trekkers left the colony with their families in covered ox-wagons, these were placed in a circular formation (laager) in times of attack by African tribes. The Boers gradually brought the interior of the country under their control, seized African land and cattle, and in some cases established their subsistence economy on the basis of a "temporary feudal system". [19] A century later the Great Trek, its heroes and heroines, were resurrected in order to glorify the "revolutionary" struggles of Afrikanerdom. [20]

A brief statement as to the degree of primary accumulation achieved in South Africa in two centuries of weak ties to the metropolis should mention that capital accumulation was negligible, though the extent of expropriation of the African tribes was considerable. [21] We find two phenomena: on the one hand, the tribes had been forced into small enclaves of land insufficient to meet their growing needs; on the other, tribesmen remained on the land, now claimed to be owned by the Boers, in a variety of subservient positions. [22]

Hence, by 1870 the trek-Boer had, with the indirect backing of the metropolis (guns and ammunition supplied), played the leading role in

the initial process of primary accumulation. But, he simultaneously created an independent mode of production, a pre-capitalist semi-feudal society based on white landlords and black tenants, which was in later years to become an obstacle to metropolitan ambitions in Southern Africa.

3.1.4. The Imperialist Period: 1870-1901

In South Africa the post-1870 period is marked by the re-entry of the metropolitan force, the so-called "Imperial factor", on the satellite stage. The policy of the British state was strongly influenced by the mining capitalists in this period of systematic primary accumulation, at the same time competition from German imperialism gave the British metropolis its own basic interest in carrying out colonization in South Africa. [23]

In this historical sketch, I am obliged to leave out specific details and concentrate on the historical trend. The British policy of aversion to territorial expansion in general, and particular aversion to expansion in South Africa in the 1850's and 1860's, had led to the formation of various political units in the territory. [24] From 1870 until 1901 a distinct process was taking place in South Africa, namely, the bringing under British rule of not only the African chiefdoms, but also the Boer Republics, the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, which were formally recognised in 1852 and 1854. [25] The defeat of the Boer Republics in 1901 signalled the completion of the process of British colonization. The direct intervention of metropolitan state power had created the conditions for the formation of a unified South African state.

The imperialist period coincided with discoveries of fabulous diamond and gold resources in South Africa. Vast amounts of metropolitan capital (mainly British) were poured into the mining industry and infrastructure, providing one of the crucial elements for the new capitalist mode of production. (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below).

Table 3.1. Estimated Figures of Investment in Southern Africa (including Rhodesia): 1880-1913 (in millions, sterling)

	Public Debt	Diamond Mining	Gold Mines (Wits)	Total British Listed Capital
1875	3,9			
1880	12,5	2,5		
1881		10,5		34,0
1885	25,3			
1887		23,4		
1890	30,8		22,6	
1895	34,5		41,9	
1900			77,4	230,0
1905	100,0		104,3	
1913				370,2

Source: R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, (London: Macmillan Press, 1972) p. 211.

Table 3.2. British Economic Expansion in South Africa

(Trade figures in quinquennial annual averages and millions of pounds sterling, emigrants in thousands, estimated investments in millions of pounds.)

Imports	1865-69: 3	1880-84: 6	1890-94: 11	1909-13: 19
Exports	1865-69: 2	1880-84: 6	1890-94: 8	1909-13: 16
Investment	1870: -	1885: 34	1900: 200?	1911: 351
Emigration	1870: -	1885: 3	1891-95: 10	1911: 31

Source: Robinson & Gallagher, op. cit., p. 6.

3.1.5. Forced Primary Accumulation: 1870-1910

Capital was exported from the metropolis, but the African tribesmen still needed to be transformed into free labourers. In the years 1870 to 1912 the number of workers employed in the mining industry rose from practicaly zero to 325,000. [26] It is important to analyse the method

used for proletarianization, since the wage and production relations first established in the mining industry formed the model for future capitalist development. The demand for labour by the rapidly expanding mining industry could scarcely be met by solely relying upon market forces. Hence, we find that the "labour problem" was uppermost in the minds of the mining capitalists at the turn of the century. The use of force was the primary means for solving it. [27] Only after the successful restructuring of the whole South African society to meet the needs of the mining industry, was the direct power of the British state withdrawn.

3.1.5.1. The Migrant Labour System

A common, but temporary phenomenon in the earlier stages of centre capitalist development is the seasonal labourer. This worker retains his small peasant holding, but finds it necessary to work a few months a year in industry, due, for example, to an incapacity to maintain subsistence on the land, to a need to pay cash taxes, or to a desire to improve his standard of living. In South Africa this phenomenon also arose. In the 1870's Africans flocked to work a few months a year in the diamond mines attracted by high wages. [28]

But large scale gold mining required a steady flow of cheap labour. Seasonal labour was too erratic and expensive for a modern capitalist venture on the scale of the gold mining industry. Two alternative ways of solving the labour problem were available: firstly, to transform the seasonal workers into a permanent proletarian community in the vicinity of the mines; and secondly, to rely upon a system of regular migrant labour, with the migrating worker permanently housed in the rural reserves. On account of the relative economic advantage - more about this below - the mining capitalists chose the latter solution. [29]

All that needed to be done was to permanently restrict the area of land available to the African tribes so that the economic forces, i.e., inability to maintain subsistence, would drive a steady stream of "voluntary" workers to the mines at a fixed wage. Whereas, head taxes, hut taxes and even dog taxes were imposed on tribal Africans to indirectly force them to seek wage labour, such indirect compulsion could be par-

tially relaxed as "structured necessity" became the economic force behind permanent migrant labour. [30]

3.1.5.2. The Role of the Mining Capitalists in the "Freeing" of the Labourers

At the time of the diamond (1867) and gold (1886) discoveries, South Africa was comprised of four territories. The Cape and Natal were British colonies, and the Orange Free State and Transvaal were Boer Republics. The gold reef happened to be situated in the Transvaal. The influx of European settlers into the Transvaal soon led to a political crisis, as the Boer government did not wish to be ousted politically by the foreigners who soon exceeded the Boers in number. A rough profile of the Transvaal immigration is presented in the table below.

Table 3.3. Regional European Population: 1854-1892 (in 000's)

	Cape	Natal	O.F.S.	Transvaal
1854	112	7,6	15	25
1873	236	18,6	27	40
1892	377	47	78	119

Source: Robinson & Gallagher, op. cit., p. 57.

Yet the crisis revolving around "uitlander" political rights was a front for the real antagonism between the mine owners representing the forces of monopoly capital and the patriarchal Boer leaders representing a pre-capitalist semi-feudal society. [31] Quite simply, the mine owners wanted authority over the state in order to, among other things, control the formation of the proletariat. In this regard, their role in the introduction of Pass Laws in 1895, which aimed to regulate and thereby cheapen African labour, is instructive. [32]

The Jameson Raid of 1895 was an early unsuccessful attempt by the capitalists to take over the Transvaal administration. The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, achieved their goal, which was described as follows by Hobson at the time: " ... it may be said that this war is being waged

in order to secure for the mines a cheap adequate supply of labour". [33]

A few years after the war, in 1905, the South African Native Affairs Commission reported its recommendations for future "native policy" in British South Africa. This report is of great importance as it provided the blue-print for the establishment of a permanent migrant labour system. In particular the commission stated that "certain restrictions upon the purchase of land by natives are necessary", and recommended "that purchase by natives should in future be limited to certain areas to be defined by legislative enactment". [34]

Before going on to a detailed discussion of the migrant labour system we will conclude this section on the capitalists' active role in the forging of a proletariat with a description of the wage system developed by the mine owners.

The rapid moves towards monopoly control (so-called "group control") in the gold mining industry enabled the capitalists to form the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines in 1889, a cartel primarily organised to reduce the cost of labour. [35] In the Chamber's 1889 report it was stated that the result of competition between mine managers for African labour "has been a steady rise of wages all round, which is adding very heavy additional expense to the working of the mines ... ". [36] By reasoning that higher wages would produce an overall reduction in the supply of "non-market oriented" African workers, the conclusion was reached to fix wage rates with respect to <u>all</u> Africans employed on every gold mine. Yet the facts revealed clearly indicate that African labourers were in fact market oriented (money conscious) and the goal of the Chamber was to remove wage competition between mines in order to lower the wage bill. [37]

Between 1900 and 1908 it appears that African labourers were still able to respond to wage reductions by withdrawing from the labour market. [38] In fact the mine owners were obliged to import Chinese indentured labour to meet their needs between 1904 and 1908. However,

> by 1908 almost 150,000 Africans were again employed on the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal. From then on, though there were annual fluctuations, the numbers rose steadily. [39]

In 1910 the Liberal British government granted independence to South Africa. The Union Constitution extended political rights to whites only, with a few exceptions the coloured peoples were not enfranchised. [40] In 1913 the white Parliament passed the Natives Lands Act which legalised the 1905 recommendations of the British Native Affairs Commission. Under this Act the approximate respective land distribution was,

> 125,890,600 morgen of land to be shared by 671,980 rural whites, making a morgenage of 187.3 per rural white; while ... 16,973,400 morgen of scheduled and released land to be divided among a population of 4,110,813 rural blacks, working out on an average for the whole Union of 4.1 morgen per black. That is, each rural white has on the average 45 3/4 times as much land as each rural black. [41]

3.1.5.3. Reproduction of the Capitalist Relationship

> Capitalist production, therefore, of itself reproduces the separation between labour-power and the means of labour. It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the condition for exploiting the labourer. It incessantly forces him to sell his labour-power in order to live, and enables the capitalist to purchase labour-power in order that he may enrich himself. [42]

Capital in South Africa was fully aware of the "inevitable law of proprietorship of land parcels" when it enclosed the African masses in the reserves. [43] Its aim was simply to create a semi-proletariat which would be dependent on the sale of labour-power for its survival.

The following statistical information reveals the extent to which overcrowding existed in the reserves, and the resulting economic dependence of the African communities on the export of labour.

The population density figures from the 1921 census showed that:

> The average for the Union as a whole was 14.64 to the square mile, and for the predominantly or exclusively native areas: Transkei as a whole 58.59; Glen Gray 46.13; Herschel 53.54; Kingwilliamstown 70.01; Zululand 24.06; rest of Natal 35.76, ranging from 51.37 in Camperdown to 150.65 in Inanda ... Thus at that time the essentially African, and almost completely non-urbanised, districts of the Transkei and Natal

had a density of population hardly exceeded by even the highly-urbanised Rand. [44]

The official Union Year Book estimated in 1932 that native production of maize was too little for their consumption by 8,000,000 bags per year. In 1925 it was reported that the Transkei ... could not support its inhabitants from its own resources, so that at any given moment nearly half the able-bodied men were absent in European employ. [45]

Between 1921 and 1930, 640 million pounds of mealies (maize) were produced by Africans, and between 1931 and 1939 this fell to 490 million pounds, though production by white farmers rose steeply during the same period. There was no longer room to move when land became exhausted, and most peasants did not practice new methods of rotation and fertilizing, which alone could have maintained communities with fixed, as opposed to shifting, cultivation. [46]

The declining productivity and growing population in the reserves led to a change in the character of migrant labour.

/It/ had begun with a few of the young unmarried men from a village going out to work for a few months. Its character changed as the proportion of men increased, as it included older married men, and as the periods of employment away from home became longer and longer. The proportion of adult men (tax-payers) away rose to 71.7 per cent in Middledrift district (an eroded area of the Ciskei) and 67 per cent in Sekhukhuneland in the Transvaal in 1928-29. [47]

Before going on to study the economics of migrant labour we will quote statistics on the assistance of the South African State to white and African farming which further indicate the State's role in the formation of the migrant labour system. In the twenty-five years from 1910 to 1936 it is estimated that the State spent over £112,000,000 to create and support a white capitalistic farming class. On the other hand, assistance given for agricultural development in the Native Reserves in the period 1910-1934 was a mere £624,000. [48]

3.1.5.4. The Economics of Migrant Labour

Describing the transformation of independent spinners and weavers into wage labourers, Marx commented on their relationship to the capitalist as follows:

> finally, even the illusion of "selling" him their products, disappears. He purchases their labour and takes away first their property in the product, soon also their ownership of the instrument, unless he allows them the "illusion of ownership" in order to diminish his costs of production. [49]

Earlier in this paper we referred to the two options open to the mining capitalist in the creation of the proletariat, labour could either be located "on the spot" or rural based. In a statement by the Chamber of Mines to the Mine Native Wages Commission (1943) we find the rationale for the choice of a rural based proletariat:

> The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force by means of tribal natives from the Reserves at rates of pay, which are adequate for this migratory class of labour but inadequate in practice for the detribalised urban native is a fundamental factor in the economy of the Gold Mining Industry. [50]

Since it is on account of its ability to supply cheap labour that the migrant labour system was established, the source of its cheapness needs investigation.

We learn from Marx that:

> The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this special article ... Hence the sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour-power must include the means necessary for the labourer's substitutes i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-owners may perpetuate its appearance in the market. [51] (Emphasis added).

The advantage of a rural based proletariat was firstly, that it permanently tied the sum of the means of necessary wants to the level of a subsistence economy i.e. it did not permit the African worker increasing wants which would have meant higher wages; [52] and secondly, that by allowing the worker the "illusion of ownership" of a plot in the reserve it permitted the reduction in the costs of production to the mining industry. [53] Basically, the mines paid a "single man's" wage while his family supported itself from peasant production. To illustrate the point we refer again to the Mine Native Wage Commission which reported that,

> /t/he Chamber of Mines has based its case very largely on the argument that, in fixing the wages of the mine labourers and in determining whether the wages so fixed are adequate, it is entitled to take cognizance of the full subsistence which a native is able to obtain from his holding in the Reserve. [54]

There were also disadvantages attached to the use of migrant labour, for example, the high rate of labour turnover and the corresponding lack of experienced workers. These negative factors were not crucial as the work-process required unskilled labour. In the early years the mines suffered from seasonal labour shortages when African men returned to their homes at ploughing and harvesting times. But the mine owners gradually ironed out these difficulties by extending the length of the contracts and offering bonuses to returning workers. Worker discipline was maintained by the strict enforcement of pass laws and the use of enclosed compounds. Recruitment costs were unavoidable, but by deducting travel expenses from wages the additional transport costs were avoided.

Advantages of the system included the fact that the constant change in African employees made trade union organization very difficult and retarded the formation of a modern urbanized proletariat with political aspirations. Furthermore, the cost of supplying social services was substantially reduced:

> Apart from a rising scale of wages, a permanent labour force would require social amenities, such as housing and recreation, of a more extensive and costly type than the migrant labour will accept. Even more costly, whether at the employers' or the government's expense, would be the necessary provision for old age or unemployment. [55]

Now according to Marx, "free labour means above all that the worker must be separated from the land". But in South Africa an apparent anomaly existed, for the worker had access to a plot in the reserve. The point is, however, that on the one hand the plot was too small to make possible an independent existence; on the other hand it was large enough to supplement a wage below the subsistence costs. Statistics show that income from the mines represents approximately half the rural proletarian family's subsistence requirement in the 1940's, the other half was earned in the Reserve. [56] So it is obvious that "plot"

income subsidised the mining companies, i.e., it enabled them to reduce their labour bill substantially.

Engels described a similar phenomenon in nineteenth century Germany, when he pointed to the pecularity of the form of proletarianization of small-allotment peasants:

> And here is seen in all its glory the "blessing" of house and landownership for the modern worker. Nowhere, hardly excepting even the Irish domestic industries, are such infamously low wages paid as in the German domestic industries. Competition permits the capitalist to deduct from the price of labour power that which the family earns from its own little garden or field ... (and permits the payment of wages) ... far below the value of labour power. [57]

Thus in reality, the migrant worker is a free labourer for he is structurally forced to sell his labour to the capitalists in order to survive. He has been for all practical purposes separated from the land. The economic benefit of land ownership accrues to the capitalist rather than to the worker. Further, it must be pointed out that at least at certain periods or in certain regions the reproduction of labour power was not even sustained: (see 5.1.4.4.)

> Once the contract is over, the worker is sent back home, often a worn-out wreck. In the ... Transkei one can see many of these tubercular, crippled, burned-out by their labour in the mines ... a heavy economic burden to their already poverty-stricken relatives. [58]

What we have demonstrated is that the extraordinary cheapness of migrant labour lay both in the tying of the total income of the rural based proletariat to a stationary, pre-capitalist level of subsistence and in the subsidy provided to the capitalists by the reserve income. In conclusion, we might point out that the mechanism used to produce an unlimited supply of cheap labour to serve capital in South Africa, was widely applied by the imperialists in Africa. [59]

Conclusion

In this section we have sketched the process by which black labour was proletarianized in South Africa. Two questions arise from this analysis of the formation of the capitalist mode of production. Firstly, how was it possible for the mining industry to function efficiently using unskilled migrant workers? Secondly, what does the fixing of African wages at the level of rural subsistence imply about the nature of capitalism in the South African satellite?

The answer to the first question will be found in a study of the level of productive forces and the production relations operative in the gold mining industry (see sections 3.2. and 4.1.4.2); to the second, in an analysis of the inner-workings of the South African economy and its dependency on the world market (see section 4.1.5.1).

3.2. Production Relations in the Gold Mines: The Basis of Class, Political and Ideological Relations in South Africa: 1890-1920

Introduction

In this section we will examine the formation of class relations in the dominant capitalist industry, the gold mines. Emphasis will be placed on the demystification of the relationship between the bulk of the white labour on the gold mines, the supervisors, and the African semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Furthermore, we refer to the political and ideological relations which arose simultaneously with the establishment of stable production relations in mining, and point out that this early structure became the basis of all industrial relations in South Africa.

My general point of departure when assessing capitalist production relations in the gold mines and their impact on South African society, is indicated by the following quotation from Marx:

> The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining

element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers - a relationship always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity - which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic base - the same from the standpoint of its main condition - due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances. [60]

3.2.1. Marxist Class Theory

The final chapter of Marx's Capital was to have dealt with "Classes" but unfortunately it was not completed. However the problem of class is present throughout his work, making it possible for latter-day Marxists to re-construct the theory of class which his analyses imply.

Two interpretations of Marxist class theory, differing primarily in breadth, confront the student today. The first being the narrow - "economistic" conception of class, the second being more broadly based. Both theories agree that the social classes are defined by their position in the production process, i.e., by their place in the economic sphere.[61] The economistic theory stresses the exclusivity of the economic sphere in determining social classes. Whereas, the broader theory here represented by Poulantzas, argues that:

The economic place of the social agents has a "principal" role in determining social classes. But from that we cannot conclude that this economic place is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states that the economic does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of production or social formation; but the political and ideological (the superstructure) also have an important role. For whenever Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao analyse social classes, far from limiting themselves to the economic criteria alone, they make explicit reference to political and ideological criteria. We can thus say that a social class is defined by its "place" in the ensemble of social practices, i.e. by its place in the ensemble of the division of labour which includes

political and ideological relations. This place corresponds to "the structural determination" of classes, i.e. the manner in which determination by the structure (relations of production, politico-ideological domination/subordination) operates on class practices - for classes have existence only in the class struggle. [62]

As an example of a politico-ideological effect on class determination, Poulantzas points to the "special authority in overseeing the labour process and its despotic organization" which some workers exercise in production. He has the best precedent for his insistence on the importance of this criterion in class determination, namely, Marx's principal work Capital, to which we now refer.

> The directing motive, the end and aim of capitalist production, is to extract the greatest possible surplus-value, and consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest possible extent. As the number of the co-operating labourers increases, so too does their resistance to the domination of capital, and with it, the necessity of capital to overcome this resistance by counterpressure. The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function, due to the nature of the social labour-process, and peculiar to that process, but it is, at the same time, a function of the exploitation of a social labour-process, and consequently rooted in the unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the living and labouring raw material he exploits ... If, then, the control of the capitalist is in substance twofold by reason of the two-fold nature of the process of production itself, - which, on the one hand, is a social process for producing use-values, on the other, a process for creating surplus-value - in form that control is despotic. As co-operation extends its scale, this despotism takes forms peculiar to itself. Just as at first the capitalist is released from actual labour so soon as his capital has reached that minimum amount with which capitalist production, as such, begins, so now, he hands over the work of direct and constant supervision of the individual workmen, and groups of workmen, to a special kind of wage labourer. An industrial army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants (foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function. [63] (Emphasis added.)

Here Marx reveals the contradictory nature of the labour of supervision, which in the capitalist mode of production, is characterized by supremacy of capital over labour. He acknowledges the productive aspect of supervisory labour, while clearly stating that the politico-

ideological factor, authority and direction, is dominant in the determination of the class of this "special kind of wage labourer". Reasoning along the same line, Poulantzas has maintained that "as a 'whole' engineers and technicians cannot be considered as belonging to the working class". [64] And to this non-working class group we can obviously add all foremen, overseers or "gangers" who command on behalf of capital on the production front.

The question then arises as to which class this group belongs? Poulantzas would regard it as a fraction of the "new" middle class, [65] whereas Therborn would consider it a part of the "intermediate strata". [66] Of one fact we can be certain, that this group of technicians and foremen do not constitute a labour aristocracy, which is a stratum of the working class itself. [67]

With these theoretical tools in mind we can now turn to an analysis of the so-called "white working class" in South Africa.

3.2.2. Production, Class and Distribution Relations in the Gold Mines

3.2.2.1. Production Relations

As mentioned, at the turn of the century vast amounts of British capital were poured into the South African infrastructure and gold mining industry, laying the foundations of a capitalist mode of production. The crucial empirical circumstance affecting the appearance of the capitalist system in South Africa, was the presence of a large body of tribal Africans which could be converted into a cheap supply of labour for the mines.

Now according to Marx in order to reveal the "hidden basis of the entire social structure" of a specific society we must analyse "the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers", i.e., the production relations.

In South Africa large scale capitalist production was first established in the mining industry in the late 1800's. The economy remained primarily engaged in the production of gold and other minerals up to the

1940's, with mining production relations determining all other industrial production relations, as well as the specific form of the State. Hence, it is necessary to analyse the relations of production which the mine owners found to be most suitable for pumping surplus-value out of labour.

We refer to the Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission, 1919, for a detailed description of production relations in the gold mines.

> The White miner is the first to enter his working place in the morning. His last act on the previous shift was to light up his fuses for blasting, and it is now his duty to see that the place is safe enough for his gang to work in before letting them commence their tasks. He enters with a few natives, dresses down pieces of rock which might fall and endanger life and limb, and generally makes the place secure ... He then admits the remainder of the natives, points out the position and direction of the holes to be drilled, assists in the rigging up of machine drills, and gets the work well underway.
>
> When he feels he can safely leave the natives to continue their tasks, he proceeds to the place where his explosives are stored, prepares his cartridges, fuse and detonators for blasting, returns to the working place to see the finish of the process of drilling, fetches his explosives, sends the natives out, charges up his holes, places guards to prevent persons entering by mistake, lights up his fuses, either in person or by means of natives acting under his immediate eye, and proceeds up the shaft to be hoisted to the surface. The natives in his gang will have rigged up the machine drills, done the drilling, and shovelled the rock, broken by the previous day's blast, to the bottom of the stope to be transferred to the trucks, and generally done all or nearly all the manual work required ....
>
> The white trammer, waste packer and timberman, similarly will do the supervision of the native's work, lending a hand where required and being generally responsible for the safety of the native ... There is a good deal of elasticity in the extent to which native labour is utilized in the actual operations to be carried out. One White man will do a good deal of the manual work himself, where another would content himself with directing.
>
> One principle is, however, practically universally observed and that is that every native or coloured person has to work under the supervision of a White man who is not an official, A shift boss, for example, is not permitted to set a half-a-dozen natives on any job, such as tramming or shovelling, but must place them in charge of some White man, who is responsible for their safety and for the due performance of their work. This restriction

> is due primarily to custom and partly to mining regulations which, although primarily intended for the preservation of safety, have in course of time come to be regarded by White workers as their bulwark against the demand of the natives to be allowed to do work now only entrusted to whites. Those regulations and customary restrictions constitute what is generally known as the 'colour bar' ... [68] (Emphasis added.)

Commenting on the role of white labour in the gold-mines in the early years, de Kiewiet writes that,

> /t/hey did not become miners in the Australian or Canadian sense of the word, but a group of highly paid overseers superintending a great mass of unskilled black labour. [69]

And after a visit to South Africa in 1899, J.A. Hobson concluded that,

> South Africa is not in any true sense a white man's country, for though white men live there, they do not work there save in the capacity of overseers of serf labour. [70]

In short, the production relations in the mining industry were characterized by capitalist ownership (control) of the means of production, and a small group of white foremen and skilled wage labourers who oversaw a great mass of unskilled and semi-skilled African workers.

Furthermore, the use of sub-contracting or "co-exploitation" was common practise up to about 1920.

> White miners were both contractors and wage earners, exploiters as well as exploited ... The /early mining/ system had given rise to a partnership between skilled immigrant miners from Cornwall or elsewhere and white South Africans, usually Afrikaners, who hired and supervised the gang of African helpers. In later years the companies took over the responsibility for recruiting and paying the African, partly to stop crimping and to peg his wages at a figure acceptable to all owners. The principle of relating the white miner's earnings to the amount of work extracted from his gang persisted.... /The white miner's/ ... earnings depended on "the efficiency per boy per fathom per day". The harder the African worked, the greater was the ganger's income ... Since the supply of African labour was constantly renewed, a ganger had no material interest

> in conserving the strength or promoting the well-being of the men under him. He did not regard them as fellow workers. He was their "baas" and so they addressed him. [71]

Applying the theoretical tools developed in the earlier section, we can immediately recognize the contradictory role played by the white wage labourers in the production process. [72] White skilled labourers and foremen command in the name of "white" capital and this special function within production places them in a special position with respect to the African workers whom they supervise.

The production relations in the gold mines were in essence, exploitation of black labour-power by "white" capital assisted by a special squad of white wage earning supervisors. And it is this specific interrelationship which became the basis of the entire South African social structure since the advent of large-scale capitalist production at the turn of the century.

3.2.2.2. Class Relations

Given the particular relations of production in the South African mining industry we can objectively define the classes of the three interacting groups. We had foreign monopoly capital, which was directly antagonistic to the African working class, and a group of non-working class white wage labourers with a special role in the production process. This last group, commonly and falsely referred to as the "white working class", [73] will now be examinied more closely.

An investigation of the white workers requires an analysis of this group's relationship to "white" capital and black labour on an economic, political and ideological plane. Since the capitalist controls the production process and its corresponding political and ideological aspects, we shall begin with an analysis of the capitalist-supervisor relationship.

The goal of the capitalist was simply to exploit the vast gold deposits by means of the subjugated African's labour-power. To do this he needed an intermediate group of white skilled workers. This group was con-

veniently recruited in Britain with the promise of high wages from the South African El Dorado. But the use of British immigrant mining engineers and artisans fulfilled a double purpose for the capitalists; the purely economic purpose, as a ready supply of necessary skilled labour, and the political purpose, as a pro-British (jingo) pressure group against the Boer Republican government that administered the gold-rich Transvaal.

The mining capitalists had hoped to keep their white skilled labourers in a vulnerable position so as to ensure their absolute control over production. This meant that the white wage earners' organizations were not initially recognized by the capitalists and those who attempted to form trade unions were victimized.

But British immigrant skilled labourers had brought their class consciousness to South Africa, and all capitalist efforts to prevent their trade unionization failed. However, it took the white labourers until the early 1920's to consolidate their position as a permanent and protected group of skilled labourers and supervisors in South African mining production.

The mining capitalists recognized the importance of a group of satisfied white supervisors who would command the African workers on their behalf. But they tried to keep their "sergeants" in a weak position so that in times of crisis they could reduce their wages, dismiss the inefficient and force the remainder to supervise a larger number of African workers per man. [74] It was against this vulnerability that the white supervisors fought, successfully entrenching their role as unassailable supervisors of black labour and obtaining legal recognition of the "colour bar" in the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926.

It is of crucial importance to note that at no time did the ruling capitalist class ever consider even the partial replacement of their white supervisors with cheaper black supervisors, i.e., the formation of a multi-racial group of skilled labourers and supervisors. [75] The maintenance of a white's only supervisory group was fundamental to the colonial structure of exploitation, which aimed to keep the black working class in a state of permanent submission.

The capitalists greatly feared the development of class consciousness among the enslaved African workers. Only by walling-off the African proletariat from the white supervisors, could they retard the growth of African class consciousness and trade unionism which so greatly threatened their interests.

The white supervisor-black worker relationship can only be understood if seen in the shadow of the capitalist ruling class in which it stood. The white wage earners were placed in a functionally contradictory position in the production process. They both contributed to the production of surplus-value and acted as supervisors of the exploited African proletariat. The latter aspect of their function was determinate with respect to their objective class position, i.e., they were not a part of the working class.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the period of white labour's struggle to consolidate its elite position, from the 1890's to the 1920's, it did not regard African workers as class comrades but as a threat to its supervisory and technical monopoly. [76] The mine owners interest in maintaining a racial hierarchy in production coincided with that of the white miners. The African workers in turn, viewed the white labourers as the greatest obstacle to their advancement. [77]

3.2.2.3. Distribution Relations

> The so-called distribution relations, then, correspond to and arise from historically determined specific social forms of the process of production and mutual relations entered into by men in the reproduction process of human life. The historical character of these distribution relations is the historical character of production relations, of which they express merely one aspect. [78]

The distribution of social wealth reflected the production relations in the South African mining industry. The lions share of the net product, of course, went to the capitalists. [79] But, of particular interest is the distribution of wages between the white wage earners and the African working class.

The exceptionally wide wage spread between white and black labour initially established in the mines had its basis in the historically different "values of labour power" for skilled immigrant whites and unskilled tribal Africans. [80] However this wage relationship, which was historically determined, became rigid on account of the establishment of a racial hierarchy in production, commonly referred to as the "colour bar".

In 1911 there were 24,700 whites and 190,100 Africans employed on the gold mines. [81] On average, whites earned £333 per annum and Africans £28.5 p.a., the earnings gap ratio between white and black labour being 11,7:1. [82] Whereas white wages had been rising between 1889 and 1911, African wages had declined from £38 p.a. to £28.5 p.a. in the same period. [83] The mine owners had forced down the wages paid to the African working class by means of monopolistic wage fixing agreements and the formation of a central recruitment organization for all African mine labour. [84]

3.2.3. Some Effects of Mining Production Relations on Society in General

The specific political form of the South African state took shape simultaneously with the establishment of mining production relations. During the period from 1830 to 1880 the British Colonial Office enforced a racially liberal policy, and when the Cape Colony was granted representative government in 1854, a non-racial qualified franchise was instituted despite white settler opposition. [85] But with the rise of monopoly capitalism and an aggressive imperialist policy in the last decade of the century, an inevitable shift from the former liberal policy took place. As Lord Olivier noted,

> about 1890 British colonial policy was breaking away from its traditional principles, founded not only on axioms of Western civilization, but on the results of a century of experience in our older mixed communities, and selling the national soul to the exigencies of the new enterprise of capitalised exploitation which inspired the Partition of Africa. European enterprise was once more, as in the slavery period, being deliberately launched into a direct confrontation of white with black, the white seeking the black as a labourer and a labourer only. [86]

The specific production relations in the mining industry were based on a racial barrier between the white supervisors and the African proletariat. The corresponding political form of this specific relationship was the granting of political rights to capital's white functionaries and the denial of political rights to the African workers. Consequently, when the British imperialists relinquished their political hold over South Africa in 1910, they placed all the political power firmly in the hands of the white colonists, leaving the Africans as powerless in the political sphere as they were in the economic sphere. The white wage labourers inevitably used their political gift from the capitalists to firmly entrench their skill and supervisory monopoly and to uphold white political supremacy.

The ideological aspect growing out of the specific production relations also shifted with the revival of British capital's interest in South Africa. For just as large-scale capitalist exploitation of black labour necessitated the revocation of the liberal non-racial franchise, so too, was earlier ideological liberalism in need of revision.

In 1894 the Glen Gray Act was passed at the Cape, marking the official change in "Native" policy. Whereas the previous liberal policy had regarded the Africans as "civilizable" i.e. potentially equal, the new policy of "segregation" (of which more will be said in Chapter 5.1.2.1.) stressed the non-assimilability of the Africans into the "civilized" white society.

By trying to retard the cultural assimilation of the African people, the mining capitalists hoped to keep the black workers docile and prevent the inevitable development of their class and national consciousness.

The deliberate shift to a racist ideology aimed to inferiorize the African workers and superiorize the white overseers, thereby entrenching the "natural" master-servant relation between racially "inferior" blacks and racially "superior" whites. [87]

It is important to note that the shift away from the political and ideological liberalism practised at the Cape in the mid-nineteenth

century corresponded to the establishment of monopoly capitalist production relations in the late 1800's, and had little to do with pressure from the racially intolerant Boers. [88]

So far we have been concerned with the monopoly capitalist production relations established in the mining industry in the 1886-1920 period. The colour bar between black and white workers erected in the mining industry became the model for production relations in the manufacturing and construction industries too. [89] The wage structure in mining also set the national standards. [90] The dominance of mining in the economy as a whole in this period, is reflected in the industrial employment statistics.

Table 3.4. Industrial Employment in 1918

	White workers	All workers
Mining	32,000	291,000
Private Manufacturing	44,000	124,000
Railways	35,000	72,000
Total	111,000	487,000

Source: D. Hobart Houghton, "Economic Development, 1865-1965", The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. II, p. 21.

Conclusion

In this section we presented an application of Marxist class theory to the the capitalist production system which arose in South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By closely analysing the relations of production, particularly the relationship between white and black wage labourers, we revealed not only the basis of income distribution, but also the hidden basis of the society's political and ideological superstructure.

We objectively defined that class of white labour whose principal function entailed supervision as non-working class and antagonistic to black labour. However, not all the white labourers played a mainly authoritative role on the production front. In the next chapter we will analyse two other categories of white labour, the "poor whites" who in the 1920's and 1930's mainly occupied state subsidized jobs (4.4.), and the white skilled "labour aristocracy" (4.5.).

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS CHANGE: 1933-1948

4.1. Structural Change and the Labour Shortage Crisis

A central hypothesis of this study is that the rise to power of Afrikaner fascism can best be understood as the result of a crisis which was firmly rooted in the actual class relations of the South African society. But these antagonistic class relations were in turn based on the character and level of development of the productive forces and the corresponding production relations within the specific South African capitalist social formation. In this chapter we will examine the changing economic basis underlying the socio-economic crisis in the 1940's.

To study the whole economy of a society in a brief but meaningful way requires a high degree of critical choice as to what can safely be left out. By focusing on "change" we will attempt to isolate the impact of the dynamic elements within the total structure, for it was precisely those structural changes which laid the basis for the events in the political and ideological spheres.

4.1.1. The Growth and Distribution of National Income: 1933-1948

We begin this study of the changing economic structure of the country between 1933 and 1948 with an overall view of the growth of national income, its distribution between races (classes) in South Africa, and the contribution of the major sectors to its make-up.

As shown in Table 4.1. below, national income grew by 250 per cent in real terms over the 1912-1948 period. However, it is necessary to periodize the national income statistics in order to make meaningful comparisons and so reveal the specific features of the period. We have selected three main sub-periods: period I, from 1923 to 1929; period II, from 1933 to 1939; and period III, from 1940 to 1948. The main period of our study is from 1933 to 1948. In this period real national income grew rapidly from £255m to £575m, i.e., by 125 per cent over 15 years

Table 4.1. Growth in Real National Income in Selected Periods: 1912-1948 (Base Year = 1938, in £m)

Real N.I.		Real N.I.		Real N.I.	
Period I		Period II		Period III	
1923	204	1933	255	1940	418
1929	253	1939	396	1948	575
Increase	24 %	Increase	55 %	Increase	36 %

Real N.I.		Real N.I.	
Period IV		Period V	
1933	255	1912	164
1948	575	1948	575
Increase	125 %	Increase	250 %

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, pp. S-3, H-23.

giving an average real growth rate of 8.3 per cent per annum. In period II, which we label the "Gold Boom" period, real national income grew by 55 per cent, as compared to 24 per cent in period I. In period III, which we call the "War Economy", it grew by a further 36 per cent.

Figure 4.1. Real National Income Per Capita: 1922/23-1958/59 (Base Year = 1958/59)



Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p, S-6.

The overall growth in per capita income is shown graphically in figure 4.1. To a great extent the rapid growth of the 1930's might be interpreted as a recovery from the depression years of 1928-1931, although gold production experienced a steady growth of output.

The distribution of national income between races (classes) in South Africa was extremely inequitable. It had its roots in the creation of a cheap migrant proletariat to serve the export-oriented gold mining industry.

Table 4.2. Distribution of National Income among the Various Racial Groups, and Racial Composition of the Population and Labour Force - Union of South Africa, 1936

Income and Population Group	Europeans	Natives	Asiatics	Coloureds *	Total
A. National Income					
Income from					
All Industries (£m.)	259.8	68.5	6.1	14.5	348.9
% of Total	74.5	19.6	1.7	4.1	100.0
Farming and Fishing (£m.)	18.8	22.4	0.7	3.3	45.2
% of Total	41.7	49.5	1.6	7.2	100.0
Other Industries (£m.)	241.0	46.2	5.4	11.2	303.7
% of Total	79.3	15.2	1.8	3.7	100.0
B. Racial Composition of Population and Labour Force (%)					
Total Population	20.9	68.8	2.3	8.0	100.0
Working Population:					
Total	14.0	79.5	1.3	5.3	100.0
Farming and Fishing	5.3	91.3	0.5	2.8	100.0
Other Industries	29.2	58.6	2.5	9.7	100.0
C. Average Income per Person					
Total Population	£129.6	£10.4	£27.6	£18.8	£36.4
% of European Income	100.0	8.0	21.3	14.5	-
Working Population:					
Total	£350.3	£16.2	£91.5	£51.4	£65.7
% of European Income	100.0	4.6	26.1	14.7	-
Farming and Fishing	£103.8	£7.2	£40.0	£34.0	£13.3
% of European Income	100.0	6.9	38.5	32.8	-
Other Industries	£430.2	£41.0	£110.8	£60.4	£158.2
% of European Income	100.0	9.5	25.8	14.0	-

* The term Coloureds refers to people of mixed racial origin.

Source: Industrial Legislation Commission, 1951, p. 26, tab. 29.

The following commentary on Table 4.2., is taken from the Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission itself.

> The unequal distribution of the total income is so striking that the statistical facts reflected ... require little elaboration. Non-Europeans who constituted 79.1 per cent of the total population in 1936, and 86 per cent of the working population of the Union, received only 25.5 per cent of the national income, and the disproportion is greater still if only Natives are taken into account: 68.8 per cent of the total population, or 79.5 per cent of the working population, received only 19.6 per cent of the national income. These disparities are still more striking when the average annual income per person is compared, i.e. Europeans £129.6, Natives £10.4, Coloureds £18.8, and Asiatics £27.6. The per capita income of a Native was, therefore, only 8 per cent of that of a European, the average income of an Asiatic almost three times that of a Native, while the per capita income of Coloureds was halfway between that of Natives and Asiatics. When the income per person of the working population only is taken into account, the relative income of Natives appears in a still more unfavourable light, being only £16.2 per person, or 4.6 per cent of the per capita income of Europeans. [1]

Before proceeding to an examination of the sectoral contributions to national income, we observe the effect of the Great Depression on the South African satellite economy.

Table 4.3. Sectoral Changes in National Income in the Depression
(at current prices) (Base year = 1938)

	1929	1930	1931	1932	% Change 1929-1932
Agriculture	47	39	32	29	- 38
Gold-mining	31	32	33	35	+ 13
Other mining	14	11	7	4	- 71
Manufacturing	38	39	37	34	- 11
Net N.I. (Total)	271	257	236	217	- 20
Real N.I.	253			226	- 11

Source: L. Katzen, Gold & The South African Economy, (Cape Town: Balkema, 1964) p. 75, tab. 27.

The overall effect of the Depression was a decline in national income from a high of £271m in 1929 to a low of £217m in 1932, i.e., by 20 per cent. This decline amounted to only 11 per cent in real terms It was unevenly distributed between the various sectors. Aside from a slump in the diamond mining industry (Other mining - 71 %), farming incomes were hardest hit on account of the fall in world market prices i.e., - 38 per cent. Manufacturing was mildly affected with a decline of 11 per cent, whereas, the gold-mining industry experienced a 13 per cent increase in income on mainly account of a steady increase in output due to its ability "to absorb many thousands of Africans rendered unemployed in other industries". [2] Since South Africa did not devalue until January, 1933 the price of gold remained constant during this period.

Table 4.4. Sectoral Contributions to Net National Income: 1933-1948

	Agriculture		Mining		Manufacturing		Commerce		Public * Authorities	
	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%
Period II										
1933	31	13	56	24	32	14	29	12	89	38
1939	51	13	82	21	70	18	54	14	140	35
Period III										
1940	51	12	98	23	76	18	62	14	145	34
1948	139	16	86	10	182	21	133	16	311	37

* and Other Income.

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. S-3.

As shown in Table 4.4, in period II the mining sector's income grew from £56m to £82m, agricultural income grew from a post-depression low of £31m to £51m, and manufacturing advanced from a low of £32m to £70m. Thus, each productive sector experienced considerable growth during period II, notably, manufacturing was beginning to challenge the mining sector's predominance, since the share of manufacturing grew while that of mining declined. By 1939 mining income represented 21 per cent of the national income, manufacturing 18 per cent and agriculture 13 per cent. [3]

Similarly, in period III we see that the mining sector's income declined absolutely from £98m to £86m, whereas farming and manufacturing incomes grew substantially from £51m to £139m and from £76m to £182m, respectively. Thus the "War Economy" resulted in a major shift in income distribution between sectors. By 1948, mining income represented only 10 per cent of the national income, farming 16 per cent and manufacturing became the primary source of income at 21 per cent.

Here then, in a nutshell, we have a description of the major income and structural change which took place in the South African economy during the years 1933 to 1948. Most significant was the rapid growth in the manufacturing industry during the whole period and the absolute decline of the mining industry in period III. In period III the manufacturing industry received a major boost from the peculiarities of wartime production requirements.

So far we have only examined the external indicators of change in the economy. However, an understanding of the factors causing this sustained growth in the dependent South African economy is necessary for a proper appreciation of these changes. Therefore, we analyse the dynamics of growth, firstly in the "Gold Boom" period and then in the "War Economy" period.

4.1.2. The Gold Boom Period: 1933-1939

Frankel's analysis of the growth of national income in the pre-war years was written in 1944, a time in which gold mining was experiencing a decline and manufacturing, spurred on by war conditions, seemed to be entering a phase of self-oriented growth. [4] His analysis of the real source of the spectacular growth in national income in the 1933 to 1939 period was intended to disillusion those who had begun to think in terms of industrial self-sufficiency, and had lost sight of the primary role of the world market and South Africa's fundamental dependence on exports.

In his book Capital Investment in Africa (1936), Frankel was led to conclude that,

> the economy of the Union /of South Africa/ is the most advanced in Africa, but ... its economic structure still displays in a striking manner the characteristic feature of all African territories, that is, their relatively large dependence on a very restricted number of exportable products as the basis of their relation with the world economy. [5]

He accordingly saw his task to give a lesson in the hidden workings of a typically dependent capitalist economy like South Africa.

We begin with Frankel's summary of the real factors which led to this period's growth and then proceed to show how he proved his case.

> This growth was due to a combination of favourable circumstances which made it possible for the Union to attain a position which was either one of full employment or approximated very nearly thereto. The increased employment was mutually brought about owing to the rise in the value of our exports, particularly of gold, the fall in import prices and the new inducements to invest which resulted from these conditions. This investment was financed from increased private capital imports and from home-savings. (p. 131)

Thus, he isolated three mutually determinant factors which led to the growth in national income: firstly, the rise in the value of exports, particularly of gold; secondly, the fall in import prices; and thirdly, as a consequence of these two factors, new investment.

A statistical measure of the importance of exports to an economy is shown by the ratio of exports to national income. By comparing two periods Frankel was able to demonstrate the increasing dependence of the economy on exports i.e. exports adjusted by an index of import values (Table 4.5.).

Over the two periods the average annual amount of "real" imports commanded by the country's exports increased from £78m in period I to £129m in period II, an increase of £51m or 65 per cent. The corresponding adjusted average import equivalents as a percentage of national income for the two periods were 31 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. But, the export growth was not evenly distributed among the various

branches of production. In fact, the increase in gold exports was largely responsible for export growth in period II (Table 4.6.).

Table 4.5. Import Equivalents of Exports (Annual Averages in £m) (Base Year = 1929)

	Period I 1923-1929	Period II 1933-1938
Value of Exports at Current Prices	87	102
Exports Adjusted by Index of Import Values	78	129
"Real" National Income	249	365
Import Equivalent of Exports as % of N.I.	31	35

Source: Frankel, op. cit., p. 123, tab. 3.

Table 4.6. Value of Exports by Classes of Products and Percentages thereof to Total Value of Exports (Annual Averages in £m)

	Period I 1923-1929	Period II 1933-1938
Total Value of Exports (incl. Re-Exports)	87	102
Total Value of Exports of Gold (incl. Specie)	44	73
Exports of Gold as % of Total Exports	50	71
Value of Diamond Exports	10	3
Diamond Exports as % of Total Exports	11	3
Value of Agricultural Exports	26	20
Agricultural Exports as % of Total Exports	30	20
Value of Manufactured Exports	3	3
Manufactured Exports as % of Total Exports	4	3

Source: Frankel, op. cit., p. 124, tab. 4.

Between periods I and II the average annual value of gold exports rose by £29m, and the average value of gold exports as a percentage of total exports increased from 50 per cent to 71 per cent. The manufacturing industry generated only a minor part of export earnings (3-4 %) and was unable to pay for its own imports. Frankel shows that the average ratio of imported raw materials used in manufacturing remained roughly con-

at at 50 per cent of the total material costs in periods I and II, and that gross value of manufacturing exports represented only 13 per cent and 8 per of gross manufacturing imports in these periods (p. 124, tab. 5).

have examined the first two factors responsible for the rapid economic growth period II. The anti-cyclical expansion of gold exports, at a time when world ces were falling generally, provided South Africa with a good opportunity benefit from international trade.

nce again comparing these periods Frankel was able to isolate the third main tor causing the exceptional growth, the amount of new net investment (Table 4.7.)

le 4.7. Direction of "Net Investment" (in £m)

	Gold Mining	Manufac-turing	Private Building	Total Private Investment	Total Public Investment	Total Net Investmer
-1929						
l Investment	- 5	7	42	66	78	144
Total Investment	-	5	29	46	54	100
-1939						
l Investment	56	18	49	154	108	262
Total Investment	21	7	19	59	41	100

ce: Frankel, op. cit., p. 126, tab. 6.

eriod II the total amount of all net investment was nearly double that of od I, £262m compared to £144m. Of great significance in period II was the in- se in gold mining net investment. Whereas in period I new investment had not ex- ed the costs of closing down mines and replacement of capital obsolescence, in od II net investment amounted to £56m, which was 21 per cent of total net in- ment.

her significant index was that net investment as a percentage of national in- rose from 8.6 per cent in period I to 11.5 per cent in period II (p. 127, 7). Furthermore, Frankel estimated that net investment financed from home ngs as a per cent of national income increased from 5.2 per cent in period I .3 per cent in period II (p. 128, tab. 8), and that in addition to home savings, ate capital imports rose significantly from £34.2m in period I to £57.8m in od II. He concluded that,

> there can be no doubt that this increase in "private" capital imports, as also the increase in private investment from home savings, resulted to a considerable extent from the stimulus to investment provided by the increased price of gold and the general optimism to which it led. (p. 128)

For the years 1933 to 1938 it appears that new capital issued for cash in the gold mining industry amounted to £63m and a further £12m worth of capital expenditure was financed from retained profits. (p. 129) (The £75m does not take into account depreciation). This was an exceptional achievement when compared to the fact that it took the gold industry the most part of 50 years (up to the end of 1932) to attract a sum of cash capital amounting only to about £95m, excluding the amounts appropriated from profits. (p. 129)

Frankel roughly estimated that of the £63m in new cash investment in gold mining, approximately 60 per cent or £38m was likely to have come from foreign sources, and drew attention to the fact of South Africa's historical dependence on the international capital market:

> The periods in which capital could be obtained in large amounts have mainly been periods of very low interest rates in Europe, or periods during which the exceptional profitability of gold mining, and the expectations to which it gave rise, exerted a special attraction to investors. (p. 129)

Having stressed the fact that there was nothing automatic about new capital investment in South Africa and that it would only be forthcoming when the expected rate of profit was relatively high, he went on to warn of the necessity of keeping costs down in the mining industry.

Finally we mention the importance of increased gold mining taxation on state revenues. The government decided to heavily tax the "windfall" mining income which resulted from the 66 per cent increase in the selling price of South Africa's gold. This price rise was due to the exceptional conditions in the international monetary market at the time of the Depression. According to Frankel's estimates the increase in state revenue between period I and period II was £110m, and of this sum, no

less than £66m i.e. about 60 per cent was due to the increased revenue obtained by the state from gold mining. (p. 131)

The full title of Frankel's essay was "An Analysis of the Growth of the National Income of the Union in the period of Prosperity Before the War". As we have shown, the growth of national income in period II was exceptional in the context of a world capitalist depression. Certainly new investment flowing into the gold mines and its multiplier effect (though the multiplier's effect was weakened by the outflow of dividends to foreign mining capital amounting to £70m between 1933 and 1939), [6] along with the increased export value of gold due to a favourable turn in the terms of trade, played the determinant role in the creation of South Africa's pre-war "prosperity". However, Frankel's analysis ignores two crucial and related factors which equally determined economic growth.

In the first place, he fails to take into account the fact that the general economic expansion depended upon the availability of an adequate supply of "cheap" African labour, for as Horwitz noted:

> Those years in which, to the pleasureable astonishment of the annual presidential address to the Chamber of Mines, African labour supply increased from 211,000 in 1930 to 367,000 in 1940, were the decade in which the subsistence tribal economies of South Africa "pushed" their "unlimited labour supply" into the mines. They were the years in which the process of making millions of Africans legally landless was fermenting its urbanized proletariat. [7]

And secondly, that the "prosperity" was not shared equitably, and that this inequality in the division of income generated, by the "Gold Boom" was itself a factor contributing to the boom (Table 4.8.).

As we show below, South Africa was a class society with great disparities in income between classes, and there is no doubt that the profitability of industry in general, and mining in particular, was directly related to the extremely low wages paid to the black working class. The subject of labour supply and wages will be taken up later. Ultimately Frankel's omissions were directly related to his neo-classical economic

model which ignored the fact that capital is a social relation involving both capital and labour.

Table 4.8. Total Cash Earnings of Black and White Labour as a Percentage of Working Profits in the Gold Mines: 1931-1941

	Black Cash Earnings	White Cash Earnings
1931	54	61
1936	38	53
1941	26	38

Source: F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines: 1911-1969, (Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 160, app. 4.

4.1.3. The War Economy Period: 1940-1948

With the outbreak of war, ties to the world economy became steadily weaker and the extraordinary stimulus of war production began to radically alter the structure of the South African economy. This was a phase of development which Frankel has described as "active capitalist involution". [8]

In his 1940 Budget Speech, the South African Minister of Finance, Mr. Hofmeyer, acknowledged the great opportunity which the war-time weakening of foreign competition afforded the industrialists:

> It remains for me to refer to the present and potential effect of the war on our secondary industries. The last Great War was of fundamental importance in the development of this branch of our economic life. Once again we are presented with a great opportunity to make progress ... I need merely state the factors which constitute that opportunity to which I referred. Competition has been reduced as a result of the removal from the field of Germany, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland and the greater difficulties of supply from other countries. Dumping has virtually been eliminated. The costs of production of overseas articles have advanced. The irregularity of shipping facilities and the increased freight and insurance rates have largely increased the effective protection of our local industries. [9]

To isolate the dynamics of change we will compare economic indicators derived by Frankel for period II with our own for period III. However, to facilitate the comparison we break up period III into two phases: the war years, 1940 to 1945; and the post-war years, 1946 to 1948.

By the end of the war sizeable gold and foreign exchange reserves had been accumulated. Total Gold and Foreign Exchange holdings rose from £53m in 1939 to £267m in 1945. [10] The government used this favourable moment to reduce foreign debt from £106m in 1940 to £18m in 1945. At the same time increased domestic savings enabled the domestic public debt to be raised from £290m in 1940 to £540m in 1945, i.e. by £250m. [11]

South Africa experienced a rising inflation during the war years. For the purpose of measuring changes in wholesale and retail prices, the year 1938 was selected as a base year, since South Africa entered the war in September, 1939. Wholesale prices of domestic goods rose by 44 per cent by 1945, and retail prices by 32 per cent. [12] The prices of imported goods advanced more rapidly than local ones. [13] Military expenditure averaged 10 per cent of net national income between 1940 and 1945. [14] The bulk of this expenditure went to pay defence force wages. However, a portion of defence spending did lead to the creation of permanent assets, estimated at around £100m. [15] Total net investment fell substantially during the war, from an average of 11.5 per cent of national income in period II to 5.5 per cent per annum between 1940 and 1945. [16] As we have already shown, real national income continued to grow during the war, namely, by 16 per cent, but this was slower than the rate of growth experienced before the war.

By relying to a greater extent on their own resources of skill and equipment, the manufacturing and steel industries were able to adapt to war production, stimulated by the government policy of paying "cost plus 10 %". These sectors showed the greatest advance during the war, whereas the gold mining industry suffered a setback. The way in which each industrial sector coped with war conditions will be analysed later on, so too will war-time labour and wage changes.

Turning now to the post-war phase of adjustment to the imposed import limitation, it is not surprising to find that the import coefficient (imports as a percentage of national income) for the years 1946-1948 averaged 29 per cent, as compared to 24 per cent in period II and 13 per cent in the war years. The import equivalent of exports as a per cent of national income averaged 25 per cent for the period 1946-1948, as compared to 36 per cent in period II. Thus exports once again played a decisive role in the economy, yet gold's contribution to export income had declined from 71 per cent-in period II to 62 per cent. [17] However, the gold and foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to meet the extraordinary demand for imported goods in the immediate post-war years. In addition, foreign exchange was required for the import of basic foodstuffs which were normally produced locally, but which were in short supply due to severe drought in 1945, 1946 and 1947. [18]

The post-war period was also marked by a high rate of gross domestic capital formation. An average of £242m per annum was invested during the 1946-1949 period, of which £113m came out of gross domestic savings and £129m from net foreign borrowing including realization of gold and foreign exchange. [19]

Foreign capital flooded into South Africa after the war-time restrictions on capital movements were lifted, especially from Britain. This inflow amounted to an average of £100m per annum between 1946 and 1948, and saved the country from balance of payments difficulties created by excessive importing. [20] Yet the hectic pace of economic activity in the post-war years, along with declining gold production, did eventually lead to a severe balance of payments crisis in 1949, which led to the imposition of import controls. But this falls outside our period of interest.

In this section we have dealt with the growth of national income in South Africa between 1933 and 1948, and have indicated the main factors which mutually determined this period of extended economic development. We mentioned, however, the importance of labour supply and labour cost only in passing. This subject matter will now be taken up in the course of an analysis of each industrial sector and its relationship to the rest of the economy.

4.1.4. Analysis of the Major Industrial Sectors

4.1.4.1. The Manufacturing Industry

The cutting-off of the sources of metropolitan supplies during the First World War had led to a period of "active capitalist involution". Various industries were started including the manufacture of footwear and clothing. Between 1912 and 1921 the net product of manufacturing rose from £9m to £27m, in real terms from £11m to £20m. [21] However, the post-war slump and the re-establishment of normal trade relations with the metropolis resulted in import competition and threatened to ruin local industry just at a time when the unemployment of whites moving from the depressed farming areas was a major white social problem.

The mining industry was against the protection of local industry. But, with the defeat of Smuts, the mine-owners political representative, in the 1924 election and the formation of a Pact government between the rural bourgeoisie and the white Labour Party, limited tariff protections was extended to the new industries, "except in the case of industries supplying mining and agricultural requirements". [22]

Horwitz has argued that,

> the Customs Tariff Act of 1925 and the reconstitution of the Board of Trade and Industries with extensive powers and advisory duties for the protection of secondary industries, did not, however, imply a suddenly acquired major influence by manufactures and organized industry in the polity ... Such influence was rather a necessary administrative by-product of the new Government's basic social objective - increased employment opportunities for Whites. [23]

However, Kaplan has shown that the tariff protection policy

> was primarily designed to effect the industrial development of the Union, in the interests of agricultural and industrial capital, and only secondarily to provide employment opportunities for whites. [24]

Protection was not only extended to industries supplying consumer goods, of great importance was the government's perseverance, despite the lack of private capital's support and fierce competition from the International Steel Cartel, in starting the iron and steel industry in South Africa (ISCOR). [25] So due to government intervention, secondary industry received protection in the crucial period of its infancy and was consequently in a favourable position when war broke out and metropolitan competition was once again halted. In particular, the establishment of a state owned iron and steel industry during the 1930's was to play a crucial role in the war-time industrial development.

Table 4.9. Selected Private Manufacturing Statistics: 1929-1947
(Comprising Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity)
(Base Year = 1938)

	1929	1938	1945	1947
Total Whites Employed (in '000)	55	93	120	140
White Real Earnings per Capita (in £ p.a.)	183	213	283	307
Total Real White Earnings (in £m) (a)	10	20	34	43
Total Non-Whites Employed (in '000)	87	143	258	293
Non-White Real Earnings per Capita (£ p.a.)	52	56	82	84
Total Real Non-White Earnings (in £m) (b)	5	8	21	25
Net Production Output (in current £m)	34	64	152	229
Real Net Production (in £m) (c)	31	64	100	150
Total Earnings as % Real Output (a)+(b)%(c)	47	44	55	46
White Earnings as % Real Output (a)%(c)	32	31	34	29
Non-White Earnings as % Real Output (b)%(c)	15	13	21	17

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. L-3.

During the 1929 to 1938 period, net real production of private manufacturing industry doubled from £31m to £64m. In this period of expansion total real earnings as a percentage of net real output declined from 47 per cent (of which 32 % white earnings, 15 % non-white) to 44 per cent (of which 31 % white earnings, 13 % non-white) (Table 4.9.).

The war offered the secondary industries the protection they needed from metropolitan competition, and production for war needs provided a

ready market for both consumer and capital goods. The process of manufacture induced by the war-time stimulation and protection underwent a qualitative change. Prior to the war with few exceptions the factories were working on a small scale, not highly mechanised and were largely dependent on tariff protection estimated at £10m in the year 1940. [26] Between 1939 and 1944 the growth of fixed capital per employee in the factories increased by 5 per cent per annum, whereas previously it had been negligible. [27]

During the 1938 to 1945 period, net real manufacturing production rose from £64m to £100m. The total real earnings of white and non-white employees as a percentage of net real output increased sharply from 44 per cent to 55 per cent. The white portion of this rose slightly from 31 per cent to 34 per cent, the non-white rose substantially from 13 per cent to 21 per cent. If real non-white wages per capita would have been the same in 1945 as in 1938 (£56), the non-white share would have increased only from 13 to less than 15 per cent. Thus this was a period of rapid non-white wage increases in manufacturing, with real non-white wages per capita rising by 46 per cent, in comparison, white real wages per capita rose by 33 per cent (Table 4.9.).

During the years 1938 to 1945 the number of whites employed increased by 30 per cent from 93,000 to 120,000 and the number of non-whites by 80 per cent from 143,000 to 258,000. However, the number of whites officially classified as "production and related" workers declined from 32.4 per cent to 25.3 per cent of the total production workers, [28] indicating the increased dependence on a predominantly non-white proletariat.

Merhav analysed the effect of technological dependence on the production structure of a peripheral economy. The importation of modern methods of production with scales of output exceeding the limited domestic market leads inevitably to a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure in industry. [29] The validity of this observation is borne out by statistics relating to the size and output of the units of production in South African manufacturing.

> In 1940-1, 46.1 % of all the industrial establishments produced only 2.1 % of the total gross output, 60.9 % produced 4.5 %, 73.2 % produced 8.5 %, 85.4 % produced 17.7 %, and 91.1 % produced 26.9 %. [30]

Thus, 9 per cent of all the establishments accounted for 73 per cent of the country's aggregate industrial output; and "roughly the same holds true of each industrial category taken separately".

A further point of importance is that in the 1930's alone, more than a 100 new foreign companies had been registered in South Africa. [31] Although there is little evidence to support it, foreign firms, with their advantages of capital and technology from abroad, appear to have developed much faster than their local competitors and sometimes, if not generally, held a dominant position. [32] In some industries, foreign firms shared the oligopolistic leadership with local firms which had managed to grow up behind the tariff walls.

Within the manufacturing industry itself a significant shift towards the production of capital goods had been taking place since the 1933 gold-mining boom. Whereas the "metal products, machinery and transport equipment" sector accounted for 16 per cent of net manufacturing output in 1932-1933 it increased its share to 27 per cent in 1945-1946. According to the Board of Trade and Industries report, "very remarkable" profits were earned in this branch of industry during the war. [33] In comparison, the "food, beverages and tobacco" sector declined from 34 per cent of net output to 21 per cent in 1945-1946. [34]

This fundamental sectoral shift in production from light and labour intensive consumption goods to basic and intermediate capital goods, which is a true sign of industrialization, was accompanied by important changes in production technique and labour organization within the capital goods sector. According to an "Investigation into the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industries":

> Up to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Engineering Industry of the Union was still engaged largely on work of maintenance and repair and did not, to any great extent, undertake the manufacture of engineering supplies. The result was that comparatively little use was made either of operative labour or of the system of payment by results. The development

> of a comparatively large-scale manufacturing section during the war, however, necessitated a considerable readjustment of labour organization and management technique ....The Board in its investigations, has often been impressed by the fact that most journeymen have one or more labourers to help them for, apparently, no other reason than that it is the practice, whereas, overseas, skilled workers have to dispense with such assistance. [35]

4.1.4.2. The Gold Mining Industry

The gold mining industry was controlled by monopoly capital, which was described by Hobson in 1926 as follows:

> Nowhere in the world has there ever existed so concentrated a form of capitalism as that represented by the financial power of the mining houses in South Africa, and nowhere else does that power so completely realize and enforce the need of controlling politics. [36]

In South Africa gold bearing ore was not very rich, but the low-grade ore was compensated for by a number of favourable factors. The most important of these was the sheer volume of ore concentrated in a remarkably small area. This permitted considerable economies of scale. A second factor was that the grade of ore had a remarkably uniform distribution over a wide range. The importance of this was that if either the price of gold increased or working costs decreased, ore that was previously unprofitable became payable again. But it also meant that a small rise in costs could cause a considerable reduction in the volume of payable ore reserves. [37]

Gold mining was a highly labour intensive production process. Since the price of gold was internationally fixed and higher costs could not be passed on to the purchaser, the mining companies were extremely vulnerable to cost inflation. [38] African workers represented 90 per cent of the total labour force, and consequently mine profits were extremely sensitive to changes in the level of their wages. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the mining houses had instituted the migrant labour system and established a labour buying "cartel" in order to hold the price of this commodity at a minimum.

The world-wide increase in the price of gold, from 84 to 140 shillings per ounce in the post-depression years, 1933 and 1935, led to a period of rapid expansion in gold mining. This required a rapid extension of the migrant labour supply which was readily available from the South African reserves and other rural areas outside the country. The number of African workers on the mines increased from 230,000 in 1933 to a peak of 368,000 by 1941. [39]

In 1941 "working profits" [40] in the gold-mines reached £46m before tax of £27m, the total amount of ore milled was 70,400,000 tons by a total work-force of 368,417 Africans and 41,424 whites, dividends declared amounted to £19m of which 51 per cent were paid in South Africa. [41] In the 1940's the gold mines began to lose ground, and by 1943 the net product of the private manufacturing industry exceeded that of the declining mining industry. [42] In 1947 a low point was reached in the mining industry, working profits declined to £21m before tax of £6m, the total amount of ore milled dropped to 53,700,000 tons by a total work-force of 295,867 Africans and 38,829 whites, the declared dividend was £12m. [43]

The most significant change in these figures for the years 1941 and 1947 is the reduction in the African work-force by 73,000 men and the reduction in ore milled by 14,000,000 tons. Throughout this period the grade of ore mined remained more or less constant at 4.0 pennyweight/ton milled, [44] while working costs per ton milled increased from 21s2d in 1941 to 26s7d in 1947. [45] It is noteworthy, that the grade of ore milled did not increase in response to the increasing costs as one might have expected. The productivity of the African work-force improved slightly between 1941 and 1946, from an index of 114 to 116. Thus, the decline in mining revenue was directly related to the size of the African labour force employed. [46]

The mid-1940's cost crisis in the gold mining industry was cause for great concern in the Chamber of Mines. In 1946 it presented an exhaustive analysis of the position of the industry which pointed out that, whereas the price of gold had risen by 15 per cent during the war, there had been a rise in costs of production of 38 per cent over pre-war levels. The position of individual mines revealed the seriousness of

the situation. By 1946, one mine operated at a loss, one mine had ceased active operations, and 10 of the remaining 44 returned minimal profits. [47]

Table 4.10. Selected Mining Statistics: 1936-1951

	1936	1941	1946	1951
African Workers (in '000)	297	368	305	299
Total Cash Wages (in £m)	11	14	14	17
Cash Wages per Capita (in £ p.a.)	36	37	46	57
Index of Real Wages per Capita (Base Year = 1938)	100	89	92	89
White Workers (in '000)	35	41	40	44
Total Cash Wages (in £m)	14	20	23	37
Cash Wages per Capita (in £ p.a.)	409	493	575	832
Index of Real Wages per Capita (Base Year = 1938)	100	94	99	113
Total Ore Milled (millions of tons)	50	70	59	62
Tons Milled per African (in '000)	168	191	195	206
Index of Tons Milled per African	100	114	116	123

Source: Wilson, op. cit., pp. 46, 157-160.

Between 1936 and 1941, the years of the gold boom, African real wages per capita declined from an index 100 to 89, and recovered slightly to 92 in 1946 (Table 4.10). In the same years the white real wage index was 100, 94 and 99, respectively. So for over a decade the mine workers had not received a real wage increase. It is significant that white miners' cash wages were on average about £500 p.a. in these years, whereas black miners' wages were £40 p.a. i.e. the white/black earnings ratio was 12:1.

Inflation was driving up mining costs, especially the cost of stores. Between 1941 and 1946 the proportion of stores consumed to total revenue rose from 29 per cent to 37 per cent. Between 1941 and 1946 the African work-force declined by 17 per cent and the reduction in tons of ore milled was 16 per cent, revealing a direct correlation between output and the size of the African labour-force. [48] During the 1940's a sharp split developed between the wages paid to African workers in mining and manufacturing (Table 4.11.).

In the pre-war years the annual wages paid to African workers in mining and manufacturing differed marginally i.e. by £6 p.a. In 1945 the earnings gap be-

tween these two categories of workers had widened to £38 p.a., and in real t mining wages had dropped from 87 per cent to 59 per cent of manufacturing wa (Table 4.11.).

Table 4.11. A Comparison of African Wages in Mining and Manufacturing: 1939-1945 (in £ per capita per annum, 1939 = 100)

	Mining Cash & Kind	Mining Real	Manufacturing Cash	Manufacturing Real	Real Mining/Manufacturi
1939	41	41	47	47	87
1945	56	41	94	69	59

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. L-3 and Wilson, op. cit., p. 66

The importance of this split was recognized by the Chamber of Mines in its 1 Annual Report:

> Under recent legislation, the Mining Industry also finds itself in a position which, in our opinion, is alarming on somewhat different grounds. Manufacturing industries throughout the country are, as you know, subject to Wage Determinations as defined under the Wage Act. No. 44 of 1937. It is implicit in the method of consideration by which wage determinations are arrived at that any resulting increase in cost is added to the cost of the product. Today, therefore, the mines are working as neighbours of industries subject to two enactments singularly inappropriate to our established conditions. One of the most serious difficulties of all, results from the fact that determinations of Native wages are made to apply to urban conditions, and to a type of Native who has neither land nor income in the Reserves. The economic difficulties of Natives of that class have admittedly created a problem of increasing gravity, but mine natives, who are practically all tribal natives, do not experience the same difficulties. The whole economic structure of the country would be destroyed by increases in the rates of pay to mine Natives comparable with those which have been granted to urban Natives. [49] (Emphasis added)

As the crisis reached its peak in 1947, the Chamber reported that:

> The Industry cannot afford to increase wages. The gold mines receive a fixed price for their product whereas other industries are in a position to pass wage increases on to the consumer. Under present-day conditions, we cannot successfully compete with these other industries in a contest of spiralling wages. Any increase in wages would merely add to the inflation ... without, I submit, either benefiting the workers or solving the Industry's labour problems. [50]

So the mining industry was faced with a real problem, for it found it difficult to compete for African labour on a cash wage basis with the neighbouring manufacturing industries. Consequently, it experienced a decline in the labour force and in production in the 1940's.

It was in the very nature of capitalistic gold mining as developed in its monopoly form in South Africa, to always strive to keep the strategic variable cost of African labour at the barest minimum. As shown in Table 4.10., during the boom years 1936 to 1941, real African wages per capita declined by 10 per cent, and in Table 4.8., we showed that African earnings as a percentage of working profits also declined in those years. Further evidence of this is found if we compare 1951 mining statistics to those of 1946. In 1949 the price of gold rose by 35 per cent, and working profits rose from £29m in 1946 to £45m in 1951. [51] However, real African wages fell slightly in thispperiod, the size of the African labour force and total production remained roughly constant (Table 4.10.).

The mining industry was determined to keep its African labour as cheap as possible, even if this meant a loss of production. [52] It was probably convinced that it could acquire sufficient labour at a constant wage with the help of the authorities and by widening its recruitment network in the neighbouring African territories. The two crucial means of securing this goal were the maintenance of the migrant labour system and the prevention of the trade union organization of African mine workers.

4.1.4.3. The White Farming Industry

The structure of white farming was anything but egalitarian. Statistics for 1957 reveal that 25 per cent of the 103,000 farms covered 80 per cent of the farm land, alternatively, that about 76,000 farms covered only 20 per cent of the white-owned land. [53] Thus, there were a large number of poor-white farmers who earned a meagre living off the soil.

> The 1941 population census gave the cash incomes of white farming families. Almost half the owner-occupiers had money incomes of less than £200 per year; of the tenants more than half had money incomes of less than £100 per year, while among

the "bywoners" more than half earned less than £50 per year. [54]

In 1938-1939 the "Farming, Fishing and Forestry" industry contributed 12.7 per cent of the Net National Income, and employed one third of the total economically occupied population. [55] Thus, farming income was generally low. In 1936-1937 the number of African male farm labourers was 464,000, Coloureds 68,000 and Indians 14,000 - a further 160,000 Europeans were owner-occupiers, tenants and employees. [56]

Net agricultural production had reached a peak in 1927-1928 at £53m. With the world-wide collapse of agricultural commodity prices in the depression and the slow recovery, it was not until 1941 that production value again reached £53m. [57]

During these depressed years the white farmers used their strong parliamentary lobby to raise the prices of commodities such as maize, wheat, sugar, meat and dairy products, and received direct government assistance, so that, in 1939-1940 it was estimated that they received at least £7,500,000 in additional income. [58]

The control of the marketing of farm produce was brought under the marketing boards during the 1930's. Under the Marketing Act of 1937 provision was made for the representation of the trade and consumers on each board, but the producer representatives had to be in a clear majority. [59] This producer monopoly over agriculture (in conjunction with large state subsidies) led to the perpetuation of inefficient production methods and was the focus of much criticism by the liberal economists.

Horwitz writes that, "from the view point of South African agriculture, the consequences of the Second World War were hardly less revolutionary than for the country's manufacturing industry". [60] In fact, net output rose from £51m in 1938-1939 to £102m by 1946-1947. [61] The trend towards farming mechanization is reflected in the increase in tractors from 6,019 in 1937 to 22,397 in 1947. [62]

There were wide variations in the terms of agreement between farmers and their African labourers. In some regions of the country "labour

tenancy" was common, which meant that an African family was granted the right to farm and graze cattle on a piece of land in exchange for a fixed period of labour and a small cash wage each year (a semi-feudalism), in other regions full-time labour for a regular wage (cash and kind) was the general practice.

It was estimated in the late 1930's that wages paid to farm Africans, including payments in kind, varied from £13.2 to £28 per annum, but were mostly grouped around £20 p.a., the cash portion of these wages varied between £6 and £28 p.a. [63] In comparison, African industrial wages in 1939 were £48 p.a. and mining wages (cash and kind) were £41. Thus, farm wages were by far the lowest and in the pre-1940's the farming capitalists had relied upon extra-economic coercion to ensure that an adequate supply of African labour stayed on their lands. [64]

However, the Native Farm Labour Committee, 1937-1939, expressed farmers complaints over the shortage of labour, which was attributed to their inability to compete with industry on African cash wages. [65] Despite the fact that the absolute number of Africans living on white-owned farms did not decline during the 1940's, the farmers complained bitterly of a labour shortage throughout the period. It appears that the young male labourers were leaving their families on the farms and seeking work in the industrial centres, so that the numbers remained in the rural areas but the best workers went to the towns. [66]

The development of capitalism in South African agriculture has received very little attention from scholars. But recently Morris published a pioneering study of the process of transformation of the agricultural system from semi-feudalism based on labour tenancy, to capitalist labour relations dominated by a wage system. [67] According to his analysis, the 1930's and 1940's were decades of extreme class struggle between the white capitalist farmers and their African tenants. The latter's main mode of struggle being "migration" from the farms to urban employment and the mines. [68]

The fact that the farms had become the main source of labour to the towns in the 1940's, was revealed in the Tomlinson Commission of 1955. It stated that "to the increase in the number of Bantu urban residents

since 1936, the European farms and other rural areas contributed 40 %, the Bantu areas 8 %, foreign centres 23 % and the natural increase of the towns themselves 29 %". [69]

The shortage of farm labour in the 1940's appears to have had an effect on the cost of farm labour. The report of the National Marketing Council for 1938-1946 indicated that the cost of farm labour in wheat growing areas had increased by over 200 per cent; and the Council's report for 1946-1947 gives 195 per cent as the increase since 1939-1940 in the cost of farm labour in the maize growing districts. [70] These increases were in part due to the higher value placed on wages in kind.

4.1.4.4. The African Reserves

The economic role of the African Reserves has been elucidated in Chapter 3. It was demonstrated that these areas of the country had been set aside for African occupation so as to ensure the provision of cheap migrant labour to the mines. Fit African males were forced by taxation and imposed poverty to sell their labour power to the mining and industrial capitalists at a wage rate which was calculated by taking into account the meagre Reserve product. [71]

By the 1940's the scheme to ensure that every worker had a reserve income had broken down, and a high degree of concentration of land and cattle had taken place. This resulted in a large increase in the number of families possessing neither land to cultivate nor cattle to sell. For example, in the Transkei, the main South African labour reservoir for the mines, a study estimated that at least 44 per cent of the families owned no cattle at all and concluded that, "evidently thousands of families in the Reserves own no land but also possess no stock". [72] In the Ciskei, a neighbouring Reserve, it was estimated that nearly 30 per cent of the families were landless and that over 60 per cent of the families owned 5 or less cattle including 29 per cent who owned none. [73]

A survey in 1936 showed that male absentees as a percentage of the male population aged 18-54 years was 63.2 per cent in the Ciskei and 54 per cent in the Transkei. [74] If we consider a report from a single mine, showing that 88 per cent of its African workers fell between the ages

18-37 as representative, we can conclude that an even higher percentage of young fit male labourers were absent from the Reserves at any time. This was not a case of a "migrant peasantry" but rather a case of a "migrant proletariat".

The Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission of 1944 carefully constructed minimum budgets for the "average Transkeian Native family unit" and computed that, taking into account 2 years estimated reserve income and 18 months mine wages in a two year budget, the total income of an underground miner's family would fall short of its estimated minimum living costs by £14 in 1939 and £32 in 1943, [75] the difference being largely due to war-time inflation. The facts were difficult to escape, and in concluding their report the Commissioners stated:

> The native mine or industrial workers have either already become, or are tending increasingly to become, very largely dependent on their wage earning ability and effort ... that the economic conditions in the Native Reserves have caused, and tend increasingly to cause, native employees to seek a means of livelihood elsewhere; that the growing landlessness of the native peoples and the overstocking of such lands as is still owned by them has seriously intensified the difficulties of maintaining themselves on the land; that there has been a revolution in the nature and standard of living of the native peoples; and that increasingly intensive pressure upon the land in the Native Reserves is such that today the assumption of a guaranteed livelihood from the agricultural reserve for the native employee's family has, in most instances, very little foundation in fact, and in very many instances none at all. [76]

However, as we have seen, the response of the manufacturing industry and the mining industry to the necessity for increasing African workers wages was not unanimous. African wages were substantially increased in manufacturing during the war years, but in the mines every conceivable means available was used to escape paying a higher wage-bill.

Summary

In this section we have dealt with the labour supply and its price within the major productive sectors of the economy. Our findings indicate that there had been a large expansion in African employment in the

1930's and 1940's, and that a "full employment" situation had been reached. Thi condition led to a dislocation in the traditional labour recruitment channels, strong pressure on traditional wage levels, and to an intensification of the co petition between the major employers for the "limited" labour supply. The table below summarizes the significant changes in the African employment conditions i the 1940-1948 period.

Table 4.12. Wage and Employment Statistics of Africans in Selected Industries 1940-1948

	Manufacturing		Gold Mining		S.A. Railways & Harbours	
	Average Annual Wage in £	Number Employed	Average Annual Wage in £	Number Employed	Average Annual Wage in £	Number Employed
1940	47	131,000	33	352,000	41	54,000
1941	50		34		46	
1942	59		34		50	
1943	70		35		60	
1944	80		41		76	
1945	91		43		91	
1946	95		43		97	
1947	99		44		102	
1948	103	263,000	45	279,000	111	90,000
Change %	+ 118	+ 100	+ 37	- 25	+ 175	+ 6

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, pp. G-4, G-15; Report of the Industr Legislation Commission, 1950, p. 44; and Wilson, op. cit., p. 158.

Before examining the responses of the various industrial sectors to the labour shortage crisis, we should point out that this shortage was structural and in- stitutional rather than "absolute". In Table 4.13. we see that the African pop lation was growing at about 2 per cent per annum. Yet despite the apparent abu dance of African labour, the low paying mining and farming industries experien labour shortages. Quite simply, African workers preferred employment in other tors of the economy. For example, the number of African males in domestic serv rose from 115,000 in 1936 to 152,000 in 1946. [77]

4.1.5. Inter-Capitalist Rivalry over Labour Resources

In Chapter 1 we outlined the fundamentals of Marx's dynamic model of the capitalist mode of production. There we emphasized the centrality of the class struggle in shaping "the law of motion of economic society". In capitalist society struggle does not only take place between labour and capital, but also between fractions of the capitalist class itself, as each strives to maximize its profits.

According to Dobb, "labour-supply is a crucial limiting factor in the creation of surplus-value in the first instance, and as such Marx treated it as fundamental". [78] In Marxist theory the supply and cost of wage labour, upon which capital accumulation is dependent, is determined through the industrial reserve army.

> The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs down the active labour-army; during periods of over-production and paroxysm, it holds its pretentions in check. Relative-surplus population is therefore the pivot upon which the law of demand and supply of labour works. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and to the domination of capital. [79]

Thus the periodic recruitment of the industrial reserve army is the lever by which the capitalist system resists serious encroachments of labour on capital values, i.e., the rate of profit. Dobb distinguishes between an "intensive" and and "extensive" recruitment of a labour reserve. [80] The first form relates to the adoption of "labour saving" techniques, the second to the recruitment of a fresh labour supply, e.g., from pre-capitalist areas. Both forms tend to lower the price of labour power, and the "operation of one or both of these factors is the 'conditio sine qua non' for the continuation of capitalist production". [81]

The South African "labour shortage crisis" can now be examined in the light of this general theory.

In so far as class struggle between labour and capital is affected by the level of organization of the workers, i.e., the strength of the trade union, we need to mention that the African trade union movement was

struggling to get a footing in the 1940's, especially in the gold mining and manufacturing industries. However, its strength in relationship to the powerful employers' organizations was minimal. (The African trade union struggle will be discussed in Chapter 5).

The war-time industrialization caused a significant split between the level of African wages paid in the manufacturing sector and that of the mining and farming sectors, and an inevitable flow of labour from the latter sectors to the former took place (Table 4.12.). The African labour force took advantage of the rapid expansion of employment in the urban areas and the breach between sectoral wage levels became entrenched by the end of the war.

Entirely new labour market conditions had developed in the 1940's. Up until the 1940's the mines and farms had been the privileged exploiters of African labour and State policy had supported their claim to first rights over the available labour supply by restricting the entry of African to the urban areas. [82] Strictly applied "influx control" hampered the mobility of labour and directly influenced the supply and wage level of African labour. [83] Writing in January, 1942, Lord Harlech, the British High Commissioner to South Africa, clearly perceived the conflict of interests which was beginning to arise between the major economic sectors.

> It is possible that in time secondary industry, as a result of rationalization and the more efficient use of labour, might be persuaded to raise by degrees the wages of its native workers. But any general policy of raising the wage level would encounter a most formidable obstacle in the enormous power of the gold mines and the farmers ... Farmers complain of a continuous shortage of labour; but it is significant that they rely for an improvement in the labour supply not on a rise in wages and more attractive living conditions but on such legal hindrances to the mobility of labour as the Pass Laws and the restrictions on the entry of natives into the towns. The existence of 2,000,000 underpaid landless squatters on European farms is one of the major obstacles to improved farming methods such as mechanization, and the farmer class is probably the most reactionary of all in its attitude to natives and their essential needs.
>
> For forty years the average wage on the Witwatersrand gold mines has remained stationary at £3 per month (excluding the value of barrack lodging and rations). Dur-

> ing that period there has developed a shortage of native labour which might have been expected to cause a rise in wages. Such is the political influence of the mine owners, however, that the whole bargaining power of the State has been brought into action to avert impending shortages by persuading the administration of Portuguese East Africa to agree to the recruitment of Shangaans for the mines on an ever increasing scale.... Absolved by large-scale importation from the threat of labour shortage, the Chamber of Mines exerts an enormous pressure behind the scenes and through its newspapers to resist any rise in the general level of native wages. It is this influence that the Bishop of Johannesburg had in mind when he referred in his charge to a recent Synod to the restraining action of a "hidden hand". [84]

Writing after the war in 1946, Horwitz observed that,

> the latent clash of interest between producer groups of gold-mining, agriculture and secondary industry for non-European labour is now patent. Developing competition for non-European labour must ultimately raise its price. [85]

However, Horwitz's "certainty" as to the developing competition leading to higher African wages in all the sectors of the economy is derived from a notion of free competition in the labour market. But, as we have pointed out on numerous occasions, the Chamber of Mines regarded the wage rates paid by the manufacturing industries as "singularly inappropriate" for mining conditions. In 1944, it had called on the government "to provide that the gold mines should have the first call on all physically fit Natives requiring employment", arguing that, "it should be possible for it to take measures to this end, whether by restriction of the flow of Natives to urban employment or otherwise". [86] Furthermore, it emphasized the conflict of interests between the major productive sectors:

> The fact is not sufficiently widely appreciated that the interests of the primary producing industries of mining and farming are, at many points, in conflict with those of secondary industry. Artificial stimulation of the latter is of itself a cause in the decline in mining activity. [87]

The possibility of the mines introducing labour saving techniques was a realistic long-term goal. But in the short-run the mines were dependent on the continuation of the migrant labour system which supplied "cheap

labour". Consequently, the Chamber of Mines policy during the 1940's was one of resistance to African wage demands and rejection of recognition for the African Mine Workers Union. In 1946, it publicly declared that in its opinion,

> a trade union organization would be outside the comprehension of all but a few of the educated Natives of the urban type: it would be not only useless, but detrimental, to the ordinary mine Native in his present stage of development. [88]

The organized farming community had complained of a labour shortage for more than a decade. Its proposed solution to the problem was to organize African labour into two main groups, those serving agriculture and those serving industry, thus doing away with the wasteful tenant labour system by fully proletarianizing the African farm workers. [89] However, this was a long-term aim and in the short-run the farmers were very much against the free operation of the law of supply and demand for African labour. Instead they demanded that the tight restrictions on the flow of labour to the urban areas, which had been relaxed during the war, be re-enforced by the State.

The farming and mining industries refused to compete for labour in the market place and demanded that the State should intervene to reorganize the total labour system in order to enable them to secure a steady supply of cheap labour i.e. cheap relative to manufacturing wages. The call for State intervention to reorganize the labour market to suit the needs of these monopoly capitalists is hardly surprising.

We have seen in Chapter 3 how at the turn of the century the State was enlisted by mining capital to limit the supply of land to the African population so as to create "hot-house fashion" a migrant proletariat. It is therefore not surprising to find that it once again advocated State intervention when free competition for African labour was damaging capital values.

Marx knew only too well that capital only abides by the "sacred" law of supply and demand as long as its interests are served by it.

> As soon as (in the colonies, e.g.) adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an industrial reserve army and, with it, the absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class, capital, along with its commonplace Sancho Panza, rebels against the "sacred" law of supply and demand and tries to check its inconvenient action by forcible means and state interference. [90]

In the post-war conjuncture, African labour, due to its scarcity and mobility, had acquired a considerable advantage over capital in general. The operation of the laws of the market had enabled it to earn substantially higher wages in manufacturing industry and threatened the existing wage structures of the mining and farming industries. Capital needed to act. It required the State (its "agent") to intervene in the reorganization of the African labour market.

This need was clearly stated in the report of the Natives Laws Commission of 1946-1948 (the "Fagan Report"), which had been appointed by the Smuts government to recommend a new "Native Policy" in the light of the radical socio-economic changes that had taken place in the war years. In the opening paragraphs, the Commissioners confronted the central problem facing the post-war South African society, namely, the "labour supply" problem:

> When our economic conditions were of a relatively simple type, when the population was small and the country spacious, the movement of Native labour could, without central planning, sufficiently adjust itself to the needs of both the Europeans and the Natives themselves. Experience has shown however, that this is no longer the case. What would now appear to be urgently necessary is a shifting of the emphasis from the local to the central authority, so that comprehensive co-ordinated plans for the whole terrain can be divised and put into operation ... A step which we consider urgently necessary is the institution of a wide but centrally organized network of labour bureaux. [91]

Authoritarian as opposed to market allocation of the African labour-force was not only required by farming and mining capital. It was, in fact, needed by capital in general, i.e., total capital accumulation. For South African industrialization was highly dependent on the world market and the major sectors of the economy were interdependent as well as competitive. The nature and implications of the sectoral interdependence will now be explored.

4.1.5.1. The Interdependent Peripheral South African Economy

In Chapter 3 we referred to Samir Amin's model of peripheral capitalist development. The diagram below illustrates the difference between a self-centred system and a peripheral one: [92]



The determining relationship in a self-centred system is that which links sector 2 (the production of "mass" consumer goods) with sector 4 (the production of capital goods intended for the production of sector 2). The peripheral system is fundamentally different, for its determining relationship is its export-orientation and the consequent absence of a vital link to "mass" domestic consumption. This essential difference is expressed as follows by Merhav:

> The export sector is the economic equivalent of the producers' goods sector in the advanced economy, for it provides the foreign exchange for which the producers' goods can be imported. But it is in this respect the "differentia specifica" of under-development that there is no necessary technical and economic interdependence and complementarity between the export sector and the consumers' goods sector as there is between the latter and the producers' goods sector in the advanced economy. [93]

In the peripheral economy both the domestic and export sectors depend for their expansion upon imports of producers' goods from the centre. "The two sectors are not necessarily complementary to each other; the link between them is at most competitive - they may compete with one another for factors in the domestic market." [94] Furthermore, the expansion of the export sector

> is independent of the level of demand in the domestic sector (but not vice versa, since the demand for pro-

> ducers' goods that originates in the domestic sector is ultimately limited by the import capacity provided by the export sector).... The size and rate of expansion of the export sector determines through the volume of the imports it makes possible, the limits within which the domestic sector can expand. [95]

The functioning of the export-oriented South African economy was no mystery to Frankel, as his analysis of the pre-war period of growth in national income showed. Similarly, after the war, leading South African economists continued to preach the laws of peripheral capitalist development, emphasizing the economy's fundamental dependence on gold exports.

Richards described the gold dependency as follows:

> Our economy can still be represented by an inverted pyramid with gold as the base, then agriculture and then industry. Gold has in the past supplied and still supplies the greatest proportion of our exports, providing the exchange for necessary imports of raw materials and finished goods. [96]

So great was the importance of gold in the 1933-1948 expansion, that Richards, not unreasonably attributed this economic growth to a series of gold based "miracles". [97]

Amin's model has shown the fundamental lack of dependence of the expansion of the export sector on the expansion of the domestic market. In fact, the relationship between domestic "mass" consumption, i.e., "mass" wage levels, and the export sector in the periphery is the inverse of that existing between domestic "mass" consumption and the capital goods sector in the central economy. In Amin's words: "The wage rate in the export sector will be as low as the economic, social and political conditions allow it to be." [98]

Amin stressed the "political" conditions, i.e., the conditions of the class struggle in the determination of wage levels. So far we have examined the class struggle at the economic level. As we shall see, the struggle of the black working class for a greater share of the wealth it produced was met by firm resistance by mining and farming capitalists.

Manufacturing capital had been able to afford higher wages because it benefitted greatly from the war-time "active capitalist involution". However, its future expansion via import-substitution was dependent on gold exports, and on the growth of (white) "luxury" consumption rather than on (black) "mass" consumption as a market for its products.[99] If the process of industrialization was to proceed smoothly in the post-war years, capital as a whole would need to develop a system for keeping African labour cheap.

Conclusion

The analysis of the economic conjuncture in the post-war years reveals the material constraints under which the capitalist system operated. It does not, however, enable us to know the outcome of the class struggle and the specific form in which the labour shortage crisis would be resolved. This depended upon political and ideological factors and their interplay among all the class forces in the South African society. In particular, the outcome of the struggle depended upon the political struggle between classes and strata within the white population group, for only this segment of the population had the franchise, and hence the immediate possibility of influencing future State policy.

4.2. Demographic Change: 1936-1946

Here we will examine the urbanization process that accompanied the rapid economic expansion after 1933. In particular, we will isolate the growth of the urban population in the Southern Transvaal mining and manufacturing region on a racial and ethnic basis. For it was there that the decisive class struggles were waged in the 1940's and the old racial order came under the greatest pressure.

In Table 4.13., an urban/rural breakdown of the total South African population is shown. By 1946, 73 per cent of the whites and 23 per cent of the Africans were urbanized, yet, the absolute number of urbanized Africans (1,811,000) exceeded the number of urban whites (1,741,000). Between 1936 and 1946 the urban African population increased by 60 per cent. In 1946, the urban African population was weighted 2:1 in favour of men. This was primarily due to the operation of the migrant labour

system which caused the women to remain in the reserves. However, during the 1936-1946 period there appears to have been a more equal increase in the numbers of African males and females in the urban areas; males increasing by 375,000 and females by 292,000. [100] This indicates a tendency for the permanent establishment of African families in the urban locations.

Table 4.13. Urban and Rural Population of South Africa, 1911-1946

	Urban				Rural			
Race	1911	1921	1936	1946	1911	1921	1936	1946
	A. Total Population-Thousands							
Europeans	658	848	1,307	1,741	618	672	697	632
Africans	508	587	1,142	1,811	3 511	4,111	5.455	6,021
Asiatics	311	51	146	211	367	115	74	84
Coloured		250	415	547		296	355	382
All Races	1,478	1,736	3,010	4,300	4,496	5,193	6,580	7,119
	B. Percentage of Total of Each Race							
Europeans	52	56	65	73	48	44	35	27
Africans	13	13	17	23	87	88	83	77
Asiatics	46	31	66	71	54	69	34	29
Coloured		46	54	59		54	46	41
All Races	25	25	31	38	75	75	69	62

Source: Horwitz, op. cit., p. 317.

In the Southern Transvaal industrial region Africans outnumbered whites by 278,000 in 1946, [101] and they comprised 56 per cent of the area's population, the whites 40 per cent. [102] In every major industrial area of the country, African employees increased substantially after 1933, and the percentage of white employees declined. In the Southern Transvaal African employees in manufacturing increased from 51 per cent to 60 per cent of the total and whites decreased from 46 per cent to 36 per cent between 1936 and 1946. [103]

The percentage of urban whites increased from 52 per cent in 1911 to 73 per cent in 1946 (Table 4.13.). This increase in the urban white population was mainly due to internal migration, rather than immigration from Europe, which slowed down considerably after 1905. In numbers the rural white population increased marginally from 618,000 in 1911 to 632,000 in 1946; whereas the urban

whites increased by 165 per cent, from 658,000 in 1911 to 1,741,000 in 1946.

An indication of the ethnic origins of the main white population groups is given by the home language spoken.

Table 4.14. The Language Division in the White Population
(in '000)

	Urban			Rural		
	1936	1946	Change %	1936	1946	Change %
English	688	834	21	95	100	5
Afrikaans	536	821	53	585	538	- 8

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, p. A-18.

Historically, the Afrikaans-speaking population was predominantly rural, they were known as the "Boers" and spoke a brand of Dutch. The English immigrants were mainly confined to the urban areas. However, by 1946 the urban English and Afrikaans speaking populations were about equal, a result of Afrikaner urbanization. The Afrikaners made up about 58 per cent and the English 40 per cent of the total white population in 1946. [104]

4.3. The Class and Ethnic Structure of White Society: 1936-1946

The following class division of white society is taken from the work of Davies, who has attempted to reclassify the occupational census data on the basis of Poulantzas' Marxian class theory. [105]

The class positions of the great majority of the white economically active population were either bourgeois or petty bourgeois, i.e., 71 per cent of this population was non-working class in both 1936 and 1946. A minority of the white economically active population, 29 per cent, was classified as "working class". However, as we can see in the breakdown of this category, the majority of the white workers fell into the

category of "skilled craftsmen" or the labour aristocracy, the importance of which will be investigated later on.

Table 4.15. The Class Structure of White Society (in '000)

	1936	1946
A. Bourgeoisie and Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie	230	230
% of Economically Active Population	31	26
B. New Petty Bourgeoisie	291	395
% of Economically Active Population	40	45
C. Residual Category or "White Working Class"	215	250
% of Economically Active Population	29	29
Total Economically Active Population	736	875
Total Population over 15 years	1,380	1,649
Number of Dependents, Retired or Outside South Africa, and Unemployed	644	774

Notes: A) includes: non-agricultural owners, employers, land speculators, brokers, agents, managers, self-employed, top officials of State apparatuses; and owners, family workers, employers and managers in agriculture.
B) includes: repressive State apparatus employees, i.e., police and military, ideological State apparatus employees, i.e., teachers and clergy, state and local government employees, wage-earners involved in the circulation process, engineers, technicians, supervisory staff and professional services.
C) see Table 4.16. for a breakdown of this category.

Source: Davies, op. cit., Appendix 1.

Table 4.16. The White Working Class: 1936-1946 (in '000)

	1936			1946		
	Male	Female	Total %	Male	Female	Total %
1. Skilled Craftsmen	117	11	60	153	8	64
2. Semi-skilled Workers	22	21	20	40	20	24
3. Unskilled Labourers	44	-	20	29	-	12

Note: 2) includes: machine operators, transport and service workers.

Source: Davies, ibid.

Whites in semi-skilled and labourer positions represented a minority in the white working class, with white labourers appearing to have moved up into semi-skilled work during the decade. However, as a proportion of the total white economically active population, white unskilled workers formed a relatively small and declining category; being 6 per cent in 1936, and 3 per cen in 1946.

The differences between the English and Afrikaans speaking population within the white urban class structure in the 1940's was striking. We have mentione that Afrikaners represented about half the urban white population in the 194 However, the share of Afrikaner income in total white income (i.e., dividends salaries and wages) in commerce, industry and mining was estimated by Prof. Schumann (in about 1939) to be approximately 33 per cent. His conclusion was that "the average income of the white non-Afrikaner is 40 per cent higher th the average income of the white Afrikaner". [106]

This estimate may be compared with one made in 1951, which found that,

> the annual per capita income of Afrikaners in Johannesburg and nine other cities along the Witwatersrand (where Afrikaners comprised 43 % of the total white population) was £182, compared with £349 for English speaking whites. A similar disparity prevailed in other leading urban areas; even where Afrikaners predominated among whites numerically, as in Bloemfontein (73.3 %) the corresponding figures are £180 and £318. [107]

Table 4.17. Afrikaner Percentage of Ownership in Private Sector

	Commerce	Manufacturing	Finance	Mining	Agriculture	Total Excluding Agriculture
1938-1939	8 %	3 %	5 %	1 %	87 %	5 %
1948-1949	25 %	6 %	6 %	1 %	85 %	11 %

Source: Bunting, op. cit., p. 379.

It is evident from the above table that the source of the great disparity in income, lay in the essentially different class positions held by the two groups in the urban areas. Basically, the Afrikaners were the "wage-earners" in industry, commerce and mining operations which were owned and controlled by non-Afrikaners, mainly English, Jewish and foreign capitalists. Afrikaners also held a disproportionate share of the lower paid State occupations. For example, in 1946, 79 per cent of the police force was Afrikaans; bus and truc drivers (trucks operated by the South African Railways) were 71 per cent Afrikaans; post-men 56 per cent; railway labourers 90 per cent; the Civil Service 55 per cent; and of the white male school-teachers, 73 per cent were Afrikaners.[108]

In the urban areas there was clearly an economic gap between English and Afrikaans speaking whites. However, it should not be overlooked that most of the English speakers were also wage-earners; and that Afrikaner society was not itself uniformly "lower-class". A significant number of Afrikaners were members of the bourgeois class in their professional capacities as doctors, lawyers, professors and engineers; also there was a growing number of Afrikaners entering commerce and banking (Table 4.17.).

4.4. The "Poor White" Problem

In 1932 the Carnegie Commission estimated conservatively that there were 300,000 white persons in South Africa who were "very poor",[109] and 90 per cent of these people were Afrikaners, i.e. about 25 per cent of the Afrikaans speaking population were "poor whites". This term was commonly used at the time to refer to a group of people made up principally of "'bywoners', hired

men on farms, poor settlers, and a growing group of unskilled or poorly trained labourers and workers outside farming". [110] In this section we will briefly examine the roots of the "poor white" problem, and the State policies adopted to counteract its social consequences in the 1920's and 1930's.

It is generally acknowledged that the "poor white" problem had its roots in the rapid development of the capitalist mode of production. [111] Prior to this development, white Afrikaners (the "Boers") had practised subsistence farming, land had little value, and class differences between land-owners and their tenants were unimportant. But with the production of crops for the market, both domestic and foreign, came a rise in land values, and the creation of land scarcity.

It was mainly the commercialization of agriculture which led to the impoverishment of the landless and small-holder Afrikaners, and to the gradual migration of large numbers of them to the towns. This tendency was strengthened by several factors: firstly, the rural Afrikaner observance of Roman-Dutch inheritance law led to the sub-division of farms among the children, with the consequence that small, inefficient and under-capitalized units were created; secondly on account of the generally poor quality of much of the soil and the frequent occurrence of devastating droughts; thirdly, by the existence of a large body of servile African labour on the white farms, which could be far more cheaply employed than the white labourer.

The "poor white" (the term is italicized to distinguish that their poverty was only relative to other whites and not to the blacks who were far worse off) was caught in the middle of a process which uprooted him from his traditional rural existence and thrust him into the urban community. However, here too, he was by and large a misfit.

In the mines, black unskilled labour was extremely cheap and more easily controlled and disciplined due to legislation, which, for example, made it a criminal offence for black miners to strike. Thus, outside of the job of supervisor of black labour, which by the 1920's was already a predominantly Afrikaner occupation and which was constantly under

pressure from capital to reduce its numbers, there were no openings for white unskilled labour.

In the manufacturing industry too, employment opportunities for unskilled white labour were few. Black labour was cheaper and more cost-efficient. This situation was identified by the Low Grade Mine Commission in 1920:

> In mining as in most other industries, a more or less practical modus vivendi has been arrived at, but the boundary line between the employment of black and white labour is highly artificial and liable to alteration from time to time. While the position of the supervising or highly skilled white is a perfectly definite one as against the unskilled native doing rough work, that of the unskilled white is not so obvious. He can hardly be considered to be the equal in efficiency of a native who by experience and practice has acquired proficiency in his particular class of work. The labour of such a native is therefore clearly of greater value to an employer than that of the unskilled white man, and if there were no artificial restrictions, the latter would be driven to the wall. His standard of living is higher than that of the native, and where a skilled native would be content to take 5 shillings per day, because that would enable him to live in comfort according to his standard, the inferior white man will demand a higher rate of pay for the same work, less well done, because he cannot live in decency on less. [112]

In the 1920's urban white unemployment reached a high level, and was generally regarded as a major social problem for white society as a whole. Something of the magnitude of the problem can be seen in the following table:

Table 4.18. Number of White Registrations and Placements at Government Labour Exchanges

	Registrations	Placements
1920	21,700	5,500
1925	51,000	9,000
1930	81,000	19,000
1940	6,500	3,000

Source: R. Davies, "The White Working Class in South Africa", New Left Review, no. 82, November-December 1973, p. 46.

Action by the State to prevent the "poor whites" from sinking into the ranks of the urban black slum dwellers was inevitable.[113] The Nationalist-Labour Pact Government which came to power in 1924, in the wake of the "Rand Rebellion" of the white mine workers against mining capital, was acutely aware of the need to aid the "poor whites". The action that resulted was partly because of the so-called "threat to civilized standards" and partly because the capitalist class feared the possibility of solidarity arising between the poor of all races.[114] This latter fear was persistent in South African capitalist circles, for nothing would be of greater danger to their class position than the formation of a unified multi-racial labour movement. Therefore, every measure had to be taken by the State to prevent such a development.

The policy designed to protect the white unemployed from indigency and social degradation became known as the "civilized" labour policy. "Civilized" labour was defined in an official circular as

> the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard of living generally recognized as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. Uncivilized labour is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples.[115]

What was being specified was the division between black wages and the lowest feasible white wages. This meant that white minimum wages for unskilled and semi-skilled labour were not to be left to the determination of a colour-blind law of supply and demand.

Thus, the "civilized" labour policy was essentially one of State subsidization of the lower grades of white labour. This State policy should not, however, be interpreted as anti-capitalist because of its interference in the free operation of the labour market. For, a colour-blind labour market had never existed in South Africa. From the outset of capitalist development, the monopoly capitalists had

placed restrictions on the freedom of black labour in order to keep it as cheap as possible, and this policy simultaneously resulted in white labour struggling to defend itself from being under-cut by the use of cheap black labour. So the "civilized" labour policy was just one more result of the fundamental policy of South African monopoly capital, namely, that of keeping black labour cost at a minimum.

The main application of this policy was within State employment itself; for only in this sector were cost constraints secondary.

Table 4.19. Employment in Union Government Service and in Government Railways, by Race, 1924, 1936, and 1940

	1924	1936	1940
Union Government Service			
Europeans	29,031	34,575	43,298
Non-Europeans	8,955	9,041	10,928
" as per cent of total	23.6	20.7	20.2
Government Railways			
Casual Staff			
Europeans	188	4,140	5,814
Non-Europeans	3,450	20,698	28,526
" as per cent of total	94.8	83.3	83.1
Regular Staff			
Europeans	37,457	52,083	63,753
Non-Europeans	40,631	20,772	25,073
" as per cent of total	52.0	28.5	28.2

Source: Report No. 13, Social and Economic Planning Council, UG 53/1948, p. 35.

It is notable that between 1924 and 1936 there was a substantial decline in the proportion of employment of non-white labour in the State apparatus. However, after 1936 the proportion remained fairly constant. This was due to the economic expansion which created new job opportunities for whites.

The application of the "civilized" labour policy in private industry was far more difficult, due to its profit maximization/cost minimization goals. In spite of the use of various official expedients to induce and compel employers to absorb more white labour the effect was minimal. [116] It was not until the gold boom began to be felt in manufacturing that white employment increased. Furthermore, the employment opportunities for white semi-skilled labour increased as advanced manufacturing techniques, which permitted the substitution of machine operators for artisans, were introduced. [117]

The "poor white" problem which was most acute in the 1920's and 1930's was also dealt with by a policy of inducing the white unemployed to go "back to the land". However, the monetary assistance to rehabilitate white farmers was "but a palliative, and not a cure". [118] The economic drive towards urbanization was unrelenting, and the rapid industrialization and military recruitment in the 1940's soon eradicated the "poor white" problem.

The effect of the "civilized" labour policy on the class formation was that white unskilled labourers were successfully walled off from contact with their fellow poor black workers. The payment of "civilized" wages caused the white labourer to perceive the capitalist State as his benefactor, and he consequently gave it his support. [119]

4.5. The Skilled White "Labour Aristocracy"

In Chapter 3.2. we showed the particular form of labour organization which became established in the gold mining industry in the early twentieth century. This was characterised as one in which a small group of white skilled workers and foremen oversaw and "co-exploited" a great mass of unskilled black labour. The great gap between the wages paid to these different strata of the working class was revealed, and its historical origin generally examined, i.e., the high price of imported skilled white labour and the low cost of black labour due to the enforcement of the migrant labour system. We also mentioned that this wage structure was adopted in the manufacturing industry as well.

Yet in that section, we tended to lay most emphasis on the "directive and controlling" aspect of all white labour over all black labour in the mines, and there was no specific discussion of the function and class position of the skilled white workers, as opposed to the whites who were mainly supervisors.

In this section we will examine the role of the skilled white workers in industry in general, their historical status as a "labour aristocracy", their income relationship to black unskilled labour and their position in the changing industrial structure in the 1940's. In the analysis of the white class structure it was shown that the "white working class" comprised 29 per cent of the total economically active population, and of this category the majority were skilled (60 % in 1936, 64 % in 1946) and the minority semi-skilled (20 % in 1936, 24 % in 1946) or unskilled (20 % in 1936, 12 % in 1946) (Table 4.16.). This breakdown of the white workers in all industries may be compared to the findings with respect to the skill distribution of whites and Africans in the private manufacturing industry and trades in respect of which wage determinations were made during the period 1937-1948.

Table 4.20. Classification of Manufacturing Workers of Each Race According to Skill: 1937-1948

	Skilled	Semi-Skilled	Unskilled	Total
Whites	81.8	16.1	2.1	100
Africans	4.2	12.3	83.5	100

Source: Industrial Legislation Commission, op. cit., p. 22, tab. 28.b.

It is clear from the above table that the labour organization established in mining was essentially reproduced within the manufacturing industry. Africans were overwhelmingly the unskilled workers and whites the skilled ones.

Yet, the skilled/unskilled production relation itself, was not founded on race, but had its roots in the historical level of the production tech-

niques and corresponding skill requirements which were imported into South Africa along with imperialist capital at the turn of the century and thereafter. In Britain at the time, the birth-place of most of South Africa's skilled immigrant workers, the division between the skilled and unskilled within the working class was pronounced. So sharp, in fact, was the distinction between the two strata of the working class, that the skilled group was generally known by the title, the "labour aristocracy".

4.5.1. The British Labour Aristocracy, a Model

What were the defining characteristics of the labour aristocracy? According to Hobsbawm: [120]

> There is no single, simple criterion of membership of a labour aristocracy. At least six different factors should, theoretically, be considered. First, the level and regularity of a worker's earnings; second; his prospects of social security; third, his conditions of work, including the way he is treated by foremen and masters; fourth, his general conditions of living; fifth, his relations with the social strata above and below him; lastly, his prospect of future advancement and those of his children. Of these the first is incomparably the most important .... (p. 273)

Hobsbawm regarded the 1840's to 1890's period as the classical period of the British labour aristocracy (p. 272), and that up until 1914 the labour aristocracy "remained substantially of the same type and composition as in third quarter of the nineteenth century, though its centre of gravity shifted further towards the metal industries". (p. 289) This classical labour aristocracy tended to merge with the "lower middle class". However, he writes that,

> if the boundaries of the labour aristocracy were fluid on one side of its territory, they were precise on another. An "artisan" or "craftsman" was not under any circumstances to be confused with a "labourer". "The artisan creed with regard to the labourers is that the latter are an inferior class and they should be made to know it and kept in their place."...Before the rise of the New Unions of 1889 the boundaries of the aristocracy and of trade unionism were normally - for the great waves of general and unskilled organization were temporary - believed to coincide, in so far as these were any unions at all. (p. 275)

In the above definition it is indicated that the labour aristocracy is a relative concept and it is measured in relation to the amount of low paid labour below it. Now according to Hobsbawm,

> the main reason why there is a large differential between skilled and unskilled, "aristocratic" and "plebeian" occupations under capitalism is that the industrial reserve army of unemployed and under-employed, which determines the general movements of wages, affects different categories of workers differently. It operates in the first instance chiefly by keeping the wages of that kind of labour which is most easily expanded, low: that is, the least skilled. A specific reason for it in Britain was that the labour aristocrats generally enjoyed the power to make their labour artificially scarce, by restricting entry to the profession, or by other means. If they lost this - for instance by the uncontrollable rise of machines - they ceased, like the wool-combers, to be a labour aristocracy. (p. 290)

Thus, the labour aristocracy typically consists of a group of workers who have a monopoly on certain types of work and who benefit from the exclusion of competition from other workers. The political stance of this privileged strata of the working class was generally conservative, as its need to maintain its monopoly tended to lead it into collaboration with the capitalist class.

"Co-exploitation" is a term Hobsbawm uses for the common phenomenon of sub-contracting in nineteenth century capitalism. This meant that many members of the labour aristocracy, who had a direct financial interest in the performance of their labourers, in practice became co-employers of their unskilled labour. (p. 298) (We have seen that "co-exploitation" was a common form of labour exploitation in the gold mines.) Finally, he analyses the factors causing the collapse of the labour aristocracy in Britain in the post-1914 period. These were: firstly, the decline of the "basic industries", stronghold of the labour aristocracy; secondly, the change in the system of wage-payment caused the differential between "skilled" and "unskilled" to steadily narrow; thirdly, the rise of a large class of semi-skilled machine operators and the relative dimunition of the old unskilled "fetching and carrying" kind of labourer. (pp. 300-1)

The introduction of new production techniques gradually undermined the power of the labour aristocracy and its craft unions. The craft skill of the labour aristocrat was replaced by machines and the traditional skilled/unskilled division of labour was transformed into a technician/operative one. A corresponding transition from craft unions based on tools used across industries to industrial trade unions was also set in motion.

4.5.2. The South African Labour Aristocracy

An examination of the wage differentials between skilled white labour and unskilled black labour in South Africa, provides strong evidence of the existence of a labour aristocracy *par excellence* in the period of capitalist development up to the 1940's.

In 1925, the real wages of the white skilled workers of South Africa were compared to that of other countries, and it was found that, "only the United States, Canada and Australia show higher real wages; in all European countries real wages are much lower than in South Africa". [121] It was also found that the spread between the wages of the skilled worker and his unskilled "helper" was several times as great in South Africa as in any other country. [122] This differential is indicated for 1938 in the table below.

Table 4.21. Unskilled Wage as Percentage of Skilled Wage, 1938

South Africa	16.7 %
Canada	52.9 %
Great Britain	66.0 %
Italy	68.4 %
Australia	75.4 %
France	75.6 %
Germany	79.0 %
New Zealand	81.3 %
Sweden	82.0 %

Source: Report no. 282, Board of Trade and Industries, 1945, Annexure 6.

The 1940's wage movement was unique in South African labour history. For the first time black unskilled wages rose more rapidly than white skilled wages, with the exception of the mining industry (Table 4.22). The gap between the real wages of white and black workers narrowed in the 1940-1948 period, but it was still so wide, that the white workers' aristocratic stat was not called into question.

Table 4.22. Total Increases in Average Wages of Employees in Manufacturing South African Railways and Mining

	1932/33 to 1939/40	1939/40 to 1947/48
Manufacturing:		
Whites	27.7 %	76.2 %
Africans	18.8 %	118.4 %
South African Railways:		
Whites	30.7 % *	79.2 %
Non-Whites	18.4 % *	175.1 %
Mining:		
Whites	25.6 %	50.1 %
Non-Whites	12.5 %	35.6 %

* 1934/35 to 1939/40

Source: Industrial Legislation Commission, op. cit., p. 45, tab. 37a.

The mechanization of industry led to a shift from the traditional skilled/unskilled division of labour, as an intermediate stratum of semi-skilled machine operators was formed. In the 1940's competition between workers of all races for the semi-skilled jobs became a politically contentious issue.

Chapter 5

THE RISE OF AFRIKANER FASCISM: 1934-1948

Introduction

In his analysis of fascism, Poulantzas attempted to isolate the specific features of the class struggle which characterized the "political crisis" of fascism. He postulated that the growth of fascism corresponds to a hegemonic crisis of the ruling class, which entails the loss of its hegemony over both the working class and the petty-bourgeoisie, and the simultaneous disintegration of the "power bloc" due to internal contradictions between the dominant classes and class fractions. [1]

Following Poulantzas' approach to uncovering the accumulation of contradictions throughout the society in the phase of the growth of fascism, we proceed to an analysis of the "crisis of Apartheid". First we will sketch the process which led to the loss of the white ruling class' hegemony over the African working class and intelligentsia. Then, against this background, we will analyse the contradictions within white society and show how the fascistic Nationalist Party skillfully manipulated them in its rise to power.

5.1. A Sketch of the Trade Union and Politico-Ideological Conflicts between the White Ruling Class and the African Proletariat and Intelligentsia

5.1.1. The Trade Union Struggle

The persistent fear of the capitalist class in South Africa of an organised African proletarian opposition was expressed by the Native Affairs Commission in 1936, when it warned that,

> turning the Native into a lower class of the population must result, not only in the engulfing of the ethos of the Bantu race in a black proletariat, with the loss of every vestige of independence and communal brotherhood, which is the greatest birthright of the Native people, but also, and inevitably, it will result in class war - a war waged between sections of the community of un-

> equal strength and power in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can easily be distinguished from each other by the colour of their skin. [2]

The rapid industrialization in the decade following this statement was to lead to the realization of this bourgeoise nightmare. By the mid-1940's the number of Africans organised within the Council of Non-European Trade Unions had reached a peak of 158,000 members, or 40 per cent of those employed in commerce, manufacturing and service industries. [3] The majority of these workers were employed on the Witwatersrand, and in Johannesburg alone there were 80,000 organised workers. Simultaneous with the mushrooming of African trade unions in these industries, came the formation of the African Mine Workers Union on the gold mines, with a membership of 25,000 in 1944. [4]

Industrialization had led to African urbanization and the growth of an industrial proletariat on a more stable basis. This development threatened the framework of traditional socio-economic relations and required an entirely new policy to deal with the revolutionary implications of the new industrial structure. This fact was recognised by all the major commissions which investigated the changes brought about by the industrial revolution in the 1940's.

Under the heading: "Social Aspects of Native Urbanization" we find the Board of Trade and Industries (1945) expressing the need for "vision and statesmanlike guidance" to ensure that the African proletariat becomes a "constructive factor in industry".

> Racial and class differences will make a homogeneous Native proletariat which will eventually lose all contact with its former rural communal relations which had previously given their lives a content and meaning. Detribalization of large numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses in large industrial centres is a matter which no government can view with equanimity. Unless handled with great foresight and skill these masses of detribalized Natives can very easily develop into a menace rather than a constructive factor in industry. As the Board believes that the future development of industry in the Union is inseparably wrapped up with the Native the whole problem calls for vision and statesmanlike guidance. [5]

The great industrial expansion (1933-1948) turned unskilled African labour from an abundant into a scarce commodity (Table 4.12.). The change in the condition of the reserve army of labour, and manufacturing's need for more permanent labour power were decisive for the formation of African trade unions. In times when labour is plentiful, unskilled labour is easily replaceable and therefore in a weak position in relation to the capitalist. Hence, the struggle to establish trade unions, to strengthen the bargaining power of the unskilled and raise their wages, is most successful in times of full employment.

In the 1920's an "all-in" African trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) had been established. At its zenith in 1928, it was estimated to have had almost 250,000 members. [6] However, partly as a result of government harassment of its organizers and internal weaknesses, but mainly due to the decline in labour demand in the depression, the organization collapsed. [7]

The growth of a new mass trade union movement from the mid-1930's in contrast to the Industrial and Commercial Union, took place on industrial lines and had as its objective the more "conservative" goal of establishing a firm footing for the African worker in industry and permitting an essentially "economistic" struggle for the improvement of wages. The formation of many of the unions was initially the work of white communists, though Africans soon took over the leadership and white trade unionists served in advisory capacities. [8]

African trade unions, however, were not officially recognized by the industrial laws. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, revised in 1937, minimum wages were set by Industrial Councils in industries in which there were white trade unions. The Council included representatives of the employers, the government and the employees, but the term "employee" was defined so as to exclude pass-bearing Africans. Under the Wage Act of 1925, revised in 1937, the government directly set the minimum wage rates through Wage Board determinations for industries where there was no registered trade union. Both Acts were used by the government to safeguard the position of white workers from competition with the cheaper non-white labour, and were essential tools in the 1925-1939 "civilized labour" policy. (See Chapter 4.4. on the Poor White

Problem). White unemployment was eradicated during the war years both on account of the industrial expansion and the military recruitment of 186,000 white males. [9]

The war years were a period of growing class struggle. In the six year period 1935-1940, a total of 17,000 non-whites struck work for an average of 2.34 mandays per striker for a total of 40,000 mandays lost; in the following six years, 1941-1946, the corresponding figures rose to 135,700 strikers, an average loss of 2.73 days per striker, for a total loss of 370,000 mandays. [10] The government responded to African trade union action by passing War Measure No. 145 in December, 1942 which outlawed African strikes with severe sanctions. But, in spite of the law sixty illegal strikes were recorded in the following two years. [11] At the same time the Wage Board began to make minimum wage determinations to cover Africans in an attempt to defuse their militancy by adjusting wages to an urban "subsistence" level in a period of rapid inflation.

In the post-war years the measure prohibiting African strikes was not repealed. The African working class offensive culminated in the August 1946 African mineworkers strike, in which 75,000 workers challenged the cheap labour system of the mining capitalists. The strike was brutally repressed by the Smuts regime and the leaders of the African Mineworkers' Union, the Council for Non-European Trade Unions and the Communist Party were arrested.

In the opinion of O'Meara, the African mine workers' strike seemed

> to crystallise the contradictions and conflicts of an entire stage of social development ... in a sense the policies of the Nationalist government since 1948 have been a reply to questions about the nature of the South African social formation posed by the strike. [12]

The "holy of holies", the gold mining industry, had been invaded by the "infidel", and widespread African trade union demands for full recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937, which would place the African worker on an equal footing with the white worker, had to be dealt with by the State.

In the late 1930's the Minister of Labour began talking of the need to grant African trade unions official recognition. However, the fractions of the capitalist class found difficulty in deciding upon the best means to turn African trade unions into a "constructive factor in industry". [13]

In the post-war years the reply of the capitalist class was unanimously agreed upon. It rejected the right of any form of African trade union recognition in the farming and mining industries and argued for "controlled" trade unions in the manufacturing sector, denying African workers the right to register under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937.

A clear statement of the industrialists attitude towards African trade unions was given in evidence to the Industrial Legislation Commission in 1949:

> The Chamber is strongly of the view that Native trade unions should be accorded statutory recognition. Rules should be framed providing for the conditions under which they may exist, for their proper control, for their leadership by persons qualified to fulfil such a function, under Government supervision ... The haphazard drift of Native workers under conditions where they become fertile subjects for indoctrination with pernicious philosophies, must be halted. This object can only be achieved by (a) legal recognition of Native trade unions, (b) their rigid control, and (c) methodical tuition and tutelage of such organisations ... The Native has not as yet reached a stage of development where he can negotiate with his employers as visualised in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937 ... The Chamber is confirmed in the view that Natives should not be permitted to take strike action, and that the compulsory arbitration procedure advocated is ample compensation for outlawing the strike weapon. [14]

Besides the outlawing of strikes, the industrialists wanted the African trade unions which had been built up in collaboration with the white and black communists to be brought under State control in order to prevent the further radicalization of the African proletariat by "pernicious philosophies".

In compliance with the views of the capitalist class, the Smuts government refused to grant full trade union rights to black workers. A sep-

arate Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Act (1947) was drafted which excluded mine and farm workers. The aim of the proposed legislation was to crush the free African trade union movement by outlawing strikes and placing the appointment of trade union officials under State control. [15] Furthermore, it intended to stop the formation of united trade unions of all workers in South Africa, irrespective of race, by preventing Africans from becoming members of the white trade unions registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937.

This goal of splitting the labour movement along colour lines served to allay the perennial employers' fear of a united workers movement developing at a later date. Although the majority of the African workers were organised in separate trade unions in the 1940's (mainly due to the reluctance of organised white labour to form an alliance with unskilled black workers), in the post-war years there was a tendency in the central white trade union organisation to support full recognition of African workers under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937. It also advocated the affiliation of black trade unions to the South African Trades and Labour Council. [16]

As a consequence of this progressive stand by the National Executive Committee, the white trade union movement split in 1947. This split on the question of African trade union affiliation was in part a result of the effect of fascist propaganda and attacks on the white trade unions in the 1940's, a subject we will refer to later.

5.1.2. The Politico-Ideological Conflicts

5.1.2.1. The Segregation Ideology

The ideology used by the South African ruling class to justify the exploitation of the colonized Africans was known as "segregation". In order to understand the historical source of this racist ideology it is necessary to briefly examine the imperialist ideology which emerged in the late nineteenth century.

In her study of European racism, Hannah Arendt drew a sharp line between the pre-imperialist racial ideas as exemplified by Gobineau, [17]

and the racial theories which became the chief ideological tool for rationalizing the conquest and exploitation of colonial peoples:

> Racism has been the powerful ideology of imperialistic policies since the turn of the century ... Not until the end of the century were dignity and importance accorded race thinking as though it had been one of the major spiritual contributions of the Western world ... The fact that racism is the main ideological weapon of imperialistic politics is so obvious that it seems as though many students prefer to avoid the beaten track of truism. [18]

The connection between imperialism and racism was also commented upon by Hilferding, who simply stated that racial ideology served as a "scientifically-cloaked foundation for the lust of finance capital ...." [19] Thus the carving up of the globe by the imperialist nations signalled the decline of liberalism of the spirit of John Stuart Mill, who had argued that,

> of all the vulgar modes of escaping from the considerations of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences. [20]

A typical example of the way in which social Darwinism was adapted to the needs of imperialism, is taken from the writings of Kidd, a prominent British representative of this racialist thinking:

> The first step to solving the problem we face is quite simply to understand, that we in our relationship to the native residents of the tropics are dealing with people who represent the same level in humanities development as a child in the individuals development. [21]

The conclusion drawn from this infantilizing ideology was that "the administration of the tropics had the same character as a trust for civilization", i.e., the white man's burden. This paternalistic ideology placed the imperialists in the position of guardians or trustees for the "lower races". However, a suppressed liberal feature contained in the pre-imperialist colonial ideology, namely, the future right of the colonial people to self-determination (when it reached "maturity" in the opinion of the trustee), was retained in this ideology. It was only at the end of World War II that the right to self-determination was conceded by the reluctant but defensive imperialist powers.

Hobson recognized that the imperialist ideology compromised the "old liberal notion of our educating lower races in the arts of popular

government", [22] noting that "the chief indictment of Imperialism in relation to the lower races consists in this, that it does not even pretend to apply to them the principle of education and of progress it applies at home". [23] The fact was that liberal education for the "natives" was thought to be a danger to the interests of the imperialists, or pseudo-trustees for civilization, for the Kafir parsons "were becoming agitators, beginning to say the government was wrong and that the people were oppressed, in a word bade fair to become a dangerous class". This was a statement by Rhodes in the Cape Parliament in 1894, when he argued against equal education for Africans. [24] So British imperialism exported both finance capital and racist ideology to South Africa at the turn of the century.

The confrontation between the new segregation ideology and the earlier liberal ideology which espoused "equal rights for all civilized men" regardless of colour, is well illustrated in Smuts' "Rhodes Memorial Lecture" at Oxford in 1929. [25] Here Smuts forcefully defended the virtues of parallel institutions for the Africans and whites.

According to him the decisive difference between the old and new native policy was that the former proscribed the traditional African tribal institutions as barbarous and aimed to "civilize",i.e.,Europeanize the "barbarians", while the latter found great virtue in preserving the traditional African political structure. [26]

The old policy of breaking down the tribal structure was labelled as "direct rule", and the new policy which permitted their retention, under the supervision of a white magistrate, was referred to as "indirect rule". [27] Smuts argued that "indirect rule" fulfilled the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which layed down the principle that the proper relationship between colonizer and colonized should be one of a "sacred trust for civilization", the "lower races" being placed under the trusteeship of the "higher". [28] Furthermore, he thought that "the new policy of native self-government / would / provide the natives with plenty of bones to chew at", [29] which would no doubt suit their "child psychology and outlook". [30]

Smuts also drew attention to the central contradiction in the new native policy, namely, that it conflicted with the reality of an ever growing mass of detribalized Africans.

> These urbanised natives living among the whites constitute the real crux, and it is a difficulty which goes far beyond the political issue. They raise a problem for the whole principle of segregation, as they claim to be civilised and Europeanised, and do not wish to be thrust back into the seclusion of their former tribal associations, or to forego their new place in the sun among the whites. [31]

He explained how by means of the migrant labour system, traditional African culture and institutions could be preserved:

> It is not the white employment of the native males that works the mischief, but the abandonment of the native tribal home by the women and children. This the law should vigorously prevent, and the system - whether it is administered by passes or in any other way - should only allow the residence of males for limited periods, and for purposes of employment among the whites. If this is done there will be no serious danger that the indigenous native system will be unduly affected. [32]

The segregation myth was constructed by mining capital's ideologues and it served its purpose well while mining was the dominant industry. In 1927, Lord Olivier commented on the true meaning of segregation as follows:

> No white politician and no educated native in Africa thinks of a true segregation when he employs the word ... The indispensable basis of the whole economic life of white South Africa being Kaffir work, it is obvious that not one European in a hundred - and no one whom the majority would not regard as a visionary - who advocates "segregation", has any idea of sorting out and resettling the country in black and white substates, each economically self-supporting. [33]

Yet twenty-one years after this statement was written, after a period of great economic expansion and even deeper social and economic integration of the races, the "visionaries" of the Nationalist Party advocated the "socio-economic separation" of the races in South Africa. (See Chapter 6.2.6.)

5.1.2.2. The African Challenge: 1936-1948

> Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonial and dependent countries. The purpose

> of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out super-profits. But in exploiting these countries, imperialism is compelled to build their railways, factories, and mills, industrial and commercial centres. The appearance of proletarians, the emergence of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the liberation movement - such are the inevitable results of this "policy". [34] (Emphasis added)

In 1936 the Hertzog-Smuts led government passed the Native Representation and Lands Acts which legally entrenched the segregation system of separate political institutions for Africans. The anomalous Cape African franchise, which had been acquired in the pre-Union period, was removed from the statutes. Under the non-racial qualified franchise system 15,000 Cape Africans had obtained the vote by 1930. In the same year Hertzog had extended the unqualified franchise to all white women and previously unqualified white men; this meant that the Cape African vote represented less than 2 per cent of the South African electorate. [35] In compensation for their loss of the franchise the Cape Africans received three white representatives in the central parliament. In addition, a Native Representative Council was established to serve in an advisory capacity on a national level.

This removal of the individual political rights of Cape Africans led to strong opposition from the African elite, a mixture of chiefs and new petty bourgeoise elements. [36] This was the beginning of a new era of African resistance. By the mid-1940's a relatively small but politically significant African intelligentsia had been formed in the urban areas. [37]

The main political organisation of the African nationalists was the African National Congress (ANC) which had been founded in 1912. This movement had traditionally pursued a constitutional battle with the white authorities and had paid little attention to the organisation of a mass based national liberation movement. However, the 1940's was a period of intellectual fermentation which led to far-reaching changes in the conception and mode of struggle of the African political movement.

The decisive political organisation which was to transform the struggle was the ANC Youth League, founded in 1943-1944. [38] It served as a disci-

plined pressure group "giving force, direction and vigour to the struggle for African National Freedom by assisting, supporting and re-inforcing the National Movement". [39] Its aims were the eradication of all forms of racial discrimination as the means to African progress, and it recognised the urgent need for the assertion of the African numerical political majority. [40]

The miners strike and its violent suppression by the Smuts government in 1946 was to be a turning point in the politics of the formerly conservative Native Representatives Council. [41] It became evident to African leaders that the government's promises of a better deal for Africans in the post-war years were not going to be honoured, and as a result new politically revolutionary demands were made. The ANC leaders called for,

> the direct representation of Africans in all legislative bodies, national, provincial and municipal "through a common franchise". Allied to this were precise demands for the abolition of the pass laws and recognition of African trade unions including those in mining and farming. There were also claims for property rights, improved educational and health facilities, adequate social security benefits and equality before the law. [42]

The political radicalisation of the African intelligentsia coupled with the growth of trade unionism and the tendency towards the unification of the leaders and masses in a national liberation struggle, was looked upon fearfully by the white ruling class. The growing militancy of the ANC was linking up with that of the Indian Congress movement, [43] and the South African Communist Party in the post-war years. [44] However, at that time, these movements were not sufficiently powerful to endanger white rule.

5.1.2.3. The Ruling Class' Response

Since South Africa was a "colony" of the British metropolis it was most sensitive to metropolitan political and ideological changes, especially changes in colonial policy (i.e., "native policy"). Prior to the Second World War, Britain had followed a policy of Indirect Rule in her African colonies. South Africa's African policy of segregation was thus more or less compatible with accepted British colonial administrative practice. However, by the late 1930's and 1940's the "colonial contradiction" had

given rise to broad-based African nationalist movements which forced the British to abandon Indirect Rule and to begin to introduce elective forms of local government in the colonies. The disruption of metropolitan relations on account of the war also hastened the disintegration of the British colonial empire.

After the war Britain was obliged to concede her hegemonic status among the metropolitan capitalist nations to the emergent super-power, the United States. The United States strongly advocated decolonisation, as evidenced in the Atlantic Charter, for it planned to take over the positions of the weakened European colonialist countries, thereby strengthening itself. [45] Furthermore, it feared that a long liberation struggle in the colonies would provide favourable conditions for communist inspired, anti-imperialist forms of struggle to emerge. Consequently, it was necessary to quickly liberate the nationalist forces in Africa and to try to ensure that they would ally themselves with the United States.

The contradiction between the forces of national liberation and imperialist colonial rule was world-wide by the end of the war. And the "Declaration of Human Rights" by the newly established United Nations Organisation, in contrast to Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, was symbolic of the entire shift in international morality after the defeat of fascism.

The trend towards the granting of political rights to the colonial Africans was clearly established after the war. The failure of South Africa's white ruling class to adopt a progressive policy on the issue of African and Indian political rights led to strong criticism of the regime at the United Nations, particularly from the newly independent India. However, to understand why the Smuts government failed to act in accordance with the changing world conditions, it is necessary to analyse the objective social relations existing in the South African society in the 1940's. For in the contradiction between international relations and the fundamental social relations, the latter determine how the former exercise their influence. [46]

In 1942, only thirteen years after his Oxford lecture and seven years after the passing of the "Segregation" Acts, Smuts, the Prime Minister

and leader of the United Party, was obliged to concede that, "segregation /had/ fallen on evil days". [47] He pointed out that:

> A revolutionary change is taking place among the Native peoples of Africa through the movement from the country to the towns - the movement from the old Reserves in the Native areas to the big European centres of population. Segregation tried to stop it. It has, however, not stopped it in the least. The process has been accelerated. You might as well try to sweep the ocean back with a broom. It is going on all the time. With this urbanisation, we have had the phenomenon which we call "detribalisation" - the breaking-down of the old tribal traditions and culture and the authority of the chiefs. All these are breaking down far more rapidly than is desirable or good for the Natives of this country. It is the greatest revolution that has ever happened on this continent, and it is taking place right in our midst. [48]

The reality of massive black urbanisation finally shattered the segregation myth and called into question the racist social order. Smuts both acknowledged the reality of African urbanisation as inevitable and admitted the importance of the African worker.

> This country has a population of over ten millions, and that outlook which treats the African and Native as not counting, is making the ghastliest mistake possible. If he is not much more, he is the beast of burden; he is the worker and you need him. He is carrying this country on his back. [49]

But, he saved himself from the logic of "de-segregation" by falling back on the anachronistic ideal of "Christian Trusteeship" as the basis for future black/white relations. It is ironical that Smuts, the author of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, should return to the post-World War I principle of "trusteeship" to deal with post-World War II race relations in South Africa.

After decades of idealising "segregation" as the best of all policies for the Africans themselves, we find Smuts obliged to defend the continued domination on the basis that the African was still a "ward". This paternalistic imperialist ideology was totally anachronistic in the framework of an industrializing society. It reflected the fact that the material interests of the ruling class prevented it from moving with the times.

Throughout the 1940's "Christian Trusteeship" was the reply of the ruling class to African claims for equality, though emphasis was now placed on the "duties" of the trustee towards the ward. [50] The trustee who for so long had prevented the ward from tasting the fruits of his own labour, suddenly discovered that the mal-nutrition, mal-education and mal-housing of his wards were becoming a threat to his own relatively well-fed, well-educated and well-housed white world. [51]

After the war the Smuts government passed two controversial bills which were strongly criticised for their "liberalism" by the Nationalist members of parliament. Under the Native Education Finance Bill of 1945, "for the first time in South African history, the education of African children was financed out of general revenue". [52] Yet, the expenditure per white pupil was approximately seven times that per African pupil. Under the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946, for the first time African workers, other than those employed in agriculture and mining or "tribalised natives doing work for a short period of time", were entitled to receive benefits from a State fund financed by compulsory contributions from employers, employees and the State. [53]

5.1.3. The Crisis of the Ruling Class' Hegemony

> The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. [54]

According to Gramsci, a crisis is essentially a crisis of authority or hegemony, which occurs when

> huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution. [55]

The African political and trade union demands in the 1940's added up to a demand for a revolution in the traditional socio-political organisation of the South African society. Internal and external factors had led to the sudden detachment of the African petty-bourgeoisie, workers and peasants, [56] from the traditional ideology of dominance, segregation, tribalism and gradualism. The development which the ruling class feared most, namely, the formation of a large urban African mass

with a militant leadership which claimed its "place in the sun among the whites", had occurred in the immediate post-war years.

The response of the ruling class did little to cure the ever widening rift between the white rulers and their black subjects. "Christian Trusteeship" was an anachronistic ideology which could scarcely satisfy the political ambitions of even the most conservative members of the African elite. The demand for the creation of a non-racial democracy in South Africa was the unanimous appeal of the African leaders by the end of 1946.

Caught by the rising tide of African expectations, the ruling party could not formulate a new general social policy which would meet the minimum demands of the masses and facilitate their transformation into a constructive and cooperative factor in the process of industrialisation. "Segregation ha/d/ fallen on evil days", and "Christian Trusteeship" was a last weak justification for the continuation of the dying "colonial" social order. In 1942, the British ambassador to South Africa Africa described the fundamental nature of the crisis as follows:

> The white people have failed to adjust their institutions to the overriding economic fact that the whole social structure of the country is built upon the basis of native and coloured labour. They have continued, to the point of positive danger, to uphold an untenable dichotomy between a "political" population of two millions and an "economic" population of ten millions. Until this dichotomy is resolved there can be no guarantee of the permanence of real European civilization in the sub-continent. 57

It is only against this background of a crisis of the ruling class' hegemony that the rise to power of Afrikaner fascism with its Apartheid "solution" can be properly understood. For when a crisis of capitalist society is not resolved, because on the one hand, the progressive forces are still too weak to impose their political will on their conservative masters, and these, on the other hand, are losing their grip on the masses, the political field is left open to a fascist solution. 58

5.2. The Formation, Struggle and Triumph of the "Purified" Nationalist Party

Introduction

In 1934 the "Purified" Nationalist Party was formed. In 1948 it came to power after a narrow victory in the national elections. Ever since it has ruled South Africa. The history of Afrikaner nationalism in the pre-1948 period has been closely studied in recent years, in order to throw light on the origins of the policy of Apartheid. Two books have made major contributions in this regard, that of Moodie (discussed in Chapter 3.2.), and that of O'Meara, entitled Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism: 1934-1948.[59] The latter is a Marxist study and is the first to explore the class basis of Afrikanerdom in any depth. In O'Meara's words, Afrikaner Nationalism "emerges as the often surprisingly flexible reaction of specific class forces to the pressures of capitalist development".[60]

My own view on the class basis of the Afrikaner nationalist movement coincides with that of O'Meara. I have drawn heavily on both his and Moodie's findings. However, whereas they are predominantly concerned with Afrikaner nationalism itself, my concern is to study how this phenomenon fits into the changing South African social structure. I hope to explain, not only why the Nationalist Party was successful in drawing the rural and urban Afrikaner masses into its political web, but also the way in which its own class base and its subsequent "alliance" with the monopoly capital led Apartheid, in essence the repression of African labour, to become its major national policy.

In the following sketch of the Afrikaner nationalist movement emphasis will be placed upon discovering the special conditions reigning in the post-World War II conjuncture which made the rise to power of Afrikaner fascism possible. A detailed study of the Christian-Nationalist ideology and its Apartheid derivative will be undertaken in Chapter 6.2; here it is only touched upon where necessary.

5.2.1. The Formation of the "Purified" Nationalist Party

The Great Depression had a profound impact on the political field in South Africa.[61] At the onset of the depression the country was governed by the "Pact" government, comprised of General Hertzog's National Party and the white Labour Party. It had been in power since 1924. The National Party, which was the party of the Afrikaner farmers, had won a working majority in parliament in the 1929 election, but continued its alliance with labour. The South African Party, led by General Smuts, was the main opposition party and mainly represented the interests of the English speaking mining, commercial and industrial sectors. Both party leaders were former Boer generals, Smuts had thrown in his lot with the British, while Hertzog had become a staunch defender of the vanquished Boers' social and political rights.

The main goals of the National Party were, besides looking after agricultural interests, to gain sovereign independence from Britain, to achieve equal status for the Afrikaans language and to uphold South Africa's economic interests against the British ("South Africa First"). The party claimed to be both anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, by which it meant that it opposed British financial capital and non-Afrikaner mining, industrial and commercial capital in general. "Hoggenheimer", pictured as a fat opulent Jew, was the traditional Afrikaner symbol of everything "evil" in the urban financial capitalist world.

By 1929 Hertzog had succeeded in attaining these three goals: at the 1926 Imperial Conference, the Balfour Declaration granted the Dominions complete equality of status with Britain herself; in the same year the Afrikaans language was granted equality in the State; and throughout the second half of the decade South Africa had experienced "national" economic development.

The depression hit the agricultural sector hardest. When Britain left the Gold Standard in September 1931, the Hertzog government refused to follow her lead, on the grounds that it was preserving South Africa's economic independence. It was not until December 1932 that the government reluctantly took South Africa off the gold standard. For more than a year its policy worsened the situation of the farmers. The devalu-

ation substantially raised the price of gold, and as we have shown in Chapter 5.1., South Africa experienced a boom in the 1930's.

The National Party threatened to tax away all the "excess" profits generated by the higher gold price and to use them to subsidize the farmers. Rather than seek confrontation with the united agricultural interests, the Chamber of Mines pushed for a coalition with agriculture in a government of national unity. Since Hertzog had achieved his three cherished goals, little stood in the way of a reconciliation of Afrikaner nationalism and "imperialism". Hence, the United South African National Party (hereafter U.P.) was formed in 1934.

From 1934 to 1939, the Hertzog-Smuts led party, a fusion of "gold and maize", totally dominated Parliament and Hertzog's ideal of a unified white South African nation appeared to be within reach. The English and Afrikaans speaking peoples had been united under the umbrella of the U.P., the economy was prospering as a result of the gold boom and white society was unified in its policy of segregation. These were the idyllic days.

But the U.P. did not manage to placate all the Afrikaner nationalists, for a minority rejected fusion with Smuts fearing that it would lead to the domination of the Afrikaner cause by imperialist and capitalist forces. In 1934, these dissident nationalists formed the "Purified" Nationalist Party (hereafter N.P.), which strongly opposed Hertzog's brand of Afrikaner nationalism, which included English-speaking white South Africans as part of the Afrikaner nation. In contrast, they stood for exclusive nationalism and retained the Afrikaner republican ideal i.e., a complete break with British imperialism.

The N.P. had two distinctive wings, a conservative one in the Cape, led by Dr. Malan, and a radical one in the Transvaal. Malan, who had been the leader of the Cape branch of the National Party under Hertzog, had rejected fusion with Smuts and withdrawn his party machine. It is thought that one of the main reasons why the Cape Nationalists rejected an alliance with big capital, was that they had the backing of nascent Afrikaner financial capitalist interests which preferred to build up their capital base independently. A second reason was that Cape agriculture

was mainly export oriented, whereas the agricultural interests which had joined Hertzog in the alliance with gold mining had more in common with the mines as they supplied the maize for the African workers directly to the Chamber of Mines. Another reason was that the majority of the "poor whites" lived in the Cape and it was thought that an alliance with northern monopoly capital would mean selling out their mass base. So, Malan chose to support the "small man", and joined up with the northern Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie which vehemently opposed fusion with "Hoggenheimer".

5.2.2. The Afrikaner Broederbond: The Vanguard of Afrikaner Fascism[62]

The post-depression political realignment fundamentally altered the character of Afrikaner nationalism. After 1934 it "differed markedly in its class base, ideological orientation and organizational structure from the pre-1934 varieties".[63] The Afrikaner farmers in the Transvaal followed Hertzog into the U.P. leaving the petty bourgeois Afrikaner intellectuals with the choice of either compromising with "imperialism" or continuing the fight to maintain a separate Afrikaner nation.

In the twentieth century the pace of Afrikaner urbanization had been swift. (See Chapter 4.2.) According to O'Meara,

> /the/ inexorable disintegration of the old, "traditional", platteland communities had contradictory results. At one level, it saw the apparent persistence of the petty bourgeois ideological structures of the now swiftly changing platteland communities. Capitalist farmer, poor white and intellectual all came from the same platteland. In the early years of this transition, they all mediated its changes through the spectacles of the old (Calvinist, petty-commodity producer) Weltanschaung.[64]

The white agricultural sector was made up of a large number of small landowners and a small number of large landowners (see 4.1.2.3.), and in the Depression these small farmers and tenant farmers were particularly hard hit. As a consequence the plight of the "poor whites" was exacerbated (see 4.4.), becoming a major cause for concern in leading Afrikaner circles. In 1934, a national conference on the Poor White Problem was held. Dr. Verwoerd, who was a driving force behind the conference, addressed it as follows:

> it is important for the Afrikaans-speaking to consider that out of a population of scarcely two million white inhabitants, of which approximately one and one-eight million are of Afrikaans-speaking descent, it is conservatively estimated that more than 300,000 are poor Whites ... about a quarter of our Afrikaans-speaking people are poor Whites ... At the same time by far the most voluntary welfare organizations are English-oriented. [65]

The newly urbanized Afrikaner intellectuals felt culturally inferior and alienated in the larger English-speaking towns, and were often obliged to give up their language and culture in order to get by in these urban centres. Given the mass poverty and unemployment in the early 1930's and their own deep sense of alienation, a significant group of Afrikaners, mainly academics, teachers and clergy, who had been in the forefront of the struggle for Afrikaner language and social equality in the 1920's, rejected Hertzog's compromise with the traditional enemy of Afrikanerdom. They set about the arduous task of reconstituting the broken-down community of Afrikaners of all classes and regaining the lost pride of the Afrikaner volk (people). O'Meara has summarised the humiliating political experience of the Afrikaners at the hand of British imperialism as follows:

> To those class forces which comprised the base of the Nationalist Party, and to the Anglo-Boer War veterans who dominated its leadership, the mining houses, the banks, the great import houses, the "English" press and the senior state officials were all synonymous with "imperialism". It was these partners, marching together under the hated Union Jack who had driven the Boers into the Great Trek, stolen the diamond fields of the OFS with a cheap legal trick and tried to annex the Transvaal; it was these fortune hunters who bled the Transvaal white and then trampled into dust the independence of the Boer Republics, killing 25,000 women and children in their concentration camps in the process; under Milner they had even tried to destroy the Afrikaans language whilst driving poor Afrikaner farmers off their land into the Sodom and Gomorrah of the cities, and (most heinous of all), economic competition with the Black man; these foreign devils had corrupted once-heroic Boer Generals like Botha and Smuts, turning them into the "handymen of the Empire" and the tools of the mineowners, so that but four years after Union in 1910, South Africa had been dragged into Britain's war with Germany and Afrikaner had fought Afrikaner in the ensuing Rebellie; their "imperialist" policies were destroying the rural communities, transforming proud rural patriarchs into the pitied and despised poor whites, dividing the volk in the full bitterness of class warfare; and finally their relentless pursuit of profit and domination led them to substitute white miners with cheap black labour

> in 1922, and when a great mine strike ensued, butchered nearly 300 people whilst they bombed and shelled the miners into submission. [66]

The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) was a secret organisation which was formed in Johannesburg in 1918 to promote Afrikaner interests. In 1927, in response of Hertzog's decision to withdraw the republican ideal from the National Party's principles after the Balfour Declaration, the Broederbond took the crucial decision to take an active role in every dimension of Afrikaner life. It was greatly concerned with the plight of the urban Afrikaners and it believed that the solution to Afrikaner problems lay in conquering the economic as well as political spheres of influence in South Africa.

The Broederbond was a distinctly petty bourgeois organisation: teachers, academics, clergymen and civil servants provided the backbone of the organisation, representing over 50 per cent of its 2,528 all male membership in 1944. [67] Academics played a determining role in the formulation of its Christian-National ideology. (The content of this ideology will be examined in Chapter 6.2.). Many of the younger academics, five of whom, all newly returned from doctoral studies in Europe, N. Diederichs, P.J. Meyer, H.F. Verwoerd, G. Cronje and A. Hertzog (the son of the Prime Minister), played a decisive political role in the mobilization of the Afrikaner masses. Dr. Malan and other leading Cape politicians (e.g. Dr. T.E. Dönges) joined the Broederbond in the mid-1930's. It appears that a delegation from the organisation played an important role in dissuading Malan from following Hertzog into the union with Smuts. [68]

The Broederbond perceived the threat of economic and cultural imperialism and sought to counter it by aiming its sights on the acquisition of political and economic power in South Africa. In 1934, its Chairman admonished:

> Let us keep the eye fixed on this, that the main object is ... that Afrikanerdom shall reach its ultimate destiny of domination in South Africa ... Brothers, our solution for South Africa's troubles is not that this or that party shall gain the upper hand, but that the Afrikaner Broederbond shall rule South Africa. [69]

The Broederbond's role throughout the 1930's and 1940's was essentially one of policy making, and it provided the collective leadership for

Afrikanerdom. [70] Leading members of the Nationalist Party and those of the numerous "cultural-political" organizations which sprang up under its auspices during this period, were all members of the Broederbond.

It was necessary to develop a strategy to win over the Afrikaner masses to the cause of Christian-National republicanism. This strategy was developed in the 1930's and comprised three main areas of approach: "the ideological re-definition of Afrikanerdom and its Nationalism - 'kultuurpolitiek'; the organization of Afrikaner workers into separate trade-unions; and the establishment and promotion of Afrikaner business interests". [71] By the end of the 1930's great strides forward had been made in the first area.

In 1938, the "Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings" (Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations) a Broederbond organization which had over 300 "cultural" organizations affiliated to it, promoted a festival to celebrate the centenary of the Great Trek. (See Chapter 3.1.3.). This was the first mass mobilization of Afrikaners under the banner of the new ideology. The leader of the "Simboliese Ossewatrek" (Symbolic Ox-wagon Trek) was H.J. Klopper, founder of the Afrikaner Broederbond. The movement of the ox-wagons from the Cape to the Transvaal, along the paths of their ancestors, captured the hearts of the Afrikaner masses, sweeping them towards a new national unity.

The cult of the nation/volk, which took root in the centenary celebrations, was intended by the leaders to bridge the gap between Afrikaners in the cities and the countryside, between rich and poor, to reunite the economically divided nation. The "simple" ox-wagon was a pre-industrial symbol of Afrikaner unity, which was intended to serve as an inspiration to modern Afrikanerdom "in its time of need", to help it to maintain its unity in the difficult phase of the "second trek", from the idyllic countryside to the "gruesome" cities. [72]

The Symbolic Trek culminated in the laying of the cornerstone of the Voortrekker monument on December 16, 1938, a century after a Boer Commando had routed the Zulu army at Blood River. The monument, situated on a hill outside Pretoria, was intended to "anchor the national myths and symbols in the consciousness of the people", [73] to symbolize Afri-

kaner spiritual solidarity and unity in the past, present and future. Over a 100,000 people, many dressed in trekker costume, gathered at the "altar of Afrikanerdom" on that day, in order to demonstrate their "God given" national identity. A further 40,000 people "worshipped" at Blood River, the site of their past glory.

The character of the 1938 Afrikaner volk festivities was not unique, for as Marx noted, bourgeois revolution was prone to "draw its poetry from the past", and that,

> just when /men/ seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. [74]

In order to ensure that the spirit of the "Ossewatrek" did not evaporate, a new volkish organization, the "Ossewa Brandwag" (Ox-wagon Sentinel) was launched to spread the Christian-Nationalist ideology throughout the land. In addition, an "Ekonomiese Volkskongres" (People's Economic Congress) was convened in 1939 with the aim of re-educating the Afrikaner masses to the task of "self-help". In practice this meant the channeling of the savings and consumption of the Afrikaner employees and farmers towards the capitalist and cooperative enterprises of the rising Afrikaner bourgeoisie. The "Reddingsdaadbond" (Union for the Act of Salvation) was set up to mobilize "support" for the "poor whites" (who by this time were fully employed) by building up Afrikaner business so that it, rather than "British-Jewish" capital, might employ Afrikaner employees in a true brotherly spirit.

On the labour front the aim of the Broederbond was to destroy the grip of the established trade union movement and its Labour Party on the Afrikaner workers. In 1936 the "Nasionale Raad van Trustees" (National Council of Trustees) was formed by Hertzog, Meyer and Diederichs in order to "form right (wing) inclined trade unions and thereafter serve as a liason body with the Afrikaner nation". [75] By exploiting the contradictions between the mainly English skilled workers, who led and controlled the craft unions, and the mainly Afrikaans-speaking semi-skilled workers, it was hoped that the "de-nationalizing" affect of class con-

sciousness might be arrested. Anti-communism was another weapon frequently employed, for the communists played a fringe role in the white labour movement.

5.2.3. The Internal Struggle During the War

When the war broke out in Europe, the U.P.'s unity was threatened. Hertzog sympathised with Germany's ambitions and was strongly against South Africa's participation in another British war. Smuts, who was regarded as "the handyman of the Empire" by the Nationalists, was equally adamant about the need to support Britain. In a parliamentary vote Smuts defeated the combined Hertzog-Malan neutrality policy by 80 votes to 67, and subsequently became the new Prime Minister. A significant fraction of the Afrikaner farming representatives left the U.P. with their leader Hertzog.

Before the outbreak of the war the Broederbond had solved its organisational problems and had succeeded in re-defining the content of Christian-Nationalism. It had also managed to arouse the sympathies of the masses for its republican cause.

Nothing seemed to be more advantageous to the nationalists than the split in the U.P. For it was hoped that Afrikanerdom could be re-united in a struggle against the U.P. In 1940 Hertzog was re-elected to the leadership of the re-united Nationalist Party, but within a year he walked out in protest against the exclusive (anti-English) ideology which the Broederbond had incorporated into the policy of the party. Malan regained the leadership, but shortly after had to struggle against the Ossewa Brandwag (hereafter O.B.) to retain the party's dominance in the political field.

The O.B., which was organised along para-military lines, captured the imagination of the masses. In the early 1940's it was reported to have had between 300,000 and 400,000 members, a number representing 60-70 per cent of all the adult Afrikaners.[76] This was a populist movement which was mobilised by a radical Christian-Nationalist ideology and the strong anti-British, pro-German sentiment among Afrikaners. The strength of the O.B. was so great that Smuts was obliged to retain a

strong military force in the country to safeguard his power from a possible O.B. coup. [77] "That Smuts feared an uprising is indicated by his early ban on private ownership of firearms for the duration of the war." [78]

In 1941, Malan perceived the O.B. leader, Commandant-General van Rensurg, as a threat to the N.P.'s political leadership and consequently renounced the earlier agreement of cooperation between the party and the O.B. He started a successful campaign to discredit and weaken the O.B.'s hold over the masses and to build up the party's own grass roots organisation. (This subject is discussed further in Chapter 6.2.). As a consequence of this internal struggle, the Afrikaner movement was politically weakened during the war years and Smuts won a strong parliamentary majority in the 1943 elections.

5.2.4. The Post-War Crisis and the Triumph of Apartheid

5.2.4.1. The Economic Basis of the Conflict in the Power Bloc

In a capitalist social formation where the bourgeois class is constitutively divided into different class fractions there is a need for a "power bloc",

> /which/ can only function on a regular basis in so far as a dominant class or fraction of a class imposes its own particular domination on the members of the alliance in power, in short in so far as it succeeds in imposing its hegemony and cementing them together under its leadership. [79]

Conflicts within the power bloc are not confined to the economic level, but have repercussions on both the political and ideological planes. And as Poulantzas noted, "contradictions between the dominant classes and class fractions often take on sufficient importance to determine the forms of State and of regime". [80]

The contradiction between the major industrial sectors over the policy of African labour allocation lay at the core of the post-war intra-capitalist conflict. This contradiction has been analyzed in Chapter 4. The alliance between mining, farming and manufacturing in the 1934-1939 period had depended on the existence of a satisfactory labour supply being available to each sector, though by the end of this period the

farmers were complaining of labour shortages. The State backed industrialization during the war had undermined the labour supply and profitability of gold mining, and further aggravated the farm labour shortage. However, the power bloc, although showing signs of strain, did not split into open conflict until after the war.

5.2.4.2. The United Party's Social and Political Strategy in the 1948 Election

The U.P., which had represented an alliance of the three sectors, formulated its response to the labour conflict in the report of the Fagan Commission which published its recommendations just before the 1948 election. This report concluded that:

1) The townward movement of Natives is simply an economic phenomenon ...
2) It can be guided and regulated, but it is impossible to prevent it or turn it in the opposite direction
3) We, therefore, have to accept the fact that there is a permanent urban Native population. [81]

The report contained a long analysis of the social evils of migrant labour and exposed the lies about the "benefits" of migrant labour to the Africans, which had been for so many years propagated by the mining industry. However, it could not proscribe the migrant labour system on account of its being an economic necessity for the mines and the economy as a whole. Consequently it concluded that,

> the policy should be one of facilitating and encouraging the stabilization of labour; but on the other hand, migratory labour cannot be prohibited by law or terminated by administrative action ... [82]

In fact, the report recommended the removal of the legal provisions and stopping of the administrative policy which had historically prevented the free flow of African labour to the towns in the interests of the farming and mining sectors. [83] It also planned to introduce "central guidance for the purpose of turning the migrant stream into the most useful channels" by means of a system of labour bureaux. [84]

In essence the report expressed a policy closely in line with the manufacturing and commercial sectors' need for a stabilized labour force. It announced to the mining and farming sectors that the State would not support their demand for first call on the African labour supply, and

that they would have to compete in a "freed" labour market with rival capitalists. For example, in answering the question as to whether migrant or stabilized labour would be used in the new Orange Free State gold-fields, it replied that,

> this case too, is covered by the general principles we have laid down i.e., in respect of migrant labour: no compulsion one way or the other, but, in so far as the Government is itself in a position to act or is able to influence other bodies, the creation of facilities for a stable labour force. /Furthermore, it stated that/ ....it may be questioned whether sufficient migrant labour will be obtainable to enable the mining companies to exploit the Free State mines entirely with that class of labour. [85]

The Fagan Report which embodied the U.P.'s future "Native" policy signified a complete break with the segregation policy of the past, for it recognized the inevitability and desirability of permanent African urbanization.

This U.P. policy proposal clearly favoured the labour interests of the manufacturing industries over those of mining and farming. During the early 1940's the U.P. government had significantly relaxed the laws controlling the influx of Africans to the towns. In the immediate post-war years attempts were made to halt the flow of Africans to urban areas, but these measures proved inadequate. [86] Hence, the U.P. was finding it harder to satisfy the labour requirements of all its supporters. Both the mining and farming sectors were against the main principle of the Fagan Report which implied the formation of a competitive market for African labour, since they could not compete with manufacturing wages. (See Chapter 4.1.5.). So on this key issue the power bloc was hopelessly divided in the post-war conjuncture.

However, on the question of black political and trade union rights there seems to have been agreement within U.P. circles. No trade unions were to be permitted in mining and farming, and industrial trade unions were to be segregated, with the African trade unions under State control. Equal political rights would not be extended to the urban African, Indian and Coloured populations in the foreseeable future. Christian Trusteeship and the maintenance of white supremacy were to be the election policies. [87]

Although the 78 year-old Smuts remained the leader of the U.P. during the 1948 election it was commonly known that Hofmeyer was to be his successor. Smuts had dominated the political scene since the declaration of war and his success in the European theatre had earned him respect and admiration. However, there was no suitable heir to his mantle in the United Party.

Hofmeyer was a brilliant but eccentric character. [88] At 25 years of age he had become the Principal of the Witwatersrand University. He ran the government almost single-handed during Smuts' frequent absences overseas in the 1940's. But above all, Hofmeyer was a liberal on racial matters within the South African context.

On separate occasions proceeding the 1948 election he declared that "natives will eventually be represented in Parliament by Natives and Indians by Indians"; furthermore, he attacked the prevailing white South African "Herrenvolk" (master race) mentality. [89]

In Smuts' own opinion: "Hofmeyer is too clever by half and no leader, no leader unfortunately". [90] Yet Smuts was deeply committed to Hofmeyer on account of a long personal friendship, and in the absence of any other "natural" leader in the ranks of the United Party he used his enormous prestige to secure Hofmeyer's future leadership.

The principal contradiction between the Black masses and the ruling class was explored in Section 5.1. In the post-war conjuncture even the conservative Black leaders had totally rejected racial inequality, and a general loss of credibility in the United U.P.'s "Christian Trusteeship" policy had transpired. (See Section 5.1.2.2.)

In 1947 Smuts expressed the difficulty he faced in re-establishing the ideological grip over the black and white masses in the post-war years as follows:

> I am very busy these days to see what can be done to improve European-non European relations, which are definitely deteriorating. This is due not only to more difficult conditions here - rising cost of living, scarcities, higher prices with which wages do not keep pace, but also to the new wind blowing through the world. The fully publicized discussions at UNO are having a great effect in all directions. We even hear about

> them from our domestic and farm Natives who really have nothing to complain of, but are deeply stirred by all this talk of equality and non-discrimination. I am so anxious to stay this rot and get a move on to better relations, but it is even more difficult now in view of these Native claims, which have just the opposite effect on European mentality. Both extremes are gathering strength and it is all the more difficult to find a "via media" as a solution. The old Fabian slogan of gradualness would be the best solution under the circumstances, but the extreme tempers on both sides almost rule this out. If only one could get people back into a reasonable mood, but that is the very thing that has disappeared on both sides. Still, I am anxious to try my hand at a solution. The danger is that appearing pro-Native I may run the risk to lose the general election next year, and thus hand the Natives over to the other extreme. The time has certainly arrived when a new effort at a reasonable compromise and to secure a new hope for Native advance should be opened up. [91]

The predicament Smuts faced is a good example of the way in which racism, or what Hofmeyer called the predominant "Herrenvolk" mentality, "restricted the options open to those charged with guarding class interests". [92]

5.2.4.3. The Nationalist Party's Apartheid Offensive

Although the Afrikaner nationalist movement was shaken by the power struggles in the war years, the Broederbond was still intact and was instrumental in setting a new course in mid-1944. At a Volk's congress, it was decided that the future Christian-Nationalist racial policy would be "Apartheid". [93] Although there were occasional references to an ideal Apartheid policy which intended to territorially separate the races in South Africa, it was clear from the political statements on the subject that what was in fact meant was rigid enforcement of the old segregation system.

The program for the Christian-Nationalization of the Afrikaner masses was carried out during the war. Efforts were made to draw Afrikaners from every walk of life into the volkish community. After the war, however, there was a change in emphasis in the appeal for unity. The "positive" dimensions of Christian-Nationalism, e.g., Afrikaner separatism and republicanism, were toned-down, and the threat of liberalism and "communism" were played-up. "If you want to solve the Communist danger

in South Africa", said Dr. Malan at a Nationalist Party congress in 1945, "you must look for its origin, and it is chiefly the non-Europeans who are influenced by the propaganda of equality". [94]

The Apartheid appeal was intimately linked to the Christian-Nationalist ideology (see Chapter 6.2), and like the positive appeal of the "people's community", it transcended the sectional interests and conflicts within the various strata of Afrikanerdom and provided a powerful harmonizing force for the internally split movement. Yet, when it came to appealing to each section of the community, the totalitarian Apartheid doctrine was tailored to fit the material, not merely ideological, needs of each fraction.

To the Afrikaner farmers, whose number one complaint against the government was that its pro-manufacturing policy was causing a severe labour shortage on the farms, Apartheid promised that African labour would be redirected from the towns to the farms. [95] This promise must have been particularly attractive to Transvaal farmers who, being closest to the Witwatersrand industrial complex, feared its magnetic pull on their African labour. Transvaal farmers were dependent on tenant labour and therefore, were reliant upon the State to enforce tenancy contracts. [96] Not only had the Smuts government turned a blind eye to this matter, but it had investigated the maltreatment of African farm labourers in the Eastern Transvaal, in June 1947. This action was greatly resented by the farmers. [97] Further, the Nationalists promised to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act by excluding some categories of Africans, for the farmers believed that such social benefits attracted them to the towns. [98]

One of the main Broederbond activities had been to weaken the influence the Labour Party and the established trade unions had over the Afrikaner workers. Towards the end of the war this ambition was pursued with renewed vigour by the N.P. and the O.B. The first through the establishment of the "Blanke Werkers se Beskermingsbond" (The White Workers' Protection Society), the second via the "Labour Front". The familiar names of Diederichs, Meyer, Verwoerd and Schoeman (the in-coming Nationalist Minister of Labour) stood behind the continued attack on the white trade union movement. [99] And once again the Mineworkers Union came under particularly strong pressure.

O'Meara and Davies have both studied the methods used by these Christian-National organizations to win over the Afrikaner mine workers and railway men. [100] Both showed that it was not the inherent appeal of Afrikaner nationalism that drew a segment of the workers to the Christian-Nationalist trade unions, but the specific conditions faced by the workers in each industry. For example, the Mineworkers Union, which was the established trade union of the white mine supervisors (mainly Afrikaners) was extremely corrupt, and hence, susceptible to the attacks of the fascists. Further, white mine workers had not had a real wage increase for almost a decade, and thus were open to the Nationalists' promise to support their claim for a 30 per cent wage increase should they come to power. [101]

Other white wage-earners were also discontent with their post-war wage increases. [102] The continued inflation in the post-war years particularly affected the low-wage whites, as food and clothing prices rose substantially. Economic grievances clearly existed among white wage-earners and these were exploited by the Nationalist politicians. But the Smuts government's policy of accepting the stabilization of African labour and absorption of black workers into semi-skilled jobs was a far more volatile election issue. For example, a massive white building workers' strike was launched in 1946 against the government's decision to train black building artisans. [103]

The privileged white wage-earners, whose status was guaranteed by State intervention in the labour market, i.e., colour-bars, could only look with apprehension at the prospects of a racially competitive labour market. Hence Apartheid, which promised the perpetuation of colour-bars in industry and white supremacy in all spheres of society, was extremely popular with the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie (the State employees) and industrial workers.

The Nationalist Party manipulated the racial fears of the Afrikaner masses, making political capital out of the liberal racial views of Hofmeyer, the United Party's deputy leader. [104] In essence the 1948 election was fought over whether Hofmeyer's liberal vision or Christian-Nationalist Apartheid would steer post-World War II South Africa.

The Nationalists' attempts to split the white labour movement, plus repeated policy statements of their intention to introduce State control over the trade unions, no doubt influenced the social democratic Labour Party's decision to enter into an "anti-fascist" electoral pact with the United Party.[105]

The Nationalist Party entered into an electoral coalition with the Afrikaner Party, which represented the remains of Hertzog's party and was led by Havenga. It appears that Havenga, a former Minister of Finance, had negotiated with Smuts in late 1946 about a possible alliance, and it was rumoured that the Chamber of Mines and other "influential Johannesburgers wanted Havenga to form a new middle party. He could discard Malan on the right and Hofmeyer on the left".[106] But Smuts refused Havenga's demands, one reason being his insistence on becoming Prime-Minister after Smuts, a post already assigned to Hofmeyer.[107]

So Afrikaner unity was re-established on the eve of the 1948 election. The Nationalist Party had reached an agreement with the Afrikaner Party, and the latter had an electoral pact with the Ossewa Brandwag, which was still branded by Malan and by this time had been considerably weakened.[108]

5.2.4.4. The 1948 Election Results

The outcome of the election came like "a bolt from the blue" to the rival parties. The Nationalist bloc obtained a slender majority in parliament as a result of a solid swing to the right which gave them 36 new seats, almost doubling their 1943 holding. However, the victory was a result of the distorting effect of the electoral system. The N.P./A.P. alliance gained 52.7 per cent of the 150 parliamentary seats with only 39.4 per cent of the vote, whereas the U.P./L.P. alliance won only 47.3 per cent of the seats with 53.3 per cent of the vote. If the seats had been distributed in proportion to the votes, the U.P./L.P. alliance would have had 80 seats and the Nationalists 59 seats.[109] The decisive factor causing this electoral distortion was the geographical concentration of the parties victories, for the U.P. seats were mainly in the loaded urban constituencies, and those of the N.P. in the unloaded rural constituencies.[110]

Table 5.1. Seats and Votes of the Major Parties: 1938-1953

	U.P.* Seats	U.P. Votes (in '000)	L.P.* Votes	L.P. Seats	U.P./L.P. Seats	U.P./L.P. Votes
1938	111	446	3	49	114	495
1943	89	435	9	38	98	473
1948	65	524	6	27	71	551
1953	57	576	5	35	62	611
	N.P.* Seats	N.P. Votes	A.P.* Seats	A.P. Votes	N.P./A.P. Seats	N.P./A.P. Votes
1938	27	260	-	-	27	260
1943	43	322	-	-	43	322
1948	70	402	9	42	79	481
1953	94	599	-	-	94	599

* U.P.=United Party, L.P.=Labour Party, N.P.=Nationalist Party, A.P.= Afrikaner Party

Source: P. van den Berghe, op. cit., pp. 293-294.

The majority of the white electorate were clearly not drawn into the Nationalist camp on account of racial hysteria. The Apartheid slogan, with its promise to save "white civilization", appears to only have been attractive to Afrikaner voters. Hence, the argument that the racist campaign was of less significance in the Nationalist victory than the decade long systematic Christian-Nationalization of the Afrikaner masses appears to have some validity. [111]

The results in the Transvaal, the province most strongly affected by industrialization, were decisive in bringing the Nationalists to power. Of their national gain of 36 seats, 25 were in the Transvaal (see Table 5.2.). They gained 10 urban seats (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand and Pretoria) and 15 rural seats. The Nationalists increased their total vote in the province by 69,000, which was divided 32,000 urban and 37,000 rural. Thus the Party strategy for bridging the gap between urban and rural Afrikaners succeeded. In particular, the efforts directed towards winning the Afrikaner "worker" paid off, for it won 6 seats in the Witwatersrand mining and industrial region. However, the combination of geo-

phical factors and the electoral system worked strongly against the U.P./L.P.
lance:

the disparity between votes cast and seats won is seen at its most dramatic in the Transvaal, where, with a majority of over 24,000 votes over the Nationalists, the United and Labour Parties could muster only 30 out of 66 seats, and 6 of these were unopposed. In Pretoria they won only 3 out of the 8 seats, while polling more votes. And all 23 rural seats in the Transvaal were won by the Nationalists with only 59.6 % of the votes. [112]

le 5.2 The Distribution of Seats and Votes in the Transvaal
(in '000)

	1943		1948		1953	
	U.P./L.P.	N.P./A.P.	U.P./L.P.	N.P./A.P.	U.P./L.P.	N.P.
annesburg: Seats	17	1	16	2	14	3
Votes	66	17	56	18	56	26
vatersrand: Seats	15	0	11	6	8	10
Votes	69	38	77	60	92	85
toria: Seats	6	2	3	5	2	6
Votes	31	21	31	30	34	41
al Areas: Seats	15	8	0	23	0	24
Votes	66	59	64	96	72	118
al: Seats	53	11	30	36	24	43
Votes	232	135	229	204	254	269
nge: Seats			- 23	+ 25	- 6	+ 7
Votes			- 3	+ 69	+ 25	+ 65

rce: Heard, op. cit., pp. 21-23, 39-41, 60, 62-63.

.5. The Consolidation of Power: 1948-1953

Broederbond's main objective, "that Afrikanerdom shall reach its ultimate des- of domination in South Africa", had "miraculously" occurred. [113] The National- Party had come to power on the broad basis of the Afrikaner "volkswil" (people's l). The social basis of the regime lay in Afrikaners of all classes, the agri- tural, commercial, financial and emergent industrial bourgeoisies, as well as petty bourgeois masses and "workers".

Yet, this regime which represented the will of 80 per cent of the Afrikaners, had received a minority of the popular vote and held only a slim majority in parliament. The non-Nationalist voting public were shocked and dismayed by the victory of the "Malanazis", and scarcely knew what to expect from the new government in the light of all its fascistic pronouncements during the preceding decade. The Nationalists promptly reassured them that they had nothing to fear.

With regard to the mining industry's status, the Prime Minister Dr. Malan publicly repudiated the party's program which had called for the semi-nationalization of the gold mines. (See Chapter 6.2.5.) In April 1949, Dr. A. Hertzog, a "radical" Nationalist, proclaimed that, "for all those who look to the future of South Africa there is only one solution, and that is that, irrespective of any key industries, the gold mining industry should be nationalized by the State". Dr. Malan replied that "the government contemplated no sweeping measures such as the nationalization of the gold mines". [114]

Furthermore, after having pursued a rabid anti-British imperialist political line since the early 1930's the new regime completely reversed its stand. [115] It was quick to allay British fears and gave assurance that its financial and commercial interests in South Africa would not be jeopardised. It expressed its desire for friendly relations with Britain and pushed for closer military links on the pretext of the gravity of the international communist threat. [116]

The manufacturing industry and commerce were uncertain as to the effect of the Apartheid policy on the future status of the urban Africans, their labour force. They too received assurances that the government fully backed the industrialization of the country and that adequate labour would be made available to each sector.

The "white working class", a minority of which had supported the Nationalist Party in 1948, was not as a whole regarded as a threat to the regime. Hence the scheme for State control of the white trade unions was dropped. But leftist and communist elements within the trade unions, who pushed for the formation of racially mixed trade unions had to be eliminated.

In 1950 the government passed the "Suppression of Communism Bill" which spearheaded its attack against all anti-Apartheid activities regarded as a "threat to the State". The word "communism" was given a very wide definition and included any doctrine or scheme:

> (a) which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions, or by means which include the promotion of disturbance or disorder;
> (b) which aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races of the Union. [117]

By means of this Act the government suppressed the Communist Party of South Africa, and removed from office those trade union officials (of all races) who opposed its plan for the segregation of the trade unions and who supported the democratic struggle of the African masses. [118]

One of the first initiatives taken by the new government was to appoint the Industrial Legislation Commission of Inquiry. It had comprehensive terms of reference to cover the whole field of labour and race relations in industry, and a specific mandate to report on the desirability of having separate trade unions for the different races. True to expec tation, when it reported in 1951, the Commission recommended that "it should be the policy of the government to achieve the organisations of European and non-European workers in separate trade unions". [119]

The Commission analysed "the most important phenomena resulting from this fundamental 'industrial revolution'" and reached the "clear conclusion" that the "non-European labour has already become an integral part of the national economy" [120]-so much for ideal Apartheid. (See Chapter 6.2.6.) It went on to pose the following questions with respect to labour:

> What will be the outcome of this economic development if no directional control is applied or exercised? Must this very real problem confronting the Union at the present moment be left to resolve itself by the free inter-play of the law of supply and demand, while interference and control in other spheres of the national economy have already come to be accepted as a matter of policy? [121]

To check the operation of the free market for African labour a national system of labour bureaux was to be gradually installed to recruit and allocate African labour. The first step in this direction was the pass-

ing of the Natives Laws Amendment Act in 1949. Its funcion was to restrict the flow of Africans to the towns in order to produce more labour for the farms and mines. [122] The gold mining industry's labour supply did not recover immediately. In 1951 it was slightly below the 1946 level (See Table 4.10). However, the "cost crisis" was relieved by the devaluation of sterling and the South African pound in September 1949. The devaluation led to a 44 per cent increase in the price of gold and more than doubled the working profit per ton milled. [123] Havenga, who as we mentioned had been the mine owners choice as a successor to Smuts, had been appointed the new Minister of Finance and was responsible for the devaluation which in the opinion of a leading South African economist,

> represented largely an internal transfer of resources from the importers and others to the gold mining industry - a redistribution of internal income, or perhaps more correctly a retransference to the gold mining industry of some of the profitability which (apart from grade reduction) the rising cost and wage levels during and since the war have taken from it - a whole or partial restoration of the former position. [124]

Clearly, the erstwhile "anti-capitalist" Nationalist Party was forging an alliance with mining capital. [125] None of the additional gold revenue was used to raise the African workers' wages as one might have expected considering the mining industry's earlier lament over its inability to compete with manufacturing wages. However, the white mine workers were well rewarded for having supported the Nationalist Party in the elections, their wages were raised by 45 per cent following the devaluation. (See Table 4.10.)

In order to protect their narrowly won power the Nationalists quickly took measures to bolster their parliamentary position. Immigration from Britain was drastically curbed and longer residency was required in order to vote. The African representation in parliament was removed, and unconstitutional attempts were made to remove the Coloured voters in the Cape. The most effective short-term measure was to grant South West Africa 6 seats in the central parliament, with the average number of voters per constituency at less than half the number required in South Africa. The white population of this territory was 66 per cent Afrikaans and 8 per cent German (many of whom had been Nazis). [126] It inevitably returned 6 additional Nationalist Members of Parliament in 1950. [127] Finally, the Afrikaner Party merged with the Nationalist Party in 1951

leaving the latter as the sole representative of Afrikanerdom.

To strengthen its hold over the repressive and ideological State apparatuses the Nationalists immediately set about replacing the highest officials in each branch, the army, police, courts and civil service, with trustworthy party members. [128]

In the 1953 election the U.P. and L.P. once again formed a front against the N.P. The U.P./L.P. front opposed the "unconstitutional" acts of the Nationalist regime, fearing that the methods used to remove the Coloured voters from the register might later be used against white opponents of Afrikanerdom. The Nationalists responded by claiming to be the genuine representatives of the "will of the people", i.e., the Afrikaners, and made it clear that they planned to continue to implement the Apartheid policy. [129]

The result of the election was a further increase in the Nationalist majority in parliament. It increased its seats from 79 to 94 (including 6 S.W.A. seats), but it still obtained a minority of the popular vote. (See Table 5.1.) The most significant advance was in the Witwatersrand region, where it gained 4 seats, while the U.P./L.P. lost 3. (See Table 5.2.) Thus its support among the white urban masses was growing, no doubt a result of the implementation of Apartheid which favoured white wage-earners at the expense of the black working class.

5.3. Conclusion: The Social Origins of Afrikaner Fascism and its Apartheid Policy

> What we are facing ... is not really a problem of race at all, but of adjustment to entirely new and strange economic conditions. Parallels to the South African situation are not difficult to find, and it is abundantly plain, from contemporary writings, that the social conditions brought about by the Industrial Revolution in England were widely interpreted as indicating a biological difference between the labouring class and the higher strata of the population. In South Africa the position is further complicated by the fact that the labouring class is black. [130]

In this chapter the specific features of the class struggle which characterized the political crisis of Afrikaner fascism have been explored. These included: firstly, the ruling class' loss of hegemony over the

African working class and intelligentsia; secondly, the heightened contradictions within the power bloc; and thirdly, the loss of hegemony over the petty bourgeois Afrikaner masses. Each feature was separately treated in the exposition; however, they were in fact closely related, fuelling one another and the generalized politico-ideological crisis.

The Apartheid solution to the crisis was neither fortuitous nor inevitable. Here Apartheid is taken to mean a policy of labour repression, for its victims, the Africans, Coloureds and Indians, belonged overwhelmingly to the working class. It was not fortuitous, given the fascist alliance of forces. The class basis of the fascist Nationalist Party was non-working class. Its mass support came from the racially privileged Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie or intermediate strata. The so-called "working class" supporters were invariably the supervisors of the black working class. Its elitist Broederbond leaders were essentially a rising bourgeois stratum combined with the agricultural bourgeoisie.

The class basis of the new regime made its "alliance" with "British-Jewish" industrial, mining and financial monopoly capital a necessity. This was so, because capitalist development in South Africa was dependent upon this ruling class and its imperialist allies. The weak new regime was incapable of seriously challenging the position of the ruling class. Only one policy could cement this "alliance" and that was the bringing under State control of the African labour force, i.e., the resolution of the labour allocation crisis which had split the power bloc.

The coming to power of Afrikaner fascism with its Apartheid policy was the outcome of the process of capitalist industrialization in South Africa in the context of a dependent economy based on the exploitation of the Black masses. In the competitive struggle for Black labour power Afrikaner farmers were hardest hit and in the absorption of Black workers into semi-skilled jobs the status of Afrikaner "workers" was most threatened. By pursuing their class interests they simultaneously served the interests of the mining sector, nascent indigenous industrialization and the white labour aristocracy. Hence arose the conditions for the emergence of a power bloc under the leadership of the Nationalist Party,

preceded by the organizational efforts of the Afrikaner Broederbond. Only an ideologically committed and tactically brilliant political leadership could have induced a unifying nationalist fervour into the materially divided Afrikaner volk, by ruthlessly exploiting the contradictions created in the course of rapid industrialization.

Chapter 6

A CHARACTERIZATION OF AFRIKANER FASCISM AND A COMPARISON WITH ITS EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS

> We stand for Christian-nationalism which is an ally of national socialism. You can call it the anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called fascism, in Germany national socialism, and in South Africa Christian-nationalism. [1]

The above statement by the young Ossewa Brandwag leader Vorster in 1942 has frequently been cited as proof that the Nationalist regime in South Africa is fascist. (Vorster was the Prime Minister from 1966 to 1978). Clearly, this type of evidence provides no scientific basis for determining whether or not the regime that came to power in 1948 should be categorized as a fascist one. In order to compare various fascisms with the intention of discovering whether they are similar enough to warrant classification under the same general concept it is necessary to begin by theoretically defining fascism.

This task was performed in Chapter 1.2, and on the basis of the Marxist theory of fascism outlined there we will now compare aspects of Afrikaner fascism with those of German and Italian fascism. The following comparative analysis does not claim to be exhaustive for only four essential features of fascism will be compared: social basis, ideology, social function and political form. Although Marxists tend to place the social basis and function of fascism at the centre of their analyses, here the ideological comparison will receive most attention, because this dimension has been the source of most confusion in earlier comparative studies. (See Chapter 2.).

6.1. The Social Basis of Fascism

In Chapter 1.2. we pointed out that fascism can occur at different levels of capitalist development, the only restriction being that those levels are confined to the stage of monopoly capitalism. A second necessary condition for the rise of fascism is mass democracy. As Barrington Moore has argued,

> fascism is inconceivable without democracy or what is more turgidly called the entrance of the masses onto the historical stage. Fascism was an attempt to make reaction and conservatism popular and plebeian ... [2]

At first sight the criterion of democracy would seem to exclude the possibility of fascism occurring in South Africa where only 20 per cent of the population was enfranchised. In both Germany and Italy universal democracy existed at the time fascism came to power. It is a well known fact that fascism used democracy to destroy democracy. However, in South Africa it was the enfranchised white (Afrikaner) masses who provided the mass base for fascism. Hence, we may conclude that fascism is conceivable in cases where democratic rights have been extended at least to the "petty bourgeois" masses.

Which social groups were drawn to fascism? In 1933 Wilhelm Reich, in his study The Mass Psychology of Fascism observed that,

> from the point of view of its class basis, National Socialism was a lower middle class movement and this was the case where ever it appeared ... Fascism's lower middle class is the same as liberal democracy's lower middle class, only in a different historical epoch. [3]

Reich's findings have been substantially borne out by subsequent research. However, it is now generally recognized that Nazism's appeal did effectively cross class lines. Milward has summarized the latest findings as follows:

> It is now clear that in all societies of which we have an accurate enough knowledge significant fascist mass movements had two main social foundations. The first was urban, and either middle class or with middle-class attributes, shopkeepers, and shop-workers, minor bureaucrats and officials, professional people, students, unemployed personnel from the armed forces, and handicraft workers. The other was rural, peasant landowners, sharecroppers and occasionally larger landowners. [4]

As regards the fascist leadership's class position and aspirations, de Felice, a leading scholar of Italian fascism, tells us that,

> fascism as a movement was in a large part the expression of an emerging middle class, of bourgeois elements who, having become an important social force, attempted to participate and to acquire political power. As its ranks swelled, fascism opened up to all social classes, but its backbone - both quantitatively and in so far as its leadership and the elements that were most active politically and militarily

> are concerned - is characterized as a petite bourgeois phenomenon, giving to the whole movement ... the character of a phenomenon with class aspects.

He has challenged the traditional "pre-supposition"

> that middle classes were becoming declassé, proletarianized, and to avoid this fate, they rebelled. Fascism was conceived of as a movement of those people who were being pushed down, a movement of failures. I do not question that there were many people of this sort involved in fascism, but they were the fringes. [5]

Mason, a specialist on German fascism, has pointed out that many analyses of the social composition of the leadership of local Nazi party groups which developed after 1925,

> read like a roll-call of bourgeois occupations - government officials, school teachers, doctors, clerks, self-employed businessmen, salesmen, retired officers, engineers, students. [6]

Further, he specifies that "it was not outcasts from the bourgeoisie who were involved in these cadres", [7] and that "they were concerned first and foremost with their own advancement, with an advantageous position within a new elite". [8]

What were the social conditions which led the masses to support fascism? Germani indicates several necessary conditions:

> First and most important, the crisis must be deep enough to generate a strong displacement of a sizeable portion of the middle strata, so that these masses ... become available to participate in some new form of political action, for which no suitable, legitimate channel (such as an established political party) exists. The displacement is usually, on the one hand, the consequence of structural changes such as those so prominent in transitional capitalism, while on the other it is triggered by some traumatic event involving an immediate social and political threat, real or perceived. [9]

He goes on to explain that the crucial factor contributing to the middle class trauma and the rise of fascism is the political activation of the "lower classes" (i.e. working class).

Mason has also shown the importance of this real or perceived political threat from the "lower classes" in the success of the Nazi movement:

> In the final instance it was class antagonism which represented the unifying and harmonizing element in the confusing multitude of sectional interests and dogmas which comprised National Socialism before 1933. Without this unifying bond of anti-communist and anti-social democratic interests and ideas the movement would never have been able to develop so dynamic an integrative power. Without that, it would probably have disintegrated. Though they might agree on little else, all activists achieved unison about the identity of the internal enemy. [10]

Finally, it should be mentioned that in Italy and Germany the fascist "seizure of power" was only made possible by the alliance with the established ruling class, i.e., dominant sectors of big capital, the army and the higher bureaucracy. [11]

6.1.1. The Social Basis of Afrikaner Fascism

What then was the social basis of Afrikanerdom? The Afrikaner masses who supported the Nationalist alliance in 1948 were from both rural and urban areas. The urban group was mainly comprised of minor civil servants, railway officials, shopkeepers, businessmen, professional people, students, school teachers, foremen in the mines and industries, and some workers. The rural group was comprised of small and large landowners, sharecroppers and farm foremen.

The leadership of the various volk's organizations was made up of an elite from bourgeois and petty bourgeois occupational groups: school teachers, professors, clergymen, lawyers, high public servants, businessmen and farmers.

Several social factors led the middle and lower-middle class Afrikaners to support the Christian-Nationalist volk's organizations. Rapid economic development since the turn of the century led to the uprooting of of the Afrikaner peasantry. The Great Depression intensified the "poor white" problem, while Hertzog's alliance with "Hoggenheimer" threatened to leave the displaced Afrikaner masses without political representation. South Africa's entry into the Second World War on the side of "British imperialism" inflamed deep-seated Afrikaner resentment. Finally, the rising African working class and intelligentsia were perceived as a threat to Afrikaner class and power interests. It was this threat

from non-white lower classes that served to unify the divided Afrikaner movement before 1948.

The similarity between Afrikaner fascism's class basis and social determination and that of German and Italian fascism is obvious. There are also similarities as to their manner of achieving State power. Afrikanerdom also came to power on its own steam, in a so-called "legal revolution". Also, in both cases the ability of the fascists to keep power depended upon the acquiescence of the ruling class; in South Africa this meant monopoly capital and its imperialist allies had to establish an alliance with the fascists.

6.2. The Christian-Nationalist Apartheid Ideology

> The most marked characteristic of any fascism - and fascism has always remained "national fascism" in its era - is the combination of a nationalistic and socialistic motif.* The socialistic motif always recedes further into the background not only typologically but at each progressive stage of development. [12]

Introduction

During the 1930's a group of Afrikaner intellectuals evolved a new world-view which radically opposed the prevailing liberal ideology in South African social thought. This Christian-Nationalist ideology defined a new set of moral principles by which Afrikaners were meant to live, and above all, to act politically. At the core of this doctrine lay a national conception of social reality, which was similar to that found in all fascist thought. That these Afrikaner intellectuals absorbed certain ideas from European fascism can only be explained, however, in terms of their similar social basis.

The triumph of the Nationalists in 1948 has been described by both Moodie and de Klerk as a "revolution". (See Chapter 2.2.). At the time, Hofmeyer the deputy leader of the defeated United Party, referred to it as a "revolution" rather than a "political reverse". [13] In a similar vein, Hitler said of Nazism in 1934, "the victory of a party is a change

* This "socialism" does not refer to that of communism or social democracy, rather it meant the incorporation of the proletariat into the national community and hence, the transcendence of class struggle.

of government. That of a Weltanschauung is a revolution". [14] Neither Nazism nor Afrikaner fascism brought about a revolution in the Marxist sense of the term, yet there is no doubt that the application of their ideologies had profound social effects.

The Apartheid policy was the Nationalists' solution to the 1940's crisis, since then it has served as the guiding light of the regime. It is because this doctrine has had such a decisive effect on the people of South Africa, that I think it is necessary to unravel its intellectual origins.

We can identify three stages in the development of the new ideology: the first stage, in the mid-1930's, when the nationalist ideology was coherently formulated; the second, during the late 1930's and early 1940's, in which the ideology took its most radical form, combining nationalistic and socialistic motifs, and strongly appealing to the masses, but confining its sphere of application to white society only; the third stage, from the mid-1940's, when the ideology was "tamed" by the transformation of the appeal for "Afrikaner corporatism" and republicanism into that of Apartheid, which meant the sacrifice of the "socialistic" motif to the demand for total racial (national) separation.

The first aim of this section is to show the coherence of the Christian-National ideology throughout its three stage evolution. In particular, we reveal the link between the nationalist Weltanschauung formulated by Diederichs in 1935 and the Apartheid ideology. We also demonstrate how the phase of Afrikaner corporatism served as a model for division of the society into separate socio-economic units. Ideal Apartheid was intended to prevent the economic exploitation of one nation/race by another, just as Afrikaner corporatism was intended to prevent the exploitation of Afrikaners by "British-Jewish" capital.

Generally speaking, the second stage of the ideological development has been thoroughly misunderstood. The radicalism of the early 1940's which found expression in the populist "Republican Constitution" has frequently been treated as an aberration attributable to the events of the Second World War. According to this view, the radicalism represented

an attempt to imitate German fascism so as to curry favour with an apparently victorious Germany. The derogatory term "Malanazis" was used by the liberal press to criticize the objectively pro-Hitlerian politics of the Nationalist Party under Malan's leadership during the war years. However, the Christian-National ideology did not succumb to Nazism, rather it was an indigenous fascist ideology. As Dr. Verwoerd explained in August 1941, when the Russians were reeling before the German onslaught,

> the Germans believe ... that national socialism is not an export commodity, as Mussolini has said of Fascism. Countries can learn much from each other, but none with any honour would renounce what is their own creation to please another. The Afrikaner has his own ideas of the State, born out of a history of suffering and oppression. This is his Christian-National Republicanism. [15]

The second aim of this section, is to distinguish the Christian-National ideology from that of National Socialism. Central to this task was the uncovering of the tie between Diederichs' nationalist thesis and Max Scheler's philosophical anthropology (and hence, German idealist philosophy).

The ideology of Apartheid has often been interpreted as simply "racist", and on the basis of this obvious common factor with Nazi ideology a parallel is assumed. Knowledge of the philosophical roots of Apartheid enables us to avoid this false comparison, for ideal Apartheid is based on both Nazi-type racism and cultural "racism". [16] Furthermore, a proper comparison between these two ideologies should be based not on one specific feature, such as racism or dictatorship, but on fascist ideology as a whole.

Throughout this section we have relied extensively on the quotation of prominent individuals. These men's opinions are, however, considered representative of the Zeitgeist. If they had not been fairly representative, these men hardly would have been prominent.

The subject we are dealing with here is "ideology" i.e. the moral principles which lie at the core of the components that constitute more or less rational justification of political acts. [17] Both Moodie and de Klerk insist that the "key to the Afrikaners is Calvinism". [18] Since Afrikaner philosophy in the 1930's was still on a theological foun-

dation, we do not dispute its Calvinist basis. However, it is necessary to examine the secular dimension of the theology to understand the Afrikaners in any particular historical period. For as Stoker, the leading theological exponent of Afrikaner nationalism pointed out, Calvinist principles were reconciliable both with liberalism and with modified national totalitarianism. [19]

Hence, it is the socio-political content which is attached to Calvinism, Catholicism or any other religious persuasion, which is of prime importance to the social historian, as opposed to the historian of ideas. It is for this reason that we emphasize Diederichs' social philosophy rather than the religious dimension.

The study of Diederichs' philosophy will reveal that his entire construction is deduced from the notion of the primacy of the national unit (defined culturally/spiritually) in social behavior. He made the first theoretical study of nationalism applied to Afrikanerdom and derived it from Scheler's system, rather than strictly Calvinist principles. Five years later, in 1941, two leading Calvinist thinkers, Prof. L.J. du Plessis in Die Moderne Staat (The Modern State) [20] and Prof. H.G. Stoker in Die Stryd om die Ordes (The Struggle of the Orders), [21] adapted the essentially same pattern of social ideas to neo-Calvinist principles, i.e., Calvinism's transcendant God linked to the practical primacy of the nation or State.

The importance of Diederichs' nationalist thesis in the formation of the new Afrikaner Weltanschauung makes its intellectual origins of interest. Moodie noted that this philosophy was the "basis" of the new Afrikaner ideology in the 1930's, [22] and de Klerk who was himself an activist in the Afrikaner movement at that time, commented that,

> Diederichs' treatise on nationalism as a world-view, as the basis of what would soon become the concept of 'Apartheid' or 'Separate Development', was the first sustained statement of theologized politics to come from an Afrikaner. [23]

Furthermore, given the crucial role played by the wide stratum of Afrikaner intellectuals and students in the Nationalist movement the existence of Diederichs' cogent nationalist thesis must have been inspiring.

Before proceeding to an investigation of the national world-view, we should determine whether the Christian-Nationalist ideology was universally held by Nationalist leaders. Like all ideologies, Christian Nationalism developed theoretical schisms. However, the fundamentals of the ideology appear to have been accepted by leading opinion makers and politicians. One organization in particular was responsible for the dissemination of Christian-National doctrine, and that was the Afrikaner Broederbond. All of the leading social theoreticians were members of the Broederbond, and it was via its network of volk's organizations that the Christian-National message was transmitted to the volk.

Finally, a brief word on the ideological implications of the split between the Nationalist Party and the Ossewa Brandwag. Both organizations claimed the total allegiance of the Afrikaner volk. Hence, the split was inevitable as only one of them could lead in the political field. [24] After the split in 1941 the Party maligned the Ossewa Brandwag on account of its supposed affinity to Nazism, a "foreign ideology", while it claimed to represent the authentic Christian Nationalist ideology. [25] With the defeat of the Ossewa Brandwag in the leadership struggle, and the post-war reorientation in Nationalist Party ideology from Afrikaner corporatism to Apartheid, the impression was given that "fascism" had died along with the disintegration of the Ossewa Brandwag movement.

Due to confusion as to the meaning of fascism (similarities to Nazism or Christian-Nationalism itself), the idea that the Nationalist Party had been purged of "fascism" has survived in the histories of this period. This version is a gross distortion of reality, for the "Ossewa Brandwag" was also a Christian-National organization and its political programme differed from that of the Party on matters of strategy and tactics, but not on basic principles. [26] That the struggle between these organizations was primarily a "broedertwis" (fraternal quarrel) is clearly indicated by the fact that the leading members of the Afrikaner Broederbond were split on their allegiance to the Party and the Ossewa Brandwag. [27]

6.2.1. Nicolaas Diederichs: Afrikanerdom's Philosopher

The intellectual elite played the crucial role in the formulation of the new Weltanschauung. Within the intellectual nucleus of Afrikanerdom in the 1930's the role of Nicolaas Diederichs as philosopher was decisive. His philosophical conception, which was elaborated in a pamphlet published in 1936 entitled Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing en sy Verhouding tot Internationalisme (Nationalism as a Weltanschauung and its Relation to Internationalism) [28] laid the foundations for the new ideology. [29]

To the best of my knowledge, the source of Diederichs' philosophical anthropology has never been uncovered. The two best historians of the new world-view, Moodie and de Klerk, failed to uncover its intellectual roots. The former pointed out that it was a product of young Afrikaner intellectuals who returned from doctoral studies in Europe inspired by the ideals of "neo-Fichtean" (i.e. totalitarian) nationalism. [30] He, however, distinguished Diederichs' philosophy from the anti-Semitic Folkish ideology of the Nazis, noting that,

> Diederichs' stress on the 'spiritual' definition of the nation, together with his express denial of the importance of both common biological descent and a common fatherland, implied a desire to avoid identification with the Blut und Boden ("Blood and Soil") school. [31]

The latter failed, due to his belief that the new nationalism was more closely aligned to neo-Calvinism rather than to German idealistic philosophical influences. [32]

Diederichs undertook his doctoral studies in Germany and Holland between 1926 and 1930. While in Germany he had studied initially under the famous philosopher Max Scheler until his death in 1928. In Leiden, he wrote his thesis on the subject of the "social feelings" of "Suffering and Endurance" (Vom Leiden und Dulden). He was strongly inspired by Scheler's thought, which he described as having been of "invaluable importance" for him. [33] That Diederichs remained a Schelerian on his return to South Africa, is evident from a comparison of his 1935 thesis on nationalism with the social metaphysics of Max Scheler.

Diederichs was not alone in expounding the nationalist world-view. Other major contributors to the formulation of the nationalist ideology were Prof. L.J. de Plessis, Prof. H.G. Stoker, Dr. P.J. Meyer, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Dr. G. Cronje and Dr. J. de W. Keyter, the last three men were professors of sociology at the main Afrikaner universities at some point in their careers. [34] Together they endeavoured to redefine Afrikanerdom's mission by laying the basis for the political struggle in which they played activist roles. Though there were minor shifts in the ideology during the struggle for acceptance and on account of political considerations, there is no doubt that the new ideology triumphed and that the Apartheid idea was its off-spring.

Diedrichs returned to South Africa in 1930 and held the post of Professor of Political Philosophy at the Grey University College of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein between 1934 and 1940. He was a prominent member of the Afrikaner Broederbond; from October 1938 to October 1942 he was its Chairman. [35] He strongly influenced the organization of the Afrikaner Nasionale Studentebond (Afrikaner National Student Union) which was formed in 1933, and edited its journal Wapenskou (Weapons Review). [36] He was a leader of the Nasionale Raad van Trustees, a body dedicated to the nationalist penetration of the trade union movement. He paid two visits to Nazi Germany, in 1933 and 1938, where he attended the "Anti-Komintern" training school. [37] In 1938 he published Die Kommunisme: Sy Teorie en Taktiek (Communism: Its Theory and Practice). In this book he referred to the theory of communism as "essentially the teaching of a pathological nature". [38]

In 1940 he became the Chairman of the Reddingsdaadbond. He was co-author of the Draft Republican Constitution [39] and was a founder of SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs) the intellectual organ responsible for the formulation of Afrikanerdom's "native policy" - Apartheid. [40] Simultaneously, he played an important role in the development of Afrikaner capitalism and was on the board of directors of several companies. [41] He appears to have remained aloof in the battle between the Nationalist Party and the Ossewa Brandwag. [42]

In 1948, he was elected to Parliament as the member for Randfontein, a mining constituency, with the help of the Ossewa Brandwag. [43] In 1958,

he became Minister of Economic Affairs in Verwoerd's cabinet; from 1961 to 1964 he was Minister of Mines and from 1967 to 1975, Minister of Finance in Vorster's cabinet. During his years in government he displayed a distinct bias towards economic affairs and was a leading member of the Afrikaner business community. In 1975, he was inaugurated as South Africa's State President and he died in office at the age of 75 years in 1978.

6.2.2. Diederichs' Social Philosophy

Diederichs did not clearly define the epistemological approach he used in his pamphlet on nationalism. However, he mentioned that it was an idealist method based on the intuition of "feelings" as opposed to "cold reason", and that "dynamism" or the notion of becoming was central to his thought. Also, throughout the analysis we find him "essentializing" social phenomena in the style of a phenomenologist. [44]

He begins by defining man's essential nature as a unity of nature and spirit (p. 14). The two sides of man's dual character are in constant struggle, and man's task is to reconcile the two forces in the production of culture (p. 15). Furthermore, man is conceived of as "a natural social being, he only becomes and is a man in the full sense of the word within the human community (p. 17). The next step in D's exposition is the crucial one, for he now specifies the type of community to which man must bind and subject himself in order to realize his full potential:

> Man is not only a social being, he is also a national being. Man is not only called upon to be a member of a community, but he is also, especially called upon to be a member of a nation ....Only through his consecration to, his love for and his service to the nation can man come to the versatile and harmonious development of his human existence. Only in the nation as the most total, most inclusive human community can man realize himself to the full. The nation is the fulfillment of the individual life. (pp. 17-18)

The relationship between the individual and his nation is not an equal one; "man only really becomes himself by self-sacrificing service to this higher, supra-individual order of unity which is the nation" (p. 20). The nation is not based on love for one's country or patriotism (pp. 27-29); it is not a political unit or state (pp. 31-35); nor

is it dependent upon the common blood origins of its members,

> /for/ this contradicts historical facts. No single nation exists which with respects to its origins is absolutely pure. All are mixed ... But, this idea is in principal incorrect. It turns the nation into something vital-biological and reduces it to the level of the animal. (pp. 29-31)

The positive definition of the essence of a nation is that,

> it is a group of people who feel themselves united by a common culture ... The essential of a nation is not to be sought in superficial characteristics such as race, land, colour, body shape, etc. The essential lies in how a nation inwardly feels and experiences itself ... Like any other spiritual being, a nation must continually struggle to maintain itself. (pp. 36-45)

On the question of democracy and the nationalist world-view, Diederichs argued that,

> not only have nationalism and democracy developed together in the course of history, but they substantially belong together. Nationalism can not be other than democratic ... But, we must be doubly careful not to misunderstand the concept "democracy" in this context. By democracy we do not mean the general type of people's government as we find in the most civilized countries. This democracy ... is an inheritance from liberalism, and in conflict with genuine nationalism. It works with the individual as a unit and "counts each as one and not more than one" (to use the words of Bentham). It is quantitative, atomistic, mechanical ... A genuine national or democratic government is not always the government which depends upon the majority, but only the government which is representative of the values, ideals and principles of the nation, the government in which the national whole finds itself reflected as a spiritual being. It is not the number or even the form of the government which makes it national, it is the spirit. A national or democratic government can be government by one person, a few people or many people. The rulers can be elected, self-appointed or hereditary. (pp. 55-56)

There is only one entity higher than the nation, for the chief characteristic of the nationalist Weltanschauung is that it is founded upon a religious basis (p. 62). Hence, we find that Diederichs regarded the diversity of nations as a creation of God; that every nation has a divinely alloted task and duty; and that, "to work for the realization of the national calling is to work for the realization of God's plan. Service to the nation is thus service to God" (p. 63).

Although the implications of this social philosophy for his views on profit oriented capitalism and class conflict are not clearly stated in the pamphlet, the trend of his thought is distinctly against placing any material values above spiritual values. In other writings Diederichs expressed his opinion on these subjects. In 1941 he wrote that,

> in the area of economics the state must operate according to the principle that the welfare and happiness of the whole of the people must come before the individual, and that wealth and economic power are not goals in themselves, but means in the service of the people. The Liberal principle of "laissez-faire" will be totally overthrown ... The principle of private property will be recognized, but no exploitation will be allowed on this basis, nor competition which is destructive and impoverishing of the work of nation building. [45]

An application of the nationalist world-view to class divisions within the Afrikaner community was made by Diederichs in 1937.

> If the worker is drawn away from our nation, then we might as well write Ichabod on the door of our temple. The worker has always supplemented the higher classes; the working classes are the spring from which the nation draws. Today there is a determined struggle underway which is aimed at the working classes, the foundation of our People (Volk). There are forces at work in the bosom of the People which seek to unite our workers with the proletariat of other lands ... The headquarters of this movement is in Moscow ... In South Africa we believe that the Afrikaner worker is still the best and most reliable Afrikaner. He must be drawn into his nation in order to be a genuine man. There must be no division or schism between class and class. May the day break here as is the case in Italy and Germany, where the worker may comfort himself with the thought: "What I do here I do as a worker, but I do it in service of my nation." [46]

6.2.3. Max Scheler's Social Philosophy

A proper appreciation of Scheler's philosophy can be obtained by placing him within his social context, for a clearer example of philosophy as a continuation of politics would be hard to find. Essentially, Scheler used his irrational subjective-intuitive methodology to defend idealism against the challenge of Marx's materialist conception of man and society. His social philosophy represented a defence of the rapidly disintegrating German Mittelstand against the growing power of monopoly capital and the working class.

Staude's book on Scheler centres on his "constant quest for community" and points out that both before and after the war Scheler was a "mirror" of many intellectual tendencies. "His whole life seems to have been dedicated to devising anti-bourgeois ideas to justify the bourgeois social order ... in the name of the highest culture". [47] His work in the Weimar years betrayed a "constant concern to find a way of reconciling the differences in German political life on a meta-political level". [48]

Mannheim described Scheler's thought as conservative Catholicism, and characterized the difference between Scheler's "sociology of knowledge" and his own by means of a pithy metaphor,

> we might say: according to our view, God's eye is upon the historic process (i.e. it is not meaningless), whereas Scheler must imply that he looks upon the world with God's eyes. [49]

In his monumental study of German philosophy Die Zerstörung der Vernuft (The Destruction of Reason), Lukács placed his discussion of Scheler under the heading Die Lebensphilosophie der "relativen Stabiliserung" (The Philosophy of Life of the "Relative Stabilization"), and strongly criticized his irrational tendencies. [50] Meyerhoff recognized that the two major influences on Scheler were the "philosophy of life" and "phenomenology". [51] However, Scheler differed from other philosophers of life in that he stressed, in opposition to the cult of the life force, that man's task was to spiritualize nature, not to subordinate himself to it. [52] Though he opposed the biological racist conceptions of man which were popular among the neo-Romantic philosophers of the time, his ideas on nationally bound spirit differed marginally from those of the naturalistic philosophers.

Scheler's works were banned by the Nazi regime for racial reasons, his mother was a Jewess. His leading ideas were not in accord with National Socialist ideology, in particular, his concept of the nation was elitist and based on cultural not racial factors. [53] In his system, spirit stood opposed to the lower vital racial forces. In 1925 he warned against the "foggy ideologies of the racist mass movements, which in ignorance of the European reality and drunk with imaginary absolutistic race á prioris, obscure our world perspective in every direction". [54] However, in many other respect Scheler's theories and politics were

in accord with Nazism.

> His hostility to Marxism as an "East-Jewish messianic" delusion displays all the vehemence and ignorance of the Nazis. But Scheler also continually opposed, with differences of degree and emphasis at various times, of course, the following: materialism, historical materialism, positivism, intellectualism, utilitarianism, internationalism, democracy (especially parliamentarism), pacificism, the ideals of progress, peace, comfort, happiness, "equality" ... His elevation of the nation to the status of a higher personality (Gesamtperson) to which seemingly blind sacrifice is called for, his emphasis on solidarity and community (Gemeinschaft) as contrasted with society (Gesellschaft) and its ethos, his rejection of humanitarianism and "love of mankind" in favour of love of family and nation ... his mordant hatred of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment conform closely to the pattern of Nazi reaction. Even Scheler's frequent criticism of the bourgeoisie and their way of life, without any recommendation for the cure of capitalism or for the acceptance of an alternative system of production, but only vague nostalgia for the irrecoverable past, resembles approved Nazi attitudes. [55]

We can only agree with McGill's observation that,

> what is significant is that the Nazis seized power with the help of a pattern of ideas which had been largely anticipated by great thinkers of Germany, including Spengler, Sombart and Scheler in the years preceding the advent of the Nazi regime. [56] (Emphasis added)

6.2.4. Diederichs, Scheler and Stoker

A comparison between Diederichs' philosophical anthropology and that of Max Scheler, reveals the fundamental derivation of the former from the latter. [57] On the theoretical level we find agreement on almost every point: man's spiritual essence; the metaphysical dualism of spirit and nature; man as an intrinsically social being; the importance of the collective-person (the nation) and its cultural essence; "love" as the basis of national unity, in opposition to the racist conception; the placing of the nation above the state; and finally, in the historical process, spirit directing the natural forces with God above all.

The socio-political consequences of their philosophies were similar in respect to what both writers condemned and praised. In particular they condemned: humanism, liberalism, individualism, Benthamism, and Marxism with its materialist view of history. They wished to replace the conflictive profit motivated capitalist system with a corporatist structure

which transforms the working class into a harmonious member of the community, and replaces the competitive ethos of the economic system with a communal one. Both opposed the concept of equality of all men on the grounds that "quality" should not give way to "quantity" in human affairs, and both maintained the cardinal principle of private property.

On two important issues Diederichs deviated from his master. Firstly, he made the individual subordinate to the nation, whereas Scheler insisted upon their equality before God. In 1936, Prof. H.G. Stoker, a leading Calvinist theologian and philosopher, who had the added distinction of having also studied under Scheler, [58] felt obliged to criticize Diederichs' world-view on the grounds that it seemed to deify the nation:

> /Diederichs/ wrongly perceives the relation of the individual to his nation. Diederichs rightly sets God above the nation. But he goes too far when, in the manner in which he does it, he sets the nation above the individual. Because above me as an individual is not my nation but God and God alone. [59]

Diederichs, the Nationalist propagandist and political leader, understood the value of totalitarian nationalism (which called for the subordination of the individual to the volk) in the struggle for national unity. But totalitarianism contradicted basic Calvinist principles which upheld the independence of the individual. By the early 1940's Stoker, a member of the Ossewa Brandwag, [60] had solved this vexing theological problem and placed Diederichs' totalitarian nationalism on a "positive basis", i.e., Calvinist basis. [61] The theological subtleties employed will not be discussed here. We need only mention that like Scheler, Stoker based his argument on a concept of man as "individual and social being", in opposition to liberalism's individualistic conception. [62] Consequently, without totally surrendering the basic Calvinist principle of individualism, he could argue that in times of dire Volksnood (people's distress) social being (i.e. the volk) took precedence over the individual. (See Chapter 6.2.7.). The significance of Stoker's work lies in his theoretical reconciliation of the Kuyperian Calvinist strand of thought with national totalitarianism, other strands of Calvinism simply justified nation worship on the grounds of defending God-willed national diversity.

Secondly, Diederichs deviated on the question of democracy. Scheler had consistently opposed any form of democracy, the liberal Parliamentary type and Rousseau's notion of the "general will", for both forms clashed with God's sovereignty. But Diederichs' need to mobilize the plebeian Afrikaner masses necessarily led him to insist upon the unity of nationalism and "organic" democracy, with the elite interpreting the volkswil (people's will).

6.2.5. Non-Proletarian Anti-Capitalism in Christian-Nationalist Ideology

> Plebeian anticapitalism thus appears as the feature that most clearly distinguishes twentieth-century fascism from its predecessors, the nineteenth century conservatism and semi-parliamentary regimes. [63]

We will now examine more closely the socio-economic policy advocated in numerous Afrikaner Nationalist publications and speeches during the period. Earlier on we referred to Christian-Nationalism's "socialistic motif". This term requires clarification. Prof. L.J. du Plessis, executive member of the Afrikaner Broederbond (its Chairman from 1930 to 1932), author of the Draft Republican Constitution, [64] and Ossewa Brandwag sympathizer, was careful to explain that by "socialism" he did not understand either the system of Marx or Lenin, or that of Roosevelt, Hitler or Mussolini. Rather, he meant

> only the general world-movement of our time, which aims at the goal of the full, authoritarian development of the material and spiritual riches of a people and a country upon a comprehensive, expert plan, and their equitable division, to the satisfaction of all the material and spiritual needs of the whole people in all its members and all its strata ... [65]

In another context he wrote that,

> by nationalism is meant that our economy and more particularly that of commerce and industry should take on a more South African character and should become dominantly Afrikaans; and by socialism that it should be directed and driven with the eye on community service. [66]

Basically what was proposed was Afrikaner corporatism or Volkskapitalisme (people's capitalism) which was outlined as early as 1934 by Prof. L.J. du Plessis.

> /In the past/ we accepted as inevitable that the masses who were unable to adjust /to capitalism/ quickly or well enough should drop to poor-whiteism. Sympathetically we belittled

> them and separated ourselves from them, or at best offered them "alms" in a philanthropic manner ... Meantime this process of adjustment was destroying our People by denationalization of its economic leaders and proletarianization of its producing masses. But in the awakening of self-consciousness the People has become aware of this also, and the new ethnic movement is intended to prevent the further destruction of the Afrikaner People in an effort to adjust to a foreign capitalist system, and intends rather to mobilize the People to conquer this system and to transform it so that it fits our ethnic nature. [67]

In June 1941 a fragile Afrikaner unity was achieved and all the major nationalist organizations issued a "Declaration on Behalf of Volk's-organizations", to which was appended a Draft Republican Constitution. [68] After a bitter quarrel over its medium of publication, the Republican Constitution was finally published "as a guide" in the leading Afrikaans language newspapers, on the authority of Dr. Malan, the leader of the Nationalist Party. [69] In January 1942, shortly before its publication Dr. Malan had proposed his "republican" motion in Parliament, and a comparison between the Republican Constitution and the motion reveals an agreement on basic principles.

In opposition to the "laissez-faire" liberal economic view, Malan claimed that the character of the future republic would be "anti-capitalist" meaning that "there will be no exploitation allowed of a section of the population either by big capital or by the parasitical element in the country". [70] (The former represented "British" capital,and the latter Jewish capital). And in order to prevent the exploitation of the Afrikaner volk by "British-Jewish" capitalism,he proposed the formation of a "central economic board" to regulate the economic life of the volk on the basis of co-operation rather than the conflict principle inherent in "laissez-faire" capitalism. [71]

Malan's views on the proper organization of the economic life of the volk were repeated and elaborated upon in his "social security" motion in January 1943. His starting point on economic matters was that, "all the economic activities shall be carried on, not in the interest only of the individual concerned with those activities but that they will be there for the good of the people as a whole". [72] This represented a critique of capitalism based on the rights of individuals in free competition, for it placed the volk's interest above that of individual gain.

A clearer expression of this principle was given by Dr. Dönges, vice-Chairman of the Broederbond in the 1940's and a leading Cape Nationalist, when he supported Malan's motion.

> I want to point out that this motion contains the four corner-stones of this new Christian National Order that we want to submit to the country. The first corner-stone is the solidarity idea, the idea that morally and economically there should be a mutual obligation between the individual and the community to which he belongs ... The second corner-stone is that ethical idea that the whole incentive of the community should not be materialistic, but that there should be an ethical incentive, namely, the fulfilment of all its functions, and that the State should take into consideration as its first duty, human values ... The third corner-stone ... that any plan we have must be economically practicable. The fourth corner-stone is the civilization idea, namely, that there is a destination for the white race in South Africa. The second point distinguishes this motion from all forms of materialistic socialism. The retention of private capital ... distinguishes it from Communism. The system that is submitted here is that of State-controlled national economy. [73]

Thus the economic policy proposed by the Nationalists was different in conception to that of liberalism or communism. It represented a critical reaction to the monopoly capitalist system, as Dönges explained, "a planned economy has become necessary in the first place because the system of rationalization, of mergers and monopolies, has made it necessary to protect the consumer and the worker". [74] The notion of the volksgemeenskap significantly affected the area of worker-capitalist relations and the question of trade unionism. Capitalist profits were to be limited rewards for services rendered to the nation and the worker was firstly to serve his nation and secondly his class. Consequently it was of vital importance to establish Christian-National trade unions in opposition to the existing "un-national" social democratic white unions.

The subject of the struggle for the "soul" of the Afrikaner worker has recently been well treated by both O'Meara and Davies, [75] so rather than add to their analyses, we will illustrate the application of the Christian-Nationalist economic ideology to the status of the gold mining industry in their future Republic. The attitude of leading Nationalists to this key industry serves as a barometer of their anti-capitalist sentiment. For the gold mines, which were owned about equally between foreign (mainly British) and non-Afrikaner South African capitalists,

employed mainly Afrikaner "workers" (as supervisors of unskilled Black labour), and represented a perfect target for the Nationalist ideologues who were trying to establish a mass base amongst the mine workers.

In 1941 Diederichs expressed the following opinion about the future of the "key industries" then in private hands:

> All key industries, including the mining industry, must be placed under State control with the aim of ensuring the greatest service to the "volksgeheel" on the enterprise and general national plane and not merely with an eye to the highest profits. [76]

In 1943 Malan proposed in Parliament that the gold mining industry should be brought under effective State control and that the workers should share in the profits. [77] According to Malan their policy was that, "not only those who invest their money therein must draw the advantage thereof, but that it is right that also the workers who produce the wealth must share in it". [78] (We need hardly mention that Malan did not have in mind the Black workers who comprised 90 % of the mining labour force).

Furthermore, he emphasized that the new dimension of the policy was "the lengths to which we are now prepared to go in so far as State control of the gold-mining industry ...." [79] He explained the need for State control on account of the growing power and anti-national tendencies of the monopolies (both capitalist and trade union) and proposed as a "cardinal point" a corporative policy for the mines with the employers, employees and Government represented on the directorate.

In supporting Malan's motion, Dönges pointed out that the nationalist policy for the mines did not necessarily involve nationalisation, private ownership would be retained, but "under the control of a body on which the State and the workers are adequately represented". [80]

At the same time as the Nationalist Party's members of parliament were advocating a new economic system to replace its liberal capitalism, the "Ossewa Brandwag" was similarly campaigning outside parliament under the slogan of "National Interest before Self-Interest". However, this

popular movement had less reservation about the need to render monopoly capitalism harmless by the "nationalization of key industries". [81]

Thus, in the early 1940's the major volk's organizations were mobilizing the masses on the basis of anti-capitalist rhetoric. In the post-war period anti-capitalist propaganda was largely replaced by anti-communism and the Apartheid policy. However, the 1945 Nationalist Party's program of principles retained a clause stating that,

> /its/ policy will be to make the State responsible for the financing and working of all key industries. The State to hold at least 1 % more capital than the private shareholders. The basis of exploitation will be public utility. [82]

As we have shown, this "semi-nationalisation" principle was revoked by Malan in respect to the gold mines after 1948. (See Chapter 5.2.5.).

6.2.6. From Segregation to Apartheid

Before 1940 Christian-Nationalist thinkers had not applied their logic to the race problem, they were primarily concerned with the task of maintaining an "aparte Afrikanervolk" (separate Afrikaner people) in relation to the white English. [83] In 1940 the Broederbond executive appointed an expert body to consider the racial question on behalf of Afrikanerdom. [84] Until then, the racial policy of the Nationalists was rigid "segregation". In 1944, a Volk's Congress was held to launch the new racial policy of Apartheid. The crucial difference between theoretical Apartheid and segregation was that the new policy aimed to create a self-contained white state, i.e., one no longer dependent upon black labour.

The writings of Dr. G. Cronje are generally considered to have laid the basis for the Nationalist Party's Apartheid policy. Cronje was a prominent Broederbonder, a member of the Ossewa Brandwag, and taught sociology at the University of Pretoria. His books, En Tuiste vir die Nageslag (1945) (A Home for Posterity); [85] Regverdige Rasse-Apartheid (1947) (A Just Racial Separation); and Voogdyskap en Apartheid (1948) (Trusteeship and Apartheid) are reputed to have been widely used as study material by cells of the Broderbond. [86] The first book was subtitled "The Permanent Solution to South Africa's Racial Question", and dedicated to "Afrikaner mothers, because they are the protectors of the

blood purity of the Boerenasie (Boer nation)". Cronje was primarily concerned about the dangers of miscegenation, and elaborated Nazi-type "scientific" theories of race which "proved" the superiority of the white race. His conclusion was that the Boerenasie should undertake its God-given task of protecting the purity of the white race and the Boer nation. However, in spite of this overt racism, his proposed policy of Apartheid was intended to achieve a "just" separation of the races, not racial domination nor racial suppression. [87]

> It is the right of every community to receive the fruits of its labour itself. By the nature of the matter it is unable to do this if it is permanently subordinated to another community and the service relation between community and community is not at some time or other terminated. The non-Whites can only receive the fruit of their labour themselves ... when they stand apart /separately/ as communities, and from their own strength ... can develop towards independence. The right to self-determination, also with respect to work /labour/, can not in the long-run be denied to non-Whites. [88]

He argued that industrialization had created a very dangerous threat to the future separate racial identity of the whites, and that the core of the racial question was not the numerical majority of the blacks, but that "racial contact leads to racial mixing and due to the superior position of the white, and the inferior position of the non-whites, racial conflict is born". [89] He explained on another occasion that the threat to the whites was embodied in the black proletariat, which in a racially mixed industrial society would inevitably be influenced by the communist doctrine of class struggle and the liberal teaching of equality, Christian-Nationalism's arch enemies. He warned that,

> should an organised and united non-white labour movement come into existence it would become a powerful force ... which will be the most dangerous type of non-white front thinkable to the white man.... One must keep in mind that the teaching of bolshevism with its emphasis on class struggle will be attractive to the non-tribal native and other non-whites, because they are in fact the proletariat which will have to subdue the whites, the ruling class, with force ....[90]

To prevent this outcome and secure a "home for posterity", he argued that white society must gradually reduce its dependence on black labour to zero. [91] It could instead rely upon white immigration and the reorganization of the labour process. [92] The Africans and Coloureds would be placed in separate homelands, where "every community should undergo

its own socio-economic development and governmental form". [93] An important fact to bear in mind, is that Cronje's plan for a "just" racial separation depended upon the incorporation of the British High Commission Territories and South West Africa into the scheme. [94] The territorial division was to be in terms of Southern Africa as a whole, not merely the 13 per cent of South African land reserved for the Africans.

It has been noted that there was a strong connection between the conception of Apartheid and Christian-Nationalist ideology,

> something of this basic connection might appear from the use of the very concept of "apartheid", which came to stand for the social and political order between the different groups, for the unique calling and identity of the Afrikaner nation itself, in a passage from P.J. Meyer in 1942: "the organic unity of Afrikanerdom, the Calvinistic basis of Afrikaner life, the "apartheid" (literally, "apartness") of the Afrikaner national calling and national identity ... are emphasized. The ideological "apartness" of the Afrikaner nation requires that it be "separated from" other groups, i.e., "apartheid" in its later sense. [95]

Diederichs provided a less overtly racist rationalisation for Apartheid in his maiden speech to Parliament in August 1948. [96] He began with a reference to the "furious political fights" between the major white political parties in the 1948 election, and traced their source to basically different philosophies.

> When one analyses them carefully one is driven irresistibly to the conclusion that we are not concerned here purely with a fight between two ordinary political parties or organizations or between two alternative governments each with its own views and methods of conduct; no, one comes to the conclusion from the debates one hears that what is at issue is two divergent outlooks on life, fundamentally so divergent that a compromise is entirely unthinkable except on superficial matters.

Diederichs interpreted the difference between the two world-views "as a fight between nationalism on the one hand and liberalism on the other". He argued that "individualistic" liberalism which preached "equal rights for all civilized beings" was "unnatural" and had close affinity to the hated internationalist doctrine of Communism. In opposition to these materialist doctrines he claimed that the task of every statesman was firstly spiritual, namely, "to develop the optimum capacity, the inherent vital force of his own nation". The implications

of the vitalistic national philosophy for future South African race relations was then elaborated upon:

> /t/he cornerstone of the Nationalist doctrine of apartheid is that we are here dealing not merely with a group, with individuals, with 10,000,000 or 11,000,000 people only, but that we are dealing with two population groups and races that differ from each other radically, peoples and races who on account of their fundamental differences and natural limits must be kept apart from each other to the advantage of both.

He then defended Apartheid against the charge of oppression.

> Nationalism and apartheid are not oppression. No, it is liberalism, the opposite of apartheid that spells oppression, subtle oppression, because it means the estrangement of the people and the race from its own essential being - it means in our case the Westernizing of the non-European population, its entire assimilation in our White civilization, and the destruction of all that is latent within itself; ... it implies training of non-Europeans for the material benefit of the Europeans to serve as worker and servant; it also means depriving the non-Europeans of their own servants and leaders;... it means that the right is denied the non-Europeans to have a fatherland of their own and a state of their own in which as a race they can develop to the maximum their existence as a nation.

It is important to note that in their attacks on liberalism the Christian-Nationalists were referring to the possibility of a future liberal policy on race. They understood that the traditional "native policy" of Christian Trusteeship was no longer tenable and that in the near future a choice would have to be made as to the future direction of the society. [97] In their opinion the choice was between the liberal and the national solutions, integration or separation (Apartheid). They understood that liberalism as a social philosophy implied the principle of equal political rights irrespective of race. This point was clearly made by Meyer in 1941.

> While the French revolutionary opinions, which were essentially liberal, effectively made equal white and non-white citizens of the same state, British liberalism in South Africa, not in theory, but in practice shrank from this logical consequence of its content. However, to this day the principle of equality has remained an important principle of British liberalism. Although in practice British liberalism is not always consequent, with respect to the policy of equality, it too gradually leads to its ultimate realization. [98]

In September 1948 the Broederbond executive formed a new body, the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), to formulate its Apartheid policy in greater detail. Drs. Diederichs, Dönges, Jansen, and Eiselen were leading members of SABRA. [99] Eiselen, who is widely regarded as the "architect" of Apartheid, [100] stressed the fact that only a policy of "constructive separation" could solve the pressing problem of "natives' economic and political rights". By separation he meant the

> separating of the heterogenous groups, from the population of this country, into separate socio-economic units, inhabiting separate parts of the country, each enjoying in its own area full citizenship rights, the greatest of which is the opportunity of developing such capabilities as its individual member may possess to their optimum capacity.

The goal of creating separate "self-supporting native communities" in the future, necessarily implied that,

> the European community will have to adjust its economy to function with a progressively decreasing supply of cheap labour - because that, and not native labour in particular, is what our industries and our whole economic life depend on at present. [101]

Thus, he was fully aware of the fact that the economy of South Africa rested upon cheap African labour, and explained that,

> separation means an evolutionary and not a revolutionary process, and it can accordingly be set in motion without undue dislocation of our economic life, but at the same time the aim defined above must always be kept in view. [102]

Dr. Verwoerd introduced a further element of realism, when, in his maiden speech to the Senate in 1948, he defended Apartheid from the charges of "political fraud" on account of its absurd claim to be planning the total separation of the races.

> Nobody has ever contended that the policy of apartheid should be identified with "total segregation". The apartheid policy has been described as what one can do in the direction of what you regard as an ideal. Nobody will deny that for the Native as well as the European complete separation would have been the ideal if it had developed that way historically.

Despite the historical impossibility of this ideal he insisted that,

> in every field of life one has to fix one's eyes on the stars, to see how close one can come to achieving the very best, to achieving perfection. For that reason I

> say this: keep in view what promises to be best for your country and try to approach it within the realm of what is practical. [103]

Dr. Jansen, the first Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs, was even more pragmatic about the labour needs of the economy. Besides the usual claims about saving the Africans from "de-nationalization" he pointed out that,

> we must keep in mind that industry is paying high wages to the natives, comparatively high wages in these urban areas, and the position today is, and it is a serious position, that the primary industries are losing their native workers to the secondary industries. /The government/ does not propose to move all natives from the industrial areas. It will require better regulation of the employment and distribution of the available native supply and the needs of the primary industries will have to receive greater consideration than in the past. [104]

Clearly, from the first days in power the Nationalist regime did not take seriously its "ideal" plan for the removal of native labour from the white industrial areas and the building of the native "homelands" into viable economic units, since such an interpretation of Apartheid would have undermined capitalism as a system in South Africa.

In a fascinating debate between Malan and Hofmeyer in 1947, we find Malan, as leader of the Nationalist Party, proposing the Apartheid policy in a motion before Parliament. He argued that there is a basic "difference in outlook" between himself and Hofmeyer, and specified his religio-nationalist premises as follows:

> It is the will of the Creator so far as I can learn from his works that ... differentiation within nature and in the world of nations ... shall be the case ....It justifies separation and the keeping of the various races and the various colours apart from each other ....That is the law of differentiation. There is also the law, call it the first law of nature, and it is the law of self-preservation ....It is not immoral but it signifies separation, and it is moral to preserve your nation and your race. That is the significance of separation. [105]

Hofmeyer called into question the honesty of these motives, and revealed in no uncertain terms the flaw in the Apartheid ideology. He pointed out that in Paragraph 5 of the motion, the Apartheid policy was defined as,

based upon the principle of separation of Europeans and non-Europeans "politically, residentially and as far as practicable, also industrially". Alongside of that the policy is to be "constructive and equitable in respect of the specific interests of each separate population group" ...
The hon. member said this, that it must be a just separation and that there must be no repression. He added that every section must have its own sphere. There each section must live its own life and must develop its own potentialities. It sounds splendid, does it not? But let us examine it. I will admit at once that a policy of separation need not mean repression. But then it must mean full territorial segregation. It must mean not merely putting aside separate residential areas in our towns but it must mean setting aside territorial areas sufficient for all the members of each of these groups to live an independent life and to develop their potentialities.
But that is not what the motion means. That is not what they are prepared to stand for. Quite emphatically it is not what the party wants ... they want segregation, as far as practicable, industrially. What a wealth of meaning there is in those words, "as far as practicable" ... I can but take it he means as far as the European considers it practicable from the point of view of his interests and labour needs; as far as it is practicable for the European to dispense with the non-European's services in the mines, the farms, the industries and the kitchens. Does it mean that the hon. member when he talks about separation ... is prepared to envisage the non-European as not being the hewer of wood and the drawer of water for ourselves? Of course he does not mean that. That is where the whole thing falls down. We all know that it is where the whole thing falls down. The hon. member does not intend that. And as long as that is so it does seem to me that the linking up with this doctrine of "apartheid" (separation) of the words equity and justice is a misnomer, not to call it a pretence and a sham. [106] (Emphasis added)

The use of terms such as "in the long-run" and "as far as practicable" by the framers of the policy reveals their acute awareness of the fact that the Apartheid ideal was unachievable and that the black workers would be economically forced to continue to sell their labour to the white capitalists. In the later years of Nationalist rule the full implications of ideal Apartheid were conveniently lost sight of, and in 1965 Verwoerd could declare that,

the crux of the policy of separation is political separation. The basic stand-point is that the Bantu and the Whites will have their political future apart from one another ... Territorial separation is not the crux of the policy of separation. [107]

6.2.7. Christian-Nationalism, National Socialism and Fascism

The conception of the relationship between the individual and the community lies at the base of modern social thought. The very cornerstone of fascist social and political thought is the subordination of the individual to the nation or state. [108] In Nazi ideology the nation (volk) was regarded as the primary community to which the individual owed absolute allegiance; the state was conceived of "as the emanation of the volk, the servant of the community and the race". [109] In Fascist ideology the state was the highest form of collectivity with which the individual was to totally identify; the nation was created by the state.

There were several strands in Christian-Nationalism. Each rationalized its call for the total subordination of the individual to the volk differently. Diederichs conceptualized the nation as a spiritual/cultural unit which the individual should serve. Stoker's volk was based upon both a cultural and a blood bond, [110] and the individual was only to serve this unit totally in times of volksnood (volk's distress). The Ossewa Brandwag leaders and Cronje frequently displayed a "blood and soil" notion of folkhood and called for the sacrifice of the individual. Finally, Malan took national and racial differentiation as a God-given datum which the individual had a duty to preserve. (As far as I know he did not theoretically define the relationship between the individual and his nation.)

Of the four, we have analysed Diederichs' national world-view in greatest detail. The Cronje approach is only a variation of Diederichs' theory which substitutes a racial for a cultural definition of the nation. Both "deify" the nation, and both are non-Christian since they reject the idea of a common humanity. Malan's approach is theological, but unsophisticated in regard to social theory. Only Stoker's neo-Calvinist version requires further elucidation.

In his book Die Stryd om die Ordes (1941), Stoker dissected the modern social orders, liberalism, communism, National Socialism, and Fascism, and showed how his Calvinist world-view differed from each. His chief

criticism of Nazism was that, in contrast to Calvinism which upheld the sovereignty of God and the ultimate responsibility of the individual to Him alone, it upheld the authority of the leader and preached the ultimate responsibility of the individual to his Volk and its leader. [111] Basically, he regarded both Nazism and Fascism as anti-Christian because they placed the volk or state between the individual and God, i.e., the volk or state were hypostatized. [112]

In order to circumvent the contradiction between theoretical Calvinist individualism and the practical need to unify and discipline the Afrikaner volk, Stoker argued that in the particular historical conjuncture through which Afrikanerdom was passing, a period of volksnood, it was necessary that the individual subordinate himself to the interests of the volk. Hence, he recognized that Calvinist Christian-Nationalism in the early 1940's would tend to closely resemble National Socialism. Nevertheless, he explained that this resemblance was not to be confused with identity, for Christian-Nationalism would only be a "pseudo-National Socialism". [113] By introducing a distinction between eternal and temporal Calvinist principles, he was able to simultaneously uphold and sacrifice individualism. [114] Hence, in practice his version of Christian-Nationalism was as fascistic as Diederichs'.

In both Nazi and Fascist ideologies the nation is conceived of qualitatively and not quantitatively. However, they are distinguishable in their selection of a qualitative basis for nationalism. In Italian fascism the nation was "a community historically perpetuating itself, a multitude unified by a single idea, which is the will to existence and to power" and "not a race". [115] Nazism, on the other hand, conceived of the nation as a natural/racial community, and was virulently anti-Semitic. [116]

Some strands of Christian-Nationalism primarily defined the nation as a cultural unit, others as a racial unit. However as Polanyi explains, belief in the transhistorical "spiritual" segregation of the species is also inherently racist:

> The race concept is not necessarily a biological one. Although as a rule the race is identified with blood, it is just as often regarded as consisting of various different elements. For example, not the Body but the Soul is the

> bearer of the race - an extension of this concept which makes it easier to graft Nationalism on the race theory than would otherwise be the case. [117]

The decisive criterion of fascist ideology is not the racist or non-racist conception of the volk, [118] but the conception of the relationship between the individual and the volk. As we have shown, all four strands of Christian Nationalist ideology in the 1940's viewed man as an integral part of an organic whole, which is the basis of fascism's political philosophy.

On the question of democracy, Nazism and Fascism fundamentally agreed. They both opposed liberal democracy which is based on equal individual rights, and claimed to represent a purer form of democracy based on their qualitative conceptions of the nation, i.e., the State, Party and Leader represent the national-will. [119]

In Broederbond circles in the early 1940's it was common practice to attack "British" liberal parliamentary democracy on the grounds that it was not "a genuine volk's governmental form". As Meyer explained,

> /t/he crucial difference is this: democracy and people's government both conceive of people's representation but, with the essential difference that democracy implies mechanical representation while people's government implies organic representation. [120]

The idea of organic democracy was incorporated into the Draft Republican Constitution, and in a similar way to that found in Hitler's Mein Kampf, [121] the inhabitants of the country were divided into categories. All whites would be "subjects" of the Republic, but only the "white subjects who /were/ acknowledged as members of the State by the Government would be called 'burghers' ... /and/ obtain the right to vote". However, recognition as a burger would only be accorded to subjects who could be expected "to act as builders of the nation". [122] It is significant to note that in the parliamentary debate on the Nationalist Party's "republican" motion in 1942, when questioned closely on the Party's franchise policy Dr. Malan defended the need to regulate the franchise "in accordance with the principle that the nature and the character of the State shall be duly protected". [123] Although he was a defender of the white parliamentary system against Ossewa Brandwag

attacks, his notion of the volkwil was clearly restricted to the Nationalist Afrikaners. [124]

Summing up the foregoing observations we can say: in common with Nazism and Fascism, Christian-Nationalism was anti-liberal, anti-"mechanical" democracy, anti-racial equality, anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-Semitic, [125] partially anti-capitalist, and anti-Christian (love of the volk takes precedence over love of mankind). [126] But Afrikaner fascism's totalitarian project differed strongly from those of other fascist movement. [127] In this respect, we can appreciate the frequent claims by its ideologues that it had avoided all "foreign" ideologies.

The Afrikaner fascist movement emerged from a unique multi-racial and multi-national social setting, and within this framework the Afrikaner minority was both an historically oppressed people and an oppressor people. Initially, Christian-Nationalism aimed to integrate the whole Afrikaner volk. Consequently, it fought liberalism and Marxism because they divided the volk into "de-nationalized" individuals and conflictive classes. Later on, Christian-Nationalist Apartheid was intended to preserve the volk by totally removing the threat posed by emergent African nationalism and trade unionism. It then fought the liberal and Marxist doctrines because they preached equality and class struggle to the oppressed African people.

In contrast to German totalitarian nationalism which aimed to integrate the German working class into the nation, exclusive Afrikaner nationalism could only include Afrikaner workers in the volk, i.e., the non-Afrikaner members of the South African working class were to be excluded or separated from the volk. This was the logic of Christian-Nationalism applied in a multi-racial/national setting.

If one ignores the class dimension, Christian-Nationalism appears to be very different to National Socialism on this score. However, when we depart from the ideological level to that of political practice we find that Afrikaner fascist ideology in its Apartheid form has served essentially the same function as that of German fascism. Namely, to

mask the ruthless suppression and exploitation of the working class. The truth is that the promise of separate volksgemeenskaplike development in fascist South Africa is as hollow as that of the Volksgemeinschaft in Nazi Germany, in both cases community was sacrificed to the exigencies of the monopoly capitalist system.

6.3. The Social Function of Apartheid

The Apartheid myth has essentially served the same function in the era of secondary industrialization, as the segregation myth served in the era of mining and farming dominance. This function is to rationalize the total suppression of the Black working class for the benefit of all monopoly capitalist sectors and the white wage-earners. The fascist regime has justified its oppression of the Africans (Coloureds and Indians) on the grounds that they will exercise their political rights in separate Bantustans (a new name for the old "reserves" which cover only 13 % of the territory of South Africa). Cronje's ideal of total socio-economic separation of the races was never taken seriously by the Nationalist politicians. Hence the possibility of a "just" separation was excluded from the outset. However, the regime took every conceivable measure to try to prevent the African working class from becoming the economic and political force which Cronje forewaw as the grave-digger of white social and economic privilege.

It was in the 1950's that the true meaning of Apartheid became crystal clear, and the confusion surrounding the intentions of the fascists was dispelled. We saw in Chapter 5.2.5. that the priority of the new regime had been to bring African labour under State control. This goal was achieved by the use of a combination of repressive legislation. At the core of the system instituted to control African labour lie the pass laws, influx control, labour bureaux, the outlawing of strikes and the non-recognition of trade unions.

In 1952 the regime consolidated the earlier passes into a single document known as a "reference book". This pass was issued to all Africans over the age of sixteen; women were subjected to pass laws for the first time. The pass records the individual's name, identity number, tribal origin, residential and work status, employer's signature, and tax receipts. As

the books are issued, finger-prints are taken and recorded in a central bureau. The pass must be carried at all times and produced on demand; failing this, the offender may be arrested on the spot. [128]

The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 laid down the basis for the implementation of the pass laws. It aimed to prevent the permanent urbanization of Africans by extending the operation of the migrant labour system throughout the country via the labour bureaux system. As we pointed out, in Chapter 5.2.5., the labour bureaux system was set up in 1949 to channel labour from the urban areas and the reserves to the farms and mines. Some of the main effects of this legislation will be summarised below.

> Section 10 (1) provides that no African can remain for more than 72 hours in a prescribed area /i.e., an urban and peri-urban "white" area/ unless he can prove that: a) he has since birth resided continuously in that particular area; or b) he has worked continuously in the area for one employer for not less than 10 years, or has lawfully lived there continuously for not less than 15 years; or c) the African is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under the age of 16 or anyone with the above qualifications; or d) he has permission from a labour bureau to be in the area ... Provided that a worker with Section 10 (1)(a) qualifications can prove them, he enjoys security; but only for as long as the authorities do not deem him to be "idle" or "undesirable". In that event the qualification means nothing and he can be peremptorily removed from the city. The same use of sweeping arbitrary power hangs over all urban Africans, whatever their rights under section 10. [129]

It has been estimated that about 70 per cent of the urban African male labourers were contract workers in 1960, i.e., workers not permanently domiciled in urban areas. [130] Migrant contract workers are not permitted to bring their families to the urban areas and are forced to return to the Bantustans at the end of their annual contracts. Since 1968 the laws have been tightened making urban status harder to acquire and forcing the bulk of the African labour force into total dependency on the labour bureau for employment. The following are some of the effects of such laws on contract workers:

> /They/ are tied to a particular type of work: their entire future is determined when they are given their first urban job, at whatever stage after the minimum age of 16 it might be. At that point a government official places them into one of 16 categories of work - the choice depending on what may be required at that time together with the individual's own preference. The category can never be changed thereafter.

> A man who starts out at 16 as a domestic worker, or a garbage collector, stays in the same work for the rest of his life, or for as long as he wants to work in prescribed areas ... The position of the workers who defy an employer or the State by, say, going on strike, can only be hopeless. Not merely does he risk summary dismissal and eviction from the urban area - "endorsed out" is the phrase - but he will also be a marked man with little chance of again being allowed into an urban area. [131]

The framework of control for all African workers, irrespective of status, is even more extensive. For example,

> in the case of a Section 10 (1)(b) worker, if he loses his job he is obliged to register immediately with the local labour bureau, otherwise he risks arrest and gaol. He cannot legally obtain a new job without the approval of the bureau. Equally, employers must be registered with the bureau if they want to obtain workers ... /and/ in their turn, /they/ do not have complete freedom in choosing workers. [132]

In 1953, the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act was passed, with the purpose of ensuring that any dealings concerning pay or conditions of African workers were decided between employers and the State officials, with only a nominal provision for African views to be heard. This Act perpetuated earlier prohibitions making it a criminal offence for Africans to go on strike. The penalties provided were £500 or three years imprisonment, or both. If an illegal strike is regarded as politically motivated i.e. it challenges the Apartheid system, the offenders may be charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act - with possible gaoling up to five years and/or whipping. [133]

Under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, African workers were excluded from registering their own trade unions and debarred from being members of white or Coloured registered unions. Hence, they are normally excluded from any role in collective bargaining. Where white workers take part in collective bargaining procedures, they can request that the agreement be extended fo African workers in that particular industry. A State official is supposed to look after African interests. However,

> even then only a small proportion of the Black labour force is covered by agreements of any kind ... In 1972, out of a total African labour force of 6,200,000, only 838,000 were covered by Industrial Conciliation agreements. In 1971, 293,000 Africans were covered by Wage Board determinations. [134]

The combined effect of this web of legislation of the 1950's is to leave the African worker virtually powerless and at the mercy of monopoly capital. By the end of the 1950's, the regime succeeded in bringing the opponents of Apartheid under its iron heel. The Sharpeville massacre in 1960, and subsequent banning of the African National Congress and its off-shoot the Pan African Congress, and the arrest of 2,000 leading figures in the Congress movement and 20,000 Africans, marked a turning point in the struggle against Apartheid. [135] The defeat of the African liberation movement and its communist and liberal allies, and the statutory repression of African labour, permitted the 1960's to become a golden age for monopoly capital.

By this time the labour allocation conflict between the three major sectors had been resolved. [136] The labour bureau system had ensured that adequate supplies of cheap African labour reached the low-wage farming and mining sectors. Between 1950 and 1970 the gap between African wages in manufacturing and mining/farming widened from roughly 2:1 to 3:1. [137] In the gold mines real African wages in cash and kind were lower in 1969 than in 1911. [138] The African labour force in the gold mines rose from a low point of 300,000 men in 1951 to a high of 400,000 men in 1961. More than 60 per cent of this labour force was acquired from the neighbouring less-developed countries by the use of State power. [139]

Despite the express intention of reversing the flow of labour to the urban industrial areas, the African population in the urban areas continued to grow in response to economic pressures. In 1946, 24.3 per cent of the total African population was urbanized, and by 1960, 31.8 per cent. [140] In the Witwatersrand region, the African population rose from 870,000 in 1946 to 1,300,000 in 1960. [141] Between 1950 and 1960 the number of Africans working in the manufacturing industry increased by 95,000 and the number of white employees by 8,000. [142] By 1970, 5 million Africans were urbanized as compared to 2 million in 1946. [143]

A detailed analysis of the political economy of Apartheid is beyond the scope of this study, here we merely mention a few facts which are relevant to the discussion of fascism and the economy. Firstly, white wages in mining, manufacturing and construction grew more rapidly than Black

wages throughout the first two decades of Apartheid. But in the 1970's Black wages grew more rapidly than white. [144]

Secondly, the growth of foreign investment in South Africa during the Apartheid period revealed the extent to which the repression of Black labour afforded an opportunity for foreign capital to make relatively high profits. Between 1956 and 1972, total foreign investment rose from R2,800m to R7,800m, an increase of almost 300 per cent. [145]

British investment represented 62 per cent of the total foreign investment in 1956 and 56 per cent in 1972. [146] The United States' direct investment grew from $50m in 1943 to $1,200m in 1972; this represented 16% of the total in 1972. [147] At that time Western European investment accounted for 25% of the total. The role imperialist capital played in South African industrial development and in propping up the Apartheid regime is beyond the scope of this study.

Finally, we should clarify the phenomenon known as the "growth of Afrikaner capitalism". The Afrikaner share of income in the private sector (excluding agriculture where it earned 80 per cent of the income) doubled between 1949 and 1964, from 9.6 per cent to 18.6 per cent. [148] That the Afrikaner elite should use State power to acquire capital and top positions in State industries is not an unusual event. Sweezy's remarks about the fascists who use their political power to obtain a share of the profits (in 1964 the Afrikaner share of income in mining and industry was only 10 %) are relevant here:

> /b/ut these new members of the ruling class do not bring with them a new set of motives and objectives which are at variance with the outlook of the incumbent capitalists. On the contrary, they soon adopt as their own motives and objectives which inevitably flow from the position in society which they come to occupy. They are now responsible to capital; like everyone else in this position they must strive to preserve and expand it. [149]

6.3.1. Fascism and the Economy

In monopoly capitalist society we judge the objective social function of a regime according to the results of its mediation in the class struggle. All fascisms in opposition dreamed of building a different

and "juster","anti-capitalist" economic system, which would replace greedy "liberal" man with men free from material desires. [150] However, in power there was only one "obviously consistent aspect of fascist economic policy ... /this/ was the ruthless suppression of the independent labour organizations and their supersession by organs of state control". [151]

In Chapter 1.2.2. we pointed out that modern Marxist theories of fascism stress the "relative autonomy" of the fascist regime from the monopoly capitalist class. Mason has argued convincingly that the ruthless suppression of labour by the Nazis was undertaken on their own initiative, not that of monopoly capital. [152] And, in fact, the petty bourgeois classes and strata felt more threatened by the working class. But while the fascist regime enslaved the working class to the advantage of monopoly capitalist interests, it equally ruthlessly sacrificed the interests of small property owners etc.. Hence, functionally, the fascist regime, at least in the short run, served the interests of big business or, rather, of certain sections of big business. In suppressing labour, the fascist regime did what the separate sections of monopoly capital would have liked to have done, but could not do because of internal contradictions.

The Afrikaner fascists also dreamed of replacing the competitive spirit of capitalism with the spirit of community. Even in regard to the Africans they spoke in terms of a "just" separation which would put an end to "subtle" liberal capitalist exploitation, which freed the individual African but enslaved the community. (See Chapter 6.2.6.) A good example of fascist rhetoric is found in an editorial by Verwoerd on the eve of the 1948 election, in which he attacked the Fagan Commission proposals regarding the permanent urbanisation of the African working class.

> A volk which places its future existence lower than its economic welfare, certainly deserves to go under. Today the white race of the Union stands before this inexorable choice ... It would be of great economic advantage for certain groups of whites of the present generation to have the non-whites in their midst. But, as certain as the sun shines in heaven, the future of its posterity will thereby be eclipsed . Is there a single Afrikaner worthy of the name, who is not prepared to make great personal sacrifices to secure the future of his children and his volk? A white South Africa can only arise by now making certain sacrifices and implementing the principle of apartheid. [153]

The Apartheid ideal was contrary to the realities of capitalist industrialization. So it was suitably modified by the term "as far as possible" when it came to economic separation of the races. (See Chapter 6.2.6.) There was a real attempt on the part of the regime to stop the permanent urbanisation of Africans by extending the migrant labour system. Yet, the pragmatic implementation of Apartheid involved far more than "volk-protective" interests, for it directly served Afrikaner capital accumulation in farming, and in all other sectors of the economy. Therefore, the objective social function of Apartheid has been to ruthlessly suppress the rights of the African labour force (and its political leadership) and to bring it under State control.

Non-Afrikaner monopoly capital has greatly benefitted from the policy of Apartheid. However, this policy was not directly chosen by it, and has been regarded by some elements of domestic and foreign monopoly capital as a short-sighted and dangerous policy which threatens the stability of the capitalist system in the long-run.

We may, therefore, conclude that in respect to its relationship to the working class and monopoly capital, Afrikaner fascism bears a strong likeness to Nazism. However, whereas Nazism sacrificed the material interests of the majority of its petty bourgeois supporters, Afrikaner fascism has benefitted its white wage earning supporters and small property owners in agriculture, trade and commerce. This difference is due to the multi-national setting, and the function the bulk of the Afrikaner volk play in the State bureaucracy. (See Chapter 6.4.)

6.4. The Political Form of the Fascist Regime

Fascist regimes are generally associated with totalitarianism and dictatorship. Yet, it has been shown that in Mussolini's Italy, totalitarian control over society was more apparent than real.

> Several independent centres of power survived, which did not depend on the will of the dictator or on the fascist movement, notably the king and the army, the Church and big business.... The contrast between the appearance and reality of fascist institutions was striking. The most remarkable example is that of the corporations. Held up as fascism's most imposing creation, they in fact performed no serious function, except, during the period of autarchy, that of serving as a front for the control of raw material allocations and investment decisions by groups of leading industrialists.[154]

Hitler's personal power was far greater than that of Mussolini. [155] However, in Nazi Germany big business, the army and parts of the bureaucracy retained their power. In both cases, the fascist party was subordinated to the State and high party officials attained political importance by the "usurpation of public office and functions of state." [156]

In its first term of office the Nationalist Party began replacing top officials in the State bureaucracy and the army with reliable Afrikaner Nationalists. Today, Nationalists occupy all the leading positions in the State apparatuses. While they control the army, police, public media, the Christian-Nationalist educational system, [157] and the State sector of the economy, [158] the English-speaking big bourgeoisie retains its economic and social autonomy. But, fascist regimes in power have always been "in alliance" with the traditional ruling class. Hence this form of power sharing is typically fascist.

The fascist regime in South Africa has maintained democracy for the whites and the Nationalist Party is obliged to compete with other parties in elections. This factor has frequently been pointed to in order to disprove the fascist analogy. However, as Linz has argued,

> the leadership principle - Führerprinzip - was not always there initially, but soon became characteristic and a source of many difficulties in the growth and development of the movement. It was congruent with many elements in the ideology, organization, and initial social basis, but we would argue that it was not essential. [159]

Mosse has pointed out that the leadership principles in fascism is derived from the idea of community. [160] In this "community of affinity" the leader interprets the volk's will. This leadership principle is also held by Afrikaner fascism.

The Afrikaners represent 60 per cent of the white voters, and since roughly 50 per cent of all economically active Afrikaners were employed by the public sector (in 1976), [161] Afrikaner Nationalist power has been rather secure, as demonstrated by 32 years of unbroken rule. This means that the regime depends on the active identification of the volk with "its" government. In order to protect their power, the leaders of

the volksgemeenskap must indoctrinate the members to carry out their "ethnic calling". Desertion from the volk is regarded as "high treason". All other peoples in South Africa are expected to passively accept the dictatorship of Afrikanerdom and its Apartheid policy. To challenge it is regarded as treason.[162]

Surely, the significance of fascist "dictatorship" is that it robs the masses of any effective voice in government and in production. In South Africa, where 80 per cent of the population lives without political representation under the heal of a regime which controls where each individual may live and work, we certainly are faced by a fascist dictatorship.

The democracy of the whites certainly is a "special feature" in Afrikaner fascism and its particular effect on the functioning of society requires closer analysis. However, this feature alone is insufficient to differentiate it from classical fascism. In reality the Afrikaner Nationalist dictatorship seems to have had a more total grip on society than that of Mussolini's.

6.5. Conclusion: Christian-Nationalism is Fascism

In this chapter we have attempted to draw an analogy between Afrikaner fascism and the classical European fascisms. Analogy presupposes differences, otherwise it would mean identity. Hence, the question we tried to answer was whether the differences between these phenomena outweighed the similarities in regard to essential factors. On the basis of our comparison of social basis, ideology, function and form, we reach the conclusion that Christian-Nationalism's similarities to classical fascism outweigh its differences.

SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

This study had a dual objective: firstly to adequately explain the phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism; and secondly, to examine whether this phenomenon fell under the categories provided by a general theory of fascism.

The first objective entailed exploring three analytically separate dimensions of Afrikaner fascism: A genetic one, a functional one, and a phenomenological one. As the title of this study indicates, the primary goal was to explain the "social origins of Afrikaner fascism and its Apartheid policy," i.e., the genetic dimension. The general point of departure in this investigation is contained in the following quotation which is premised on Marxist principles (outlined in Chapter 1.1):

> All nationalisms work through a characteristic repertoire of social and personal mechanisms, many of them highly subjective. But the causation of the drama is not within the bosom of the Volk: this way lie the myths of blood and Geist....The real origins are elsewhere. They are located not in the folk, nor in the individual's repressed passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the machinery of world political economy. [1]

Chapter 3 gives a sketch of the formation of a capitalist society in South Africa. Briefly, South Africa became incorporated into the world capitalist system in the late nineteenth century. In this period, British imperialism was on the rise and British financial capital was seeking new investments abroad. The discovery of diamonds and gold in the Boer Republics in the interior of "South Africa" provided a lucrative opportunity for British investors. The resulting "mining revolution" laid the basis for a new capitalist society in South Africa and led the British to forcibly bring the Boer Republics under their control.

In the first part of Chapter 3, we analysed the mechanism of "forced primary accumulation," showing how the migrant labour system was instituted to supply cheap African labour to the gold mines. Briefly, migrant labour meant that the unskilled African mine worker retained a plot of land in areas reserved solely for African occupation. These

Reserves were too small to house and feed the growing African population; consequently, African males were driven by economic necessity to sell their labour power to the mines. The main advantage of migrant labour to the mine owners lay in its cheapness. For the African wage rate set by the central employers' organization took into account the income earned by the worker and his family from peasant production, i.e., mine wages received a subsidy from the Reserves.

In the second part of Chapter 3 we analysed the formation of class relations in the dominant capitalist industry, the gold mines. It was found that the production relations in the mines were, in essence, the exploitation of a large body of unskilled African workers by monopoly capital, assisted by a squad of white wage earning supervisors. The latter group, commonly referred to as the "white working class," was not, objectively speaking, a part of the working class, but a middle stratum, because its primary function in production was to oversee African labour on behalf of monopoly capital.

Finally, we pointed out that the class relations established in the mining industry became the model for other industries, and laid the basis for the political system instituted by the British in 1910, when it granted the Union of South Africa independence. Union essentially meant an alliance between British mining capital and Boer agriculture to exploit African labour. The white male population was enfranchised, but the African workmen were denied political representation in the new State.

In Chapter 4 we explored the socio-economic structure and its change, in the 1933 to 1948 period, in order to uncover the economically determined class contradictions which were created in the course of this phase of rapid industrialization. The inner-mechanism of the peripheral South African economy was revealed in the pre-war, war-time and post-war periods of development, and each major productive sector of the economy was analysed.

The most significant finding of this research was that secondary industrialization was causing a severe dislocation in the traditional African labour supply system. The pressures of war production had led to

a substantial increase in the wage rate of Africans employed in manufacturing, construction, transport and services. Neither the mines nor the farms were willing to compete for labour on the basis of these higher wage rates, and both suffered from an acute labour shortage in the 1940's, i.e. labour was in short supply at the price they were prepared to pay. The gold mines actually lost 17% of their African labour force during this period and production and profits declined sharply. White farm production, which had historically depended on cheap African labour, had expanded significantly in the 1940's and, hence, farmers resented the loss of their captive labour supply to the towns. Both sectors called vociferously on the government to halt the operation of the competitive market for African labour, advocating State intervention to guarantee them an adequate supply of cheap African labour.

Other topics discussed in this chapter include: the importance of the export sector to the growth of the economy as a whole; the rapid rate of African urbanization accompanying the process of industrialization; the class and ethnic structure of white society; the Afrikaner "poor white" problem; and the status of the skilled white stratum of workers. These different aspects of society were highlighted in order to provide a solid background to the politico - ideological struggle waged during the period.

In Chapter 5 we analysed the specific features of the class struggle which characterised the political crisis of Afrikaner fascism. In the first part we sketched the trade union and political struggle of the Africans in the 1940's. We showed the inability of the United Party to meet the minimum demands of the African workers and intelligentsia in the post-war years. Its loss of hegemony over the African masses, and its political fumbling opened the gates for a fascist takeover.

In the second part we traced the formation and organization of the "Purified" Nationalist Party in the wake of the Great Depression. We described the crucial role played by the Afrikaner Broederbond and, in particular, the role of the academics in reformulating the political program of the Party along totalitarian nationalist lines in the 1930's.

In the mid-1940's the fascist Nationalist Party seized the opportunity for making political capital out of the "racial crisis" caused by the rapid industrialization. As mentioned, the power bloc was divided over the crucial issue of African labour supplies, while the political mobilization and trade uionization of the African workers represented a threat to elements of the white wage earners and to the capitalist class as a whole. All parties wished to see the African labour and political movement brought under State control, and the Nationalists' Apartheid policy promised to ruthlessly carry out this task. In 1948, the Nationalist Party received a mandate to implement this policy from the Afrikaner farmers and wage earners.

The analysis presented in Chapters 3,4, and 5 was intended to fulfil the first objective of this thesis. A summary of my explanation of the social origins of Afrikaner fascism and its Apartheid policy is found at the end of Chapter 5.

The second objective of this study was to determine whether the Afrikaner Nationalist phenomenon is a fascist one. In Chapter 1.2 we presented a preliminary definition of fascism and emphasized the "relative autonomy" of the fascist regime from the traditional ruling class. In Chapter 2 we summarized and criticized earlier attempts to compare Afrikaner fascism to National Socialism. Finally, in Chapter 6 we made a comparison between the class basis, ideology, social function and political form of Afrikaner and European fascism. We found that the former closely corresponded to the latter in all four respects. The most significant qualitative difference between the two fascisms resides in their national settings. Afrikaner fascism takes place in a multi-national/racial society, while European fascism occurred in "homogeneous" nation states.

.....

In conclusion, we will briefly examine the current crisis of Apartheid. For the past 32 years the power bloc, under the leadership of the Nationalist Party, has been united by the success of Apartheid on the labour front, i.e., its ability to maintain "peaceful labour relations." The policy of ruthlessly suppressing the Black (Africans,

Coloureds and Indians) workers' social and political rights has paid handsome dividends to the monopoly capitalist ruling class, whether it be "English, "Afrikaner" or "Jewish" national capital; or British, United States, West German, Japanese or Swedish international capital. Today these "ethnic" capitals are highly interlinked in their exploitative operations in Southern Africa. The precise nature of the historical relationship between the fascist regime and big business is a subject which requires closer study.

Three decades of industrialization under fascist rule has not removed the inherent contradictions of capitalism. Rather, the pursuit of Apartheid, with its emphasis on the primacy of the racial/national unit in society, has had profoundly negative effects in respect to monopoly capital's long-term interests. For it has relentlessly driven the "white" capitalist class onto a collision course with a proletariat which is simultaneously an oppressed national majority in South Africa.

The 1970's was a decade of momentous change in the whole of Southern Africa. The regional balance of power shifted dramatically against the fascist regime with the victories of the national liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In Namibia, South Africa's "fifth province," the seventies were marked by a wave of strikes and the intensification of the armed struggle under SWAPO. In South Africa this was a period of mounting Black working class struggle, culminating in the 1976 Soweto students and workers uprising, and the launching of an urban guerilla campaign under the leadership of the African National Congress.

These regional and domestic struggles have considerably altered the prospects of fascist rule in the coming years. For they may threaten not only the racist Apartheid system, but also the underlying capitalist economic stucture. Hence, the need for urgent reform, the character of which, from the point of view of the ruling classes, has been described by Genovese as follows:

> /s/ince the great object of social reform is to prevent a fundamental change in class relations, sensible reformers must fight on two fronts within the ruling class. They must fight against those reactionaries who cannot understand the need for secondary, although not necessarily trivial, change in order to prevent deeper change; and they must fight against cheerful fools who think that change is intrinsically wonderful and therefore cannot distinguish between the safe and the dangerous. [2]

In South African ruling class circles today, "change" has become the operative word. Within the fascist regime itself, the conflict between reformers and reactionaries has produced a serious schism. At the moment the reformers, led by Prime Minister Botha, have the upper hand in the Nationalist Party, and in close alliance with big business are designing a reformist strategy.

The reforms essentially involve a partial turn to liberalism. Emphasis is placed on individual, rather than racial, rights and on the virtues of free market competition. The ruling class hopes that it can win over the upper-third of the African population by granting it privileges based on merit, i.e., by giving it a stake in the capitalist system. In two recent commissions, Wiehahn and Riekert, new strategies were outlined for demobilizing resurgent African working class struggle. Basically, they hope to divide and weaken the African working class by separating the urban dwellers from the contract (migrant) and rural workers. The former would be granted permanent rights in the urban areas and forced to join State controlled trade unions. The latter would be permanently prevented from acquiring trade union and urban residential rights.

An interesting dimension of the reformers fight against the reactionaries is to be found on the ideological level. The familiar figures of Diederichs, Cronje and Meyer come in for a barrage of criticism from the reformers, on the grounds that their racist, [3] "idealistic and utopian ideologies" of the 1940's, led Afrikanerdom into its current impassé. [4]

As the struggle between reformism and revolution proceeds apace in South Africa, there is a need for in-depth studies of the total social system, similar to the one undertaken here in connection with the 1940's crisis. By uncovering the configuration of class forces behind the "liberal" mask today, one can expose the inherent limitations of "secondary change" (Genovese), and identify the need for and possibilty of fundamental change, as a means of ensuring that all the oppressed masses achieve "a place in the sun."

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. K.C. Lammers -- "Oversigt over fascisme-teorier," Historievidenskab, No's.3-4 (1975), p. 39 -- notes that this essential theoretical distinction between the three dimensions of fascism was made by M. Clemenz, Gesellschaftliche Ursprünge des Faschismus, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972).

CHAPTER 1

1. Mao Tse Tung, On Practice (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 17-18.
2. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1972), p. 24.
3. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 14.
4. Mao, p. 16.
5. K. Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 100-1.
6. Althusser, p. 156.
7. J.P. Sartre, Search for a Method (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p.26.
8. Althusser, p. 8.
9. N. Geras, "Althusser's Marxism: An Account and Assessment," New Left Review, No. 72 (1972), pp. 80-86; and Mandel, pp. 18-19.
10. E.H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 18.
11. A. Schaff, History and Truth (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 191.
12. Schaff, pp. 187-8.
13. Schaff, p. 257.
14. Schaff, pp. 140, 160-2.
15. Schaff, p. 257.
16. L. Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond (London: Palladin, 1971), p. 81.
17. M. Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973), p. 19.
18. M. Nicolaus, "Foreword," in K. Marx, Grundrisse, references appear in the text.
19. P. Vilar, "Marxist History, a History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser, New Left Review, No. 80 (1973), p. 76.
20. Dobb, Theories of Value, p. 34.
21. M. Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 96-97.
22. Dobb, Political Economy, p. 109.
23. M. Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959), p. 23.
24. Bunge, pp. 25-26.
25. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 5-6.
26. The various fascism theories can be classified under the following headings: Totalitarian, Middle-Class, Phenomenological, Psychological, Critical Theory, Industrialization and Marxist theories.
27. R. Kühnl --"Problems of a Theory of International Fascism," International Journal of Politics, II, No. 4 (1972-3), pp. 49-50 -- lists 17 questions to which a theory of fascism should provide answers.
28. Lammers, p. 39.

29. N. Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship (London: New Left Books, 1974), pp. 71-88, 331-335: Hereafter all notes labelled solely "Poulantzas" refer to this book.
30. Poulantzas, p. 17.
31. P. Togliatti, Lectures on Fascism (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 2.
32. G. Dimitrov -- For Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism (n.p.: Sofia Press, 1969), pp. 90-91 -- pointed out in 1935 that, " in the colonial and semi-colonial countries also ... certain fascist groups are developing, but of course there can be no question of the kind of fascism that we are accustomed to see in Germany, Italy or other capitalist countries. Here we must study and take into account the quite special economic, political and historical conditions, in accordance with which fascism is assuming and will continue to assume peculiar forms of its own."
33. Poulantzas, p. 357.
34. F. Engels, "Letters to Conrad Schmidt," in Marx and Engels, ed. L.S. Feuer (London: Fontana Library, 1971), pp. 441-2.
35. R. Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977) p. 83.
36. N. Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau, New Left Review, No. 95 (1976), p. 72.
37. E. Hobsbawm, "Gramsci and Political Theory," Marxism Today, July 1977, p. 207.
38. Hobsbawm, p. 209.
39. Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State," p. 209.
40. Dimitrov, p. 8.
41. Poulantzas, p. 250.
42. T. W. Mason, "The Primacy of Politics in National Socialist Germany," in The Nature of Fascism, ed. S.J. Woolf (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 165-195.
43. J. Caplin -- Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian," History Workshop, No. 3 (1977), p. 100 n. 30 -- comments that, "the term 'primacy of politics' may perhaps be slightly misleading, in that it implies a primacy 'over' the economic sphere, as in a hierarchy. For this reason the concept of 'autonomy' seems preferable, with its clear connotation of detachment rather than paramountcy."
44. T.W. Mason, "National Socialism and the Working Class, 1925 - May, 1933," New German Critique, No. 11 (1977) p. 78 n. 62.
45. Caplin, pp. 95-6.
46. E. Altvater, Problem der Empirischen Analyse der Akkumulationszyklen in Westdeutschland (Berlin: manuscript, 1972), pp. 33-40.
47. I. Thiersen, "Fascismens grundlag," Historievidenskab, pp. 90-105.
48. U. Østergård, "Økonomi og politik i den tyske fascisme," Historievidenskab, pp. 159-60.
49. Poulantzas, p. 37.
50. Poulantzas, pp. 62-3.
51. J.B. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Fascism: A Readers Guide, ed. W. Laqueur (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 25.

CHAPTER 2

1. S. Marks, "South African Studies since World War Two," in African Studies since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson, ed. C. Fyfe (London: Longman Group, 1976), p. 188.

2. B. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964); all references are to the 1969 rev. ed.
3. W. H. Vatcher, White Laager: The Rise fo Afrikaner Nationalism (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 68.
4. A. Hepple, Verwoerd (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967).
5. T. Dunbar Moodie -- The Rise of Afrikanerdom (London: Univ. of California Press, 1975) -- approaches the subject of Afrikaner Nationalism in a similar way to that of G.L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New York, Howard Fertig, 1975).
6. T. Dunbar Moodie, "The Rise of Afrikanerdom as an Immanent Critique of Marxist Theory of Class Revolution," paper presented at the 9th World Congress of Sociology (Uppsala: 1978), pp. 7, 11.
7. D. O'Meara, "Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism: 1934-1948," Diss. Sussex 1979.
8. W. A. de Klerk, The Puritans in Africa: A Story of Afrikanerdom (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975).
9. R. Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967).
10. F.A. Johnstone, Class, Race, and Gold (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 203-218.
11. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa," Economy and Society, 1, No. 4 (1972).
12. M. Legassick, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence," Economy and Society, 3, No. 3 (1974), p. 274.
13. M. Legassick and H. Wolpe, "The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy, No. 7 (1976), p. 103.
14. R. Davies et.al., "Class Struggle and the Periodization of the State in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy, No. 7 (1976), p. 27.
15. Legassick and Wolpe, p. 102.
16. P.L. van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967); and H. Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1971).
17. F. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 244.
18. Neumann, pp. 244-5.
19. Neumann, p. 251.
20. O.C. Cox, Caste, Class and Race (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 520.
21. F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 550.

CHAPTER 3

1. The term "social formation" implies a concrete structure, a society within which a particular mode of production dominates over subordinate modes. A "mode of production" is the "ideal average", a pure and abstract economic model. Hence a society cannot be reduced to a mode of production.
2. Balibar -- Reading Capital, pp. 279-80 -- comments that, "the analysis of primitive accumulation is therefore, strictly speaking, merely 'The geneology of the elements which constitute the structure of the capitalist mode of production...the transition is thought at the level of elements'."

3. K. Marx, Capital (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), I, p. 668.
4. Marx, Capital, I, p. 668.
5. Marx, Capital, I, p. 689.
6. Marx, Capital, I, p. 700.
7. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970).
8. Marx -- Capital, I, p. 716 -- points out that, "it is otherwise in the colonies. There the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them."
9. Marx, Capital, I, p. 724.
10. S. Amin, "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model," Review of African Political Economy, No. 1 (n.d.), pp. 9-26.
11. Amin, p. 13.
12. Amin, p. 15. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.1.5.1.
13. G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: Methuen, 1963), p. 58.
14. C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), p. 67.
15. de Kiewiet, p. 13.
16. de Kiewiet, p. 48.
17. de Kiewiet, p. 75.
18. Moodie, pp. 4-5,
19. F. Engels -- "Letter to K Marx," Dec. 22, 1882, in K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), p. 148 -- commented that, "it is certain that serfdom and bondage are not peculiarly medieval-feudal forms, we find them everywhere or nearly everywhere where conquerors have the land cultivated for them by the old inhabitants." E. Hobsbawm, in the "Introduction" to this book, p. 63, mentions "the possibility of the temporary feudalisation of tribal societies interacting with more developed ones."
20. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, pp. 11-12.
21. D. Hobart Houghton -- "Economic Development, 1865-1965," in the Oxford History of South Africa, eds. M. Wilson and L. Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), II, p. 2 -- mentions that, "in the 1860's, the vast majority of the white population was engaged in farming which was largely self-subsistence. The African tribesmen were stock-farmers and hunters; and sorghum and maize were grown under hoe cultivation. Their efforts were, however, even less market-oriented than those of the whites...;" p. 4 -- describes the leading Cape Colony in the 1860's as "too poor to advance rapidly by domestic capital formation;" p. 20 -- that by the end of the 1860's there were only 68 miles of railways in the country.
22. de Kiewiet, p. 49.
23. de Kiewiet, p. 109. In 1884 the German imperialists annexed South West Africa thereby threatening the British Southern Africa monopoly.
24. L. Thompson, "The Subjection of the African Chiefdoms: 1870-98," in Oxford History, II, pp. 247-48, 245.
25. Thompson, p. 250.
26. Houghton, p. 19.
27. Marx -- Capital, I, p. 703 -- - comments that, "force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power."

28. R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), p. 363.
29. The costs and benefits of migrant labour were analysed by H. Pim, "Some Aspects of the South African Native Problem," South African Journal of Science, No. 4 (1905), cited in M. Legassick and D. Innes, "Capital Restructuring and Apartheid," African Affairs, 76, No. 305 (1977), pp. 465-6.
30. S. Amin -- "Underdevelopment and Dependency in Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, No. 4 (1972) p. 519 -- remarks that, "in the region which I have called 'Africa of the labour reserves' capital at the centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available.... In order to obtain this proletariat quickly, the colonizers dispossessed the African rural communities - sometimes by violence and drove them deliberately back into small, poor regions, with no means of modernising and intensifying their farming. They forced the 'traditional' societies to be the supplier of temporary or permanent migrants on a vast scale, thus providing a cheap proletariat for the European mines and farms, and later for the manufacturing industries of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Kenya. Henceforth we can no longer speak of traditional society in this part of the continent, since the labour reserves had the function of supplying a migrant proletariat, a function which had nothing to do with 'tradition'. The African social systems of this region, distorted and impoverished, lost even the semblance of autonomy: the unhappy Africa of 'apartheid' and the Bantustans was born, and was to supply the greatest return to central capital."
31. de Kiewiet, p. 107, and Luxemburg, p. 412.
32. Lord Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour (London: Hogarth Press, 1929), pp. 266-7.
33. J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects (London: James Nisbet, 1900), p. 231.
34. Cited in Olivier, pp. 147-8.
35. Horwitz, p. 26.
36. Horwitz, p. 48.
37. Horwitz -- p. 175 -- comments that, "African mine-workers patently showed no lack of money-consciousness in relation to the operation of piece-work earnings."
38. Horwitz, pp. 433-4 n. 11.
39. Horwitz, p. 215.
40. E.S. Sachs -- The Anatomy of Apartheid (London: Collets, 1965), p. 25 -- argues that, "Union, in effect, meant the unification of the British mine-owners and Afrikaner farmers, to exploit the Africans."
41. Olivier, pp. 157-8.
42. Marx, Capital, I, p. 541.
43. Marx -- Capital, III, p. 807 -- points out that, "proprietorship of land parcels by its very nature excludes the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle-raising, and the progressive application of science...Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production - an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels."
44. Horwitz, p. 135.
45. de Kiewiet, p. 197.
46. M. Wilson, "The Growth of Peasant Communities," in Oxford History, II, p. 56.
47. Wilson, p. 65.

48. S. H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), pp. 119-20.
49. Marx, Pre-Capitalist Formations, p. 115.
50. Cited in Horwitz, p. 342.
51. Marx, Capital, I, pp. 167-8.
52. Horwitz -- p. 172 -- notes that, "the Chamber of Mines viewpoint from the earliest days /was/ that the Africans' demand for money income /was/ inelastic."
53. Horwitz -- p. 336 -- outlines the additional costs involved in the establishment of an urban-based proletariat.
54. Cited in Horwitz, p. 341.
55. M. Read, "Migrant Labour in Africa," International Labour Review, June 1942, p. 608.
56. Wilson, pp. 66-7, and Horwitz, p. 342.
57. F. Engels, The Housing Question (Moscow: Progress Press, 1970), p. 13.
58. J.A. Noon, Labour Problems in Africa (n.p.: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1944), pp. 32-38.
59. A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," in The Economics of Underdevelopment, ed. S. Agarwala (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 409-10. "The fact that the wage level in the capitalist sector /of the peripheral economy/ depends upon earnings in the subsistence sector is sometimes of immense political importance, since its effect is that capitalists have a direct interest in holding down the productivity of the subsistence workers....This is one of the worst features of imperialism, for instance. The Imperialists invest capital and hire workers; it is to their advantage to keep wages low, and even in those cases where they do not actually go out of their way to impoverish the subsistence economy, they will at least very seldom be found doing anything to make it more productive. In actual fact the record of every imperial power in Africa in modern times is one of impoverishing the subsistence economy, either by taking away the people's land, or by demanding forced labour in the capitalist sector, or by imposing taxes to drive people to work for capitalist employers. Compared with what they have spent on providing facilities for European agriculture of mining, their expenditure on the improvement of African agriculture has been negligible. The failure of imperialism to raise living standards is not wholly to be attributed to self interest, but there are many places where it can be traced directly to the effects of having imperial capital invested in agriculture or in mining."
60. Marx, Capital, III, pp. 791-2.
61. V. I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning - 1919," Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 421.
62. N. Poulantzas, "Marxism and Social Classes," New Left Review, No. 78 (1973), pp. 27-28.
63. Marx, Capital, I, pp. 313-4.
64. Poulantzas, "Social Classes," p. 35.
65. Poulantzas, "Social Classes," pp. 37-39.
66. G. Therborn, Det svenska klassamhället 1930-1970, (n.p.: Zenit, 1973), pp. 27-28.
67. Poulantzas, "Social Classes," pp. 35-37.
68. Cited in Horwitz, pp. 179-80.
69. de Kiewiet, p. 212.

70. Hobson, p. 294. "We must look forward to a continuance of the present absolute social cleavage between blacks and whites, and to the maintenance of existing divisions of economic functions. Manual work has become a badge of shame for white men, because it puts them on a level with the Kaffir (African): wherever working conditions are such that white must co-operate with black, the former is soon seen to have shifted what is arduous, monotonous, or disagreeable on to the back of the latter, and to have made a 'servant' of him. Some skilled manual labour in mining, building, or manufacturing trades is done by whites, but all told it amounts to very little, and most of it which lies outside the range of Zulus, Fingoes, and other more educable Kaffirs, is shifted on to Cape boys and other 'coloured' or half-breed men." (p. 293).
71. H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 277-8.
72. Simons -- pp. 276-7 -- argues that, "a closer analysis might have persuaded /the white communists/ that /the white worker's interests/ and those of the African /worker/ were incompatible, or contradictory in the Marxist sense. The social basis of class consciousness was smaller in the white workers than the communists supposed. White miners were both contractors and wage earners, exploiters as well as exploited."
73. The objective class position of the "white working class" has been examined in my, "The Myth of the White Working Class in South Africa," The African Review, 4, No. 2 (1974); R. Davies, "The White Working Class in South Africa, New Left Review, No. 82 (1973); H. Wolpe, "The 'White Working Class' in South Africa," Economy and Society, 5, No. 2 (1976).
74. Horwitz, p. 182, The white miners strike in 1922 was a direct consequence of the Chamber of Mines attempt to modify the "Status Quo Agreement" on the ratio of black to white miners.
75. Johnstone, p. 81.
76. Simons, p. 173.
77. Simons, p. 317.
78. Marx, Capital, III, p. 883.
79. Horwitz -- p. 214 -- reports that, "the Rand /gold mines/ absorbed some £200,000,000 of capital until the end of 1932...The total value of gold output for the same period, 1887 to 1932, was £1,145,000,000 with a total divided payment for the period of £225,000,000."
80. Marx, Capital, I, pp. 167-8.
81. F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), p. 157.
82. Wilson, Gold Mines, p. 46.
83. Wilson, Gold Mines, p. 45.
84. Horwitz, pp. 26-7.
85. Olivier, pp. 54-5.
86. Olivier, p. 56.
87. de Kiewiet, p. 212.
88. The Boer Rupublics had never permitted racial equality in the State or Church.
89. Wilson, Gold Mines, p. 13.
90. Report of the Economic and Wage Commission, U. G. No. 14- 1926, p. 85.

CHAPTER 4

1. Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission, U. G. No. 62- 1951, par. 147.
2. L. Katzen, Gold and the South African Economy (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1964), p. 80.
3. The notion that it is possible to estimate what each sector "contributes" to the national income is artificial and serves merely as an indicator. For the value figure represents what each sector "receives" from,rather than "contributes" to, the co-operatively produced incomes, since values are socially determined and not identical to prices.
4. S.H. Frankel, "An Analysis of the Growth of the National Income of the Union in the Period of Prosperity Before the War," South African Journal of Economics, 12, No. 2 (1944). All further references to this text appear in the text. Hereafter cited as SAJE.
5. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, p. 106.
6. Union Statistics for Fifty Years, Jubilee Issue: 1910-1960 (Pretoria: Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1960), p. K-3.
7. Horwitz, p. 241.
8. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 177, and Horwitz, pp. 349-50.
9. J. Hofmeyer, House of Assembly Debates, 28 Feb., 1940, col. 2406; hereafter cited as HAD.
10. Fifty Years Statistics, p. R-3.
11. Fifty Years Statistics, p. Q-8.
12. Fifty Years Statistics, pp. H-15, H-23.
13. Fifty Years Statistics, p. H-15.
14. S.H. Frankel, "Expenditure in Relation to National Income," SAJE, 15, No. 4 (1947), p. 228 tab. 1.
15. C.S. Richards, "Economic Incentives in the Post War World," SAJE 13, No. 3 (1945), p. 158.
16. Frankel, "Expenditure," p. 228 tab. 1.
17. Fifty Years Statistics, pp. H-23, N-4, N-5.
18. J.M. Tinley, South African Food and Agriculture in World War II, (California: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 101-2.
19. Horwitz, p. 359.
20. Katzen, p. 92 tab. 35.
21. Fifty Years Statistics, p. S-3.
22. Board of Trade and Industries, Investigation into the Manufacturing Industries, Report No. 282 (1945), par. 329.
23. Horwitz, P. 245.
24. D.E. Kaplan, "The Politics of Industrial Protection in South Africa, 1910-1939," Journal of Southern African Studies, 3, No. 1 (1976), p. 87.
25. Horwitz, p. 252.
26. Third Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, U.G. No. 40 -1941, p. 86.
27. Horwitz, p. 320.
28. Fifty Years Statistics, p. G-9.
29. M. Merhav, Technological Dependence, Monopoly and Growth (London: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 59.
30. R.H. Smith, "The size of the South African Industrial Unit," SAJE, 13, No. 4 (1945), pp. 301-2.
31. Fifty Years Statistics, p. R-17.

32. R.L. Threlfell, "Some Comments on Secondary Industry in South Africa," SAJE, 14, No. 4 (1946), pp. 392-5.
33. Board of Trade and Industries, Investigation into the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industries in the Union of South Africa, Report No. 286 (1946), p. 12, par. 75 and Annexure B.
34. Fifty Years Statistics, p. L-4.
35. Board of Trade and Industries, Iron, Steel ... Industries, pars. 335-6.
36. J.A. Hobson, Modern Capitalism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926), p. 267.
37. Wilson, Gold Mines, p. 15; hereafter all references to "Wilson" refer to this book.
38. Johnstone, pp. 93-4.
39. Wilson, pp. 157-8.
40. Wilson -- p. 41 -- notes that, "the difference between the revenue and the working costs of a mine is its profit, some of which is retained and ploughed back into future development. The rest is declared as 'working profits' and goes either to the government in the form of taxation or to shareholders, as dividends."
41. Fifty Years Statistics, p. K-3.
42. Fifty Years Statistics, p. S-3.
43. Horwitz, pp. 236-7; Wilson, pp. 157-60; Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Monthly Progressive Statement of Gold Production in the Transvaal, 1941-47.
44. Wilson, p. 159.
45. Statement of Gold Production.
46. Wilson -- p. 43 -- analyses the results of his regression analysis as follows: "The factors influencing the output...of the mines were also assessed. It was found that in 1936 81%, and in 1966 76%, of the variation of output could be attributed primarily to the difference in the numbers of Africans employed from mine to mine."
47. Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Proceedings at the Special Meeting, Johannesburg, October 25, 1946.
48. Wilson, p. 160.
49. Transvaal Chamber of Mines, "President's Address," Annual Report, 1943, p. 53.
50. Transvaal Chamber of Mines, "President's Address," Annual Report, 1947, pp. 62-3.
51. Katzen, p. 19.
52. The effect of the war on gold mining needs to be mentioned. There appears to have been a period, between January 1943 and August 1944, in which the United States was applying pressure on South Africa to reduce the scale of its gold mining operations and refusing to supply mining equipment. The U.S. government wanted South African resources to be applied to war needs instead, and in particular, to the production of more coal for export. The effect of the U.S. pressure on gold production is difficult to determine, it probably contributed to the decline in production in the last years of the war. See Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. III-British Commonwealth, (1943), pp. 173-202; (1944), pp. 258-69.
53. Fifty Years Statistics, p. 1-2.
54. Horwitz, p. 164.
55. Industrial and Agricultural Commission, p. 26.
56. Social and Economic Planning Council, The Future of Farming in South Africa, Report No. 4 (1945), p. 7.
57. Fifty Years Statistics, p. S-3.
58. The Future of Farming, p. 5.
59. Tinley, p. 16.

60. Horwitz, p. 380.
61. Fifty Years Statistics, p. S-3.
62. Horwitz, p. 277.
63. The Future of Farming, p. 8.
64. Native Laws Commission -- U.G. No. 28- 1948, Annex. 6:X, (2) -- noted that "Natives must be prevented from flooding one or other European area; and dislocation of the country's economic organization, based as it is largely on Native unskilled labour, must be avoided by means of control...Thus, agriculture would be seriously disorganized by the flocking of farm labourers to towns and the pass system is used to prevent this."
65. Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission, U.G. No. 21- 1944, par. 349.
66. Native Laws Comm., par. 12.
67. M. Morris, "The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture: Class Struggle in the Countryside, Economy and Society, 3, No. 4 (1976).
68. Morris, p. 28.
69. Cited in Morris, p. 33.
70. National Marketing Council's Report, (1938-46), p. 3o; (1946-7), p. 12.
71. Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of the Urban Natives -- U.G. (1942), par. 47 -- argued that, "the claim that the remuneration of the country dweller should be lower can only be sustained if it is considered equitable that industry should accept what would amount to a subsidy from the employee fortunate enough to possess private resources, a frankly untenable position."
72. Social and Economic Planning Council, The Place of the Native Reserves in the Economy, Report No. 9, U.G. (1944-46), p. 23.
73. Native Laws Comm., par. 21.
74. Native Reserves in the Economy, pp. 45, 80.
75. Mine Natives' Wage Comm., p. 19, par, 242-3.
76. Mine Natives' Wage Comm., par. 527.
77. Fifty Years Statistics, p. A-33.
78. Dobb, Political Economy, p. 121.
79. Marx, Capital, I, p. 598.
80. Dobb, Political Economy, p. 123.
81. Dobb, Political Economy, p. 125.
82. S. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1971), pp. 276-8.
83. van der Horst, p. 297.
84. "Despatch from High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom," 10 Dec., 1941, Despatch No. 12, South African Affairs, Despatches from His Majesty's High Commissioner -Lord Harlech, (1941-44), p. 82.
85. R. Horwitz, South Africa's Business (Cape Town: The African Bookman, 1946), p. 90.
86. Transvaal Chamber of Mines Gold Producers' Committee, Memorandum to the Prime Minister entitled, "Post War Position of the Gold Mining Industry," 18 Oct., 1944, in Smit Papers, 17/44, p. 8, cited in P. Rich, "The Allocation of Labour and the Evolution of Apartheid Ideology in South Africa, 1939-1960," Conference of Southern African Labour History, African Studies Inst., Univ. of the Witwatersrand, 8-10 April, 1976.
87. "Post War Position of the Gold Mining Industry", p. 8.
88. Transvaal CHamber of Mines, Tribal Natives and Trade Unionism, (1946), p. 8.
89. Morris, pp. 32-3.

90. Marx, Capital, I, pp. 599-60.
91. Native Laws Commission, pars. 4, 44.
92. Amin, "Accumulation and Development," p. 10.
93. Merhav, pp. 57-8.
94. Merhav, p. 58.
95. Merhav, pp. 59, 166.
96. C.S. Richards, "Some Thoughts on the Union's Economic Outlook," SAJE, 17, No. 2 (1949), p. 148.
97. Richards, "Economic, Outlook," p. 149.
98. Amin, "Accumulation and Development," p. 13.
99. Amin -- "Accumulation and Development," p. 14 -- notes that, "once the export sector has expanded to a certain size, an internal market makes its appearance. In comparison with the market emerging from the central process, this one is (relatively) biased in favour of the demand for 'luxury' goods."
100. Horwitz, p. 318 tab. 2.
101. Horwitz, p. 318 tab. 3.
102. Horwitz, p. 319 tab. 4.
103. Horwitz, p. 319 tab. 6.
104. Fifty Years Statistics, p. A-18.
105. R. Davies, "Capital, The State, and the White Wage Earners: An Historical Materialist Analysis of Class Formation and Class Relations in South Africa, 1900-1960," Diss. Sussex 1979, Appendix 1. This thesis has been subsequently published by (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979); however, all references are to the unpublished version.
106. Dönges, HAD, 15 April, 1941, cols. 6385-6.
107. L. Salomon, "The Economic Background to the Revival of Afrikaner Nationalism," in Boston University Papers in African History, I, ed. J. Butler, 1964, p. 235.
108. R.B. Ford, "The Urban Trek," in South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, ed. H. Adam (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 260-1.
109. J.F.W. Grosskopf, Joint Findings and Recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites, (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia, 1923), I, p. vii, par. 9.
110. Grosskopf, p. v, par. 46.
111. de Kiewiet, p. 182; van der Horst, p. 173.
112. Low Grade Mines Commission, U.G. No. 34 -1920, p. 28 par. 170.
113. de Kiewiet, pp. 221-2.
114. D. Welsh, "The Growth of Towns," in Oxford History, II, p. 184.
115. Circular No. 5, 31 October 1924; cited in van der Horst, p. 250.
116. van der Horst, pp. 252, 260; Kaplan, pp. 88-9.
117. Davies -- "Capital," pp. 181-7 -- analyses the transition from manufacture to machinofacture.
118. de Kiewiet, p. 223.
119. Davies, "Capital," p. 209.
120. E.J. Hobsbawn, Labouring Men (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 273; hereafter cited in the text.
121. Economic and Wage Comm., p. 30 par. 40.
122. Economic and Wage Comm., p. 34 par. 46.

CHAPTER 5

1. Poulantzas, p. 72.
2. Report of the Native Affairs Commission, U.G. No. 48 -1937, p. 6.
3. M. Horrell, South African Trade Unionism, (Johannesburg: Institute for Race Relations, 1961), p. 70.
4. D. O'Meara, "The 1946 African Mine Workers Strike and the Political Economy of South Africa," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XIII, No. 2 (1975), pp. 153, 159.
5. Board of Trade and Industries, Manufacturing Industries, p. 46.
6. E. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 167.
7. O'Meara, "African Mine Workers Strike," p. 154.
8. B. Hirson, "The Reorganization of African Trade Unions in the Transvaal, 1936-1942," London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Feb. 1976.
9. Union of South Africa and the War, U.G. -1946, p. 8.
10. Fifty Years Statistics, p. G-18.
11. O'Meara, "African Mine Workers Strike," p. 153.
12. O'Meara, "African Mine Workers Strike," p. 146.
13. In the following debates the lack of consensus on the question of recognition of African trade unions is expressed: HAD, May 1941, col. 7853; 1942, col. 5573; 1944, col. 52.
14. Cited in The Industrial Review, Dec. 1949, pp. 22-3.
15. Simons, pp. 559-60.
16. Horrell, p. 16.
17. H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (U.S.A.: World Publishing, 1972), p. 172.
18. Arendt, pp. 158-60.
19. R. Hilferding in P. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), Appendix B, p. 377.
20. J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, I (London: n.p. 1857), p. 390.
21. B. Kidd, The Control of the Tropics (New York: n.p. 1898), p. 34.
22. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: a Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 122.
23. Hobson, Imperialism, p. 243.
24. Debate on the Glen Gray Bill, Cape Hansard, 1894, par. 336.
25. J.C. Smuts, Plans for a Better World (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1942), pp. 57-63.
26. Smuts, p. 74.
27. Smuts, pp. 62-3.
28. Smuts, p. 67.
29. Smuts, p. 70.
30. Smuts, p. 54.
31. Smuts, pp. 76-7.
32. Smuts, pp. 78-9.
33. Lord Olivier, The Anatomy of African Misery (New York: Negro Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 70-1.
34. J.V. Stalin, The Foundation of Leninism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), pp. 5-6.
35. A. Paton, South African Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 132.
36. I.B. Tabata, The Awakening of a People (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1974)
37. O'Meara, "African Mine Workers Strike," p. 152.

38. P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912-1952 (London: C. Hurst, 1970), p. 350.
39. Congress Youth League, Basic Policy, p. 1, undated typescript, c. 1945 -- cited in Walshe, p. 352.
40. Walshe, p. 353.
41. Paton, p. 343.
42. Walshe, p. 284.
43. N.M. Stultz -- Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1974), pp. 114-6 -- discusses the importance of the Indian issue in the post-war years.
44. O'Meara, "African Mine Workers Strike", pp. 167-9.
45. G. Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 3-9.
46. A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 176.
47. J. Smuts, "The Basis of Trusteeship," South African Institute of Race Relations Bulletin, 1942, p. 10.
48. Smuts, "Trusteeship," p. 10.
49. Smuts, "Trusteeship," p. 14.
50. C.M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: Univ. of Natal Press, 1962), p. 126.
51. Lord Harlech--Despatches from His Majesty's High Commissioner, No's 12, 14 -- describes the "appalling" social conditions in the African locations in the early 1940's.
52. Paton, p. 313.
53. Davies, "Capital," pp. 283-4.
54. Gramsci, p. 276.
55. Gramsci, p. 210.
56. B. Hirson, "Rural Revolt in South Africa: 1937-1951," The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Univ. of London, May, 1976.
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58. Gramsci, p. 211.
59. D. O'Meara, "The Afrikaner Broederbond, 1927-1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism," Journal of Southern African Studies, III, No. 2 (1978); and "The Great Depression and the Transformation of Afrikaner Nationalism in South Africa," presented at the Univ. of Witwatersrand, History Dept. Seminar, 17 Aug., 1978.
60. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 24.
61. Here I am following the analysis of O'Meara, "Great Depression."
62. Here I am following the analysis of O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond."
63. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 2.
64. O'Meara, "Great Depression," p. 34.
65. Hepple, p. 27.
66. O'Meara, "Great Depression," pp. 16-7.
67. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 165; and Hepple, p. 71.
68. J.H.P. Serfontein, Brotherhood of Power (London: Rex Collings, 1979), pp. 40, 77.
69. From an internal Afrikaner Broederbond circular, c. 1934, cited in Vatcher, p. 79.
70. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 166.
71. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 174.
72. N. Diederichs, "Die Roepstem van die Ossewa," in Die Gedenkboek van die Ossewaens op die Pad and Suid-Afrika (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1940), pp. 54-7.

73. Mosse, p. 8. A little known fact is that the Voortrekker Monument was modelled on the Völkerschlactdenkmal at Liepzig. Such loans from German Volkish tradition indicate the close spiritual identification of Afrikaner cultural leaders with their German counterpart. The cultural-political imitation by Afrikanerdom of the Nazi "new politics," as described by Mosse, needs further investigation.
74. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, pp. 13, 10.
75. D. O'Meara, "Analysing Afrikaner Nationalism: The 'Christian National' Assault on White Trade Unionism in South Africa," African Affairs, 77, No. 306 (1978), p. 55.
76. O'Meara, "Afrikaner Broederbond," p. 177.
77. Lord Harlech -- Despatches, No. 2 (Oct., 1941) -- reports that, "the hope of the opposition /i.e.,Nationalists / is for a German military victory in Africa, or a Japanese cum Vichy control in the Indian Ocean, in which event they would act as an active fifth column in the Union. To prevent this General Smuts must retain in the Union military forces strong enough to crush any attempt at insurrection." He also noted that 90 per cent of the police and civil servants were pro-Nationalist.
78. Moodie, p. 193.
79. Poulantzas, p. 72.
80. Poulantzas, p. 71.
81. Native Laws Comm. (or Fagan Comm.), par. 65.
82. Native Laws Comm., par. 65.
83. Native Laws Comm., par. 61.
84. Native Laws Comm., par. 61.
85. Native Laws Comm., par. 63.
86. S. Siebert and A. Guelke, "The Control of Wages in South Africa," n.p., Oct., 1973, pp. 8-9.
87. Paton, p. 312.
88. Letter from Lord Swinton to His Majesty's Government, Despatches, 10 March, 1944, par. 11 "...after Smuts the political deluge. No one has a successor to Smuts, they assume fatalistically the mantle must fall on Hofmeyer. I.P. de Villiers said about Hofmeyer: 'The fatal thing about my brainy cousin is that he never had any of the three W's - a woman, a whisky or a wash.'"
89. Paton, pp. 344, 329, 325.
90. Lord Harlech, Despatches, 1 Feb., 1943, He quotes Smuts.
91. Selections from the Smuts Papers, VII, ed. J. van der Poel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), Letters No's. 740, 743.
92. E.D. Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 238.
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95. Davies, "Capital," pp. 287-8.
96. O'Meara, "Great Depression," p. 13.
97. Stultz, pp. 116-7.
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99. Moodie, pp. 232, 255.
100. D. O'Meara, "The 'Christian National' Assault on White Trade Unionism; " "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner Nationalism," South African Labour Bulletin, I, No. 10 (1975); R. Davies, "Capital," Chapter 7, "Afrikaner Nationalism and White Wage Earners 1934-1948," Simons, pp. 508-526, 562-8.
101. Davies, "Capital," p. 277.

102. Davies, "Capital," pp. 277-8.
103. Davies, "Capital," p. 286.
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105. Davies, "Capital," pp. 288-9.
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114. Bunting, p. 380.
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128. Bunting, pp. 152-7.
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59. Die Volksblad, 25 April, 1936; cited in Moodie, pp. 159-60.
60. Moodie, pp. 225-29.
61. Koers, "Calvinistiese Dinamiek," p. 95.
62. Die Stryd, p. 225.
63. Barrington Moore, p. 448.
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68. Moodie -- pp. 218-9 -- notes that, "the principles of economic and social action are areas in which the declaration comes closest to National Socialism."
69. Die Transvaler, 23 Jan., 1942. For Malan's reservations see Moodie, pp. 220-1.
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